Guest contributor

Antonio Graceffo 

It is well established that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) supports Burma’s military junta through both investment and arms sales. 

Many observers believe that, without continued Chinese support, the junta would have collapsed and the war might have ended, given the significant gains made by pro-democracy forces since the uprising to the 2021 military coup began four years ago.

Fears of direct Chinese involvement—whether through security forces or the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—have persisted. 

There have been repeated, though unverified, claims of Chinese nationals taking an active combat role inside Burma. While such reports are plausible, no hard evidence has emerged to confirm them.

By contrast, concerns about Chinese private security companies operating in Burma are well substantiated. Publicly available documents confirm their presence. These companies are currently providing physical security and assisting in the digital surveillance of the population.

As of April, persistent rumors, mostly originating from ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) on the ground, have circulated online, alleging that Chinese troops, drone pilots, or drone trainers are operating inside Burma. 

Social media posts have claimed sightings of Chinese military convoys in places such as Lashio, in northern Shan State, allegedly to protect key infrastructure like the Sittwe-Yunnan gas pipeline. 

However, these claims remain unverified and are not corroborated by credible sources. No mainstream news outlet or international observer, including Reuters, Al Jazeera English, or The Irrawaddy, has confirmed the presence of Chinese military personnel inside Myanmar.

Still, China’s growing involvement in the Burmese conflict is undeniable. While boots on the ground have not been confirmed, Beijing has significantly expanded its support to the junta, especially in terms of technology and weaponry. 

Since mid-2024, Chinese-made drones have played a central role in the junta’s escalating air campaign. The military has formed a dedicated drone command, known as the Directorate of Drone Warfare, under Brigadier-General Nay Myo Tun.

Thousands of Chinese Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been acquired and adapted for combat and surveillance. This includes loitering munitions modeled after Iran’s Shahed-136, as well as advanced unmanned combat aerial vehicles documented in a January report by Janes.

In addition to supplying drones, China has also trained Burmese military personnel. Reports indicate that groups of junta air force pilots and drone operators have received training in China. 

More recently, Chinese companies such as Zhongyue Aviation Firefighting-Drone Company have reportedly entered discussions with the junta to establish licensed production inside Myanmar. 

While no evidence confirms Chinese trainers currently operating in-country, the scale and sophistication of the junta’s drone warfare strongly suggest continued technical support—possibly including remote instruction or offshore training.

Rumors about Chinese troops may also reflect confusion or exaggeration stemming from China’s legitimate concerns about border security. 

Following cross-border artillery incidents in August that injured civilians in Yunnan Province, Beijing increased armed patrols along its side of the border and conducted live-fire artillery exercises in the area. 

This increase in activity, however, does not equate to troop deployment within Myanmar. 

Nevertheless, the Chinese military’s heightened readiness underscores how closely Beijing monitors the deteriorating security situation, particularly as it threatens Chinese infrastructure investments and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects like the Kyaukphyu port and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).

Chinese private security companies (PSCs) have maintained a presence in Burma for several years, but their role has expanded as the junta’s control weakens and China grows more concerned about safeguarding its BRI investments. 

In October, the junta formed a 13-member committee to establish a joint venture security company with China. The committee is responsible for overseeing weapons imports, communications equipment, and drafting a memorandum of understanding (MoU), which remains unsigned as of now.

The junta’s passage of the Private Security Services Law in February legalized the operation of foreign security companies in the country. The law permits these companies to be armed, provided their personnel are not active-duty members of foreign militaries, and requires that 75 percent of staff be Burmese citizens. 

This framework allows former Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers to operate under the banner of private security firms, blurring the line between private contractors and Chinese state actors. 

China Overseas Security Group, the largest of China’s PSCs, is likely involved in securing key infrastructure projects along the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines. 

In November, reports emerged of a deal between a Special Economic Zone management sub-committee and China’s CITIC Group, a state-owned infrastructure and development conglomerate, to facilitate the establishment of a Chinese private security company in Kyaukphyu, a strategic coastal hub in Rakhine State.

The primary mission of these PSCs is to protect Chinese personnel, projects, and logistics routes. Their roles include site security, logistical support, intelligence collection, and possibly combat-adjacent operations. 

Reports suggest that in areas like Kyaukphyu, Chinese security forces have deployed drones, jammers, and mines to defend economic zones, with speculation that PLA-trained personnel could be operating under PSC cover.

Although the presence of Chinese PSCs in Burma has raised concerns, their impact on the active fighting at the battle front is likely minimal. 

Unlike Russia’s Wagner Group, or the U.S.-based Blackwater, Chinese PSCs are not structured for frontline combat. While they are now permitted to carry weapons in Burma, a notable exception to their usual restrictions abroad, their personnel generally lack combat experience and are not trained for offensive operations.

Moreover, Burma’s war is largely a jungle conflict, with a military fighting against multiple resistance groups employing guerrilla tactics. It is improbable that Chinese security personnel would possess better training in jungle or guerrilla warfare than Burma’s resistance forces, many of whom have been fighting continuously since 1948. 

Nor are they likely to surpass the training and experience of the junta’s military, which, under successive regimes, has waged counterinsurgency campaigns for nearly 80 years. 

As such, Chinese PSCs are not operating as paramilitary forces and are unlikely to alter the trajectory of the battle to regain territory.

In urban areas, however, China has had a noticeable impact on the junta’s ability to digitally surveil and control the population, an influence expected to intensify as the regime loses more territory and grows increasingly desperate to maintain control. 

Since 2022, the junta has implemented Chinese facial recognition systems from Huawei, Hikvision, and Dahua Technology in major cities under the “Safe City” initiative. 

In May 2024, Myanmar activated a web surveillance system powered by Chinese firms Geedge Networks and CEIEC, which includes deep packet inspection, SSL decryption, Virtual Private Network (VPN) blocking, and real-time traffic monitoring. Chinese technicians are on the ground providing implementation and training.

These surveillance systems are further integrated with digital ID efforts. The junta has explored smart ID cards with embedded biometrics, modeled on Chinese systems. 

While no direct evidence links PSCs to digital ID or payment systems, their role in guarding critical infrastructure could naturally extend to data centers, surveillance hubs, and telecom nodes. 

Collectively, these PSCs and surveillance systems form a comprehensive repressive apparatus used by the junta to track, arrest, and neutralize resistance. 

Facial recognition cameras can monitor activists, while internet controls block opposition media and VPN access. Armed Chinese security personnel are authorized to detain individuals on Chinese project sites and hand them over to junta police, effectively outsourcing repression.

The use of Chinese PSCs to bypass constitutional bans on foreign troops while enabling armed enforcement raises serious questions about Myanmar’s autonomy. 

Although there is no hard evidence of Chinese troops, armed combatants, or drone personnel on the ground, Beijing’s use of PSCs and digital surveillance is pushing the limits of plausible deniability and claims of non-involvement. 

Together, these tools serve to protect China’s interests and bolster the junta through Chinese-influenced legal reforms, military-technical cooperation, and real-time digital repression.

Antonio Graceffo, PhD, holds advanced degrees in economics and national security. A graduate of American Military University, he has spent more than 20 years in Asia, contributing to think tanks and international media. 

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