Only sustained resistance, political clarity, and a credible counter-narrative can stop the junta from winning through lies.

Guest contributor

Igor Blazevic

Hard liberation struggles take time, and there are always ups and downs. During the up times, it feels like victory is within arm’s reach. During the down times, everything looks grim. No clear way forward. Suffering, hardship, loss — they feel endless and pointless.

But anyone who’s been through hard struggles, or studied the history of such struggles, knows the truth: these fights always take longer than they seem during the high points. Murderous, kleptocratic, exploitative regimes fight tooth and nail to survive. As Min Aung Hlaing himself said — there’s nothing they won’t do. That means no restraint and no mercy.

And yet, the same people who’ve lived through hard struggles and understand history also know: downturns, partial defeats, and retreats are part of the terrain. You go through them. You endure. You hold. You persist. As Churchill said: “If you’re going through hell, keep going.” The darkness always looks more final than it is. The next turn always comes — if we keep moving, even when we can’t yet see the path.

Myanmar’s Spring Revolution has achieved extraordinary things in four years. Not long ago, there were moments of real optimism — the tangible belief that the junta could be defeated and Myanmar liberated from military dictatorship. That progress was achieved through heroism, sacrifice, and endurance.

At this moment, things look less promising — for real reasons.

The biggest one: Myanmar’s neighbours have stopped sitting on the fence. They’ve chosen to back the junta, trying to keep it afloat as the “central government” of Myanmar. Other blows came too.

The earthquake hit hard — especially the people, who are the heart of the resistance. Forced conscription, new weaponry, technical support from Russia and China, improved coordination of drones, artillery, and airpower — all of it added military strength to the junta. 

On the resistance side, some momentum was lost as well. We got bogged down in complicated political debates about future federal state-building, instead of staying focused and sharp on the priorities of the day.

Meanwhile, neighbours and distant autocracies — Russia, China — pulled Min Aung Hlaing and his junta out of pariah status and gave them a second life on the international stage. That gave Min Aung Hlaing a shot of confidence.

The junta pushed its own narratives harder. Regional and international actors echoed them, while revolutionary forces partly vanished from the public space, swallowed by endless behind-the-scenes bargaining about the post-junta future.

I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: Don’t get too wrapped up in debating a future that might never come. When you feel that future slipping away, wake up. Recenter. Return to the simple clarity of the task: make that future possible.

That means: focus on defeating the junta. Focus on ending military rule, so they can’t — with help from China, India, Thailand, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — gain legitimacy through fake elections.

If the junta survives and gets accepted as Myanmar’s central government, nothing will be solved.

War will drag on, at high intensity, for at least two more years. Once recognized, the junta will move from extreme weakness toward growing strength. 

They’ll sell off remaining national assets. They’ll attract investment. They’ll sign deals, take loans. They’ll control more aid. They’ll squeeze more money from the people — at home and abroad. 

They’ll loot resources and funnel everything into military operations, vanity projects, and patronage networks — just like they always have.

Revolutionary forces won’t surrender vis-à-vis junta’s hard, murderous power. They will continue to fight back. And they’ll see no reason to accept a ‘soft surrender’ via ceasefires or corrupt deals to exchange liberation for local power and petty profits.

So let’s be clear: If the junta is recognized after sham elections, the war will continue.

They’ll keep looting. The economy will remain broken. The country — already fragmented — will stay that way, just more permanently. Revolutionary forces won’t disappear, but if they lose sight of the political goal and the people’s support, they’ll eventually decay — into warlords, gangs, or organized crime, depending on strength and size.

And then comes the real risk: deep demoralization.

The old generation — already scarred by past uprisings — will feel too, too tired to continue. The new generation — the soul of the Spring Revolution — will burn out. If Min Aung Hlaing isn’t defeated now, Myanmar faces 15 to 20 more years of kleptocracy, repression, and military impunity.

But if the junta is defeated, momentum shifts. Basic human security can immediately return. Economic activity can resume. Real political negotiations — hard, but real — can begin.

Yes, the military still has capacity. They can launch offensives and may even retake some cities. But not all their offensives will succeed — like the failed push to recapture the Asia Highway and the lucrative Myanmar-Thailand border town of Myawaddy. All these operations come with heavy losses. None of them will be game-changers.

And on the other side, revolutionary forces will strike too. Some attacks will succeed, some will fail. But the fundamental balance stays the same: The junta cannot defeat the resistance militarily. The resistance, despite setbacks in some parts of the country, keeps growing elsewhere.

That’s why it’s critical for revolutionary forces to get their internal house in order. To act in coordinated, strategic ways — slowing down setbacks, pushing forward gains. The goal: expand liberated zones from southeast to northwest, and southwest to south — so junta territory is broken into unconnected, unsustainable pockets with no secure land links.

Second — and equally important — the revolution must urgently bring forward its own political initiative.

The regional and international narratives about Myanmar are already flooded with talk of “elections,” “ceasefires,” “humanitarian priorities,” “political processes,” “inclusive negotiations,” and “peace prospects.” All of it is fake and false. It is, quite simply, shit.

But it’s a specific kind of shit — the kind described by Steve Bannon when he advised to “flood the zone with shit.”

The diplomatic and international policy-making zone polluted by these deceptive narratives functions like an information artillery barrage — a strategic carpet bombardment intended to soften the ground in preparation for a political offensive and eventual political victory.

The junta is unable to defeat the revolutionary forces militarily. But through fake elections in limited territories, and recognition by neighbouring states and a global alliance of autocrats, it can still achieve a political victory.

That is why it is crucial for the revolutionary forces to present a joint political initiative — one that is not ‘facilitated’ by regional and international actors who still cling to the belief that appeasing the military is the only solution.

This joint political initiative must be clear, visible, well-articulated, confident, and credible. It cannot be merely a joint statement — but a compelling, sustained flow of narratives that clears the zone from the shit.

This flow of narratives must be organized, strategic, and forceful. The war is never just a military war. It’s always a war of will, clarity, and political storytelling. In that ‘zone’ we need to come in a confident and forceful way.

Igor Blazevic is a lecturer at the Educational Initiatives Myanmar and Senior Advisor at the Prague Civil Society Centre.

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]