Guest contributor

Shalini Perumal

The rise of the Arakan Army (AA) in Myanmar’s Arakan (Rakhine) State presents a new challenge and opportunity for India that can significantly impact its current policy and relationship with the Myanmar military junta and the ongoing Rohingya refugee crisis, in the backdrop of its more strategic economic interests. 

The AA’s ascendance is a significant development in Myanmar’s protracted internal conflict. Originating as a relatively small insurgent group in 2009 with the assistance of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the AA has rapidly transformed into a force of its own, capitalising on the widespread discontent following the 2021 military coup. 

The junta’s power grab ignited resistance across Myanmar, creating a vacuum that ethnic armed organisations like the AA were well-positioned to take advantage of. The AA’s territorial gains in Arakan State, particularly its control over strategically important border areas, have profound ramifications for India-Myanmar relations. 

By late 2024, the AA had effectively wrested control of much of Arakan State, capturing key towns like Maungdaw, Paletwa, and Buthidaung, and even seizing the Regional Military Command (RMC) headquarters in Ann Township. 

This dramatic shift in power dynamics has placed the AA in control of vital trade routes and border crossings, making them a crucial player in the regional economy. The AA’s stated goal is self-determination for Arakan, a long-cherished aspiration that seems increasingly within reach. Their rhetoric emphasises the “freedom of the people of Arakan” and the “liberation of all ethnic groups within the region,” indicating calls for autonomy and a rejection of the military junta’s rule.

Soon after the AA seized southern Chinland’s (Chin State) Paletwa Township, Rajya Sabha (one of the Houses of the Indian Parliament) member K Vanlalvena from Mizoram State got in touch with AA leaders and went to Arakan to speak to them. Yet, New Delhi’s stance on an outreach with AA is less direct. 

Yet, in November 2024, members of anti-junta organisations such as the National Unity Government (NUG) and Chin National Front (CNF), were invited by India’s Ministry of External Affairs for a workshop by a think tank called the Indian Council of World Affairs, indicating a shifting approach from just engaging with the military junta ensconced in the capital Naypyidaw. 

The political wing of the AA, called the United League of Arakan (ULA), through its self-proclaimed “Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government,” has signaled its openness to foreign investment, stating it “welcomes and recognises all foreign investments that will bring development to Arakan and assist in its development and progress.” 

This declaration is widely interpreted as a strategic overture to both India and China, acknowledging their respective economic interests in the region.

India’s relationship with Myanmar is complex and driven by a combination of strategic and economic factors, and unfortunately, less humanitarian until recently, with international pressure. India has invested heavily in connectivity projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP), a flagship initiative designed to link its eastern seaboard to Arakan, in westernmost Myanmar, providing crucial access to its northeastern states and bypassing the “Siliguri corridor” bottleneck. 

The KMTTP involves a complex network of sea, river, and road transport, connecting Kolkata, India to the port in Sittwe, the Arakan State capital, then traversing the Kaladan River to Paletwa in Chin State, and finally reaching Zorinpui in Mizoram State via road. 

This project holds immense significance for India, promising to boost trade, improve connectivity, and accelerate development in the Northeast, which is one of its most underdeveloped regions. However, the ongoing conflict and the AA’s rise have jeopardised the project’s timely completion. As of late 2024, significant portions of the road link remained unfinished, despite substantial investments by India. 

The AA’s control of the territory through much of where the KMTTP passes makes engagement with the group almost unavoidable for India to protect its investment and ensure the project’s viability, despite growing allegations of human rights abuses of the AA against the Rohingya. At the same time, India faces its own allegations of human right abuses against Rohingya refugees living within its borders. 

Beyond the KMTTP, India’s strategic interests in Myanmar are also shaped by its desire to counter China’s growing influence in the region. China has made significant inroads into Myanmar, particularly in Arakan, where it has developed the Kyaukphyu deep sea port, as well as oil and gas pipelines that traverse the country, connecting China’s Yunnan Province to the coast of Arakan. 

These pipelines are a crucial component of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s presence in Arakan and its engagement with both the junta and various armed groups create a competitive landscape for India. India’s ongoing engagement with the AA, therefore, has been not only about protecting its economic interests. It is also about maintaining its strategic foothold in the region.

The Rohingya refugee crisis adds another layer of complexity to India’s relationship with Myanmar. The Rohingya, a predominantly Muslim ethnic nationality living in Arakan, have faced decades of persecution in Myanmar, culminating in a mass exodus to neighboring Bangladesh in 2017 following a brutal military crackdown by the Myanmar military. 

The violence against the Rohingya has been widely condemned as genocide and ethnic cleansing, with reports of widespread atrocities, including killings, rape, and arson. While India has provided some humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and within Myanmar, it has largely refrained from explicitly condemning the military actions or granting refugee status to the Rohingya living within India, citing concerns about national security and demographic balance. 

This cautious approach reflects India’s delicate yet discriminatory balancing act between humanitarian concerns and its strategic interests in maintaining cordial relations with the junta in Naypyidaw that continues to implement widespread human rights abuses against its own people.   

While the AA initially maintained a more inclusive stance towards the Rohingya, recent reports suggest a shift, with allegations of the AA itself perpetrating violence against Rohingya communities. These reports, though difficult to verify independently due to the ongoing conflict and restricted access to the region, are deeply troubling and raise serious questions about the future of the Rohingya in Rakhine State. 

Engaging with the AA, while it might seem necessary for economic and strategic reasons, risks further legitimising a group accused of human rights abuses, and will continue to undermining India’s moral standing as it has also been diplomatically engaging with the junta known for carrying out ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Rohingya. 

India faces a complex set of challenges in navigating the evolving situation in Arakan. Its policy options must consider the interplay of its strategic interests, economic investments, humanitarian concerns, and its relationship with various actors, including the AA, the junta, and China. Some potential policy options include:

• India could engage with the AA on economic and strategic matters, particularly regarding the KMTTP, but make further cooperation contingent on the AA’s demonstrated commitment to protecting the rights of all communities in Arakan, including the Rohingya. This approach would send a clear signal about India’s commitment to human rights and could potentially moderate the AA’s behaviour. It also allows India to maintain communication channels with the AA. 

• India should scale up its humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and explore ways to provide aid to those still within Rakhine State and India. This would demonstrate India’s concern for the well-being of the Rohingya and help alleviate the suffering caused by the ongoing conflict. Increased aid could also help build trust with the Rohingya community and potentially create opportunities for future engagement.

• India should support civil society and community-based organisations working on human rights and humanitarian issues in Arakan. These organizations play a vital role in monitoring the situation, providing assistance to vulnerable communities, and advocating for the rights of the Rohingya as they are more knowledgeable of the ground situation. Supporting civil society can also help promote accountability and transparency in the region.

The situation in Arakan cannot be viewed in isolation. It is inextricably linked to the broader geopolitical dynamics of the region, particularly the growing rivalry between India and China. China’s increasing influence in Myanmar, its support for the junta, and its engagement with various armed groups create a complex strategic landscape for India. 

India’s approach to the AA and the Rohingya crisis must be considered within this context. 

Furthermore, the stability of Arakan is also of significant concern to Bangladesh, given the shared border and the presence of nearly one million Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar. The potential for further violence and displacement could have significant repercussions for Bangladesh, further destabilising the region. 

India, therefore, needs to consider the implications of its policies for Bangladesh in the face of its recent political revolution, and work with Dhaka to find a regional solution to the Rohingya crisis.

The rise of the AA presents a complex and evolving challenge for India in Myanmar. Navigating this challenge requires a nuanced and proactive approach that balances India’s strategic interests, its economic investments, its humanitarian responsibilities, and its commitment to human rights. 

The Rohingya crisis remains a deeply troubling humanitarian issue, and the allegations of AA involvement in violence against the Rohingya add another layer of complexity to the situation. There are no easy answers, and India must carefully weigh the potential consequences of its actions. 

Shalini Perumal is a creative international development professional who has worked previously in Mae Sot, Thailand at Mae Tao Clinic. She is currently a freelance journalist as well as consultant at Finnish Refugee Council Myanmar.

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