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Yangon’s new trains on circular railway line; Kachin Independence Organization abolishes ‘Special Region’

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The new trains, which replaced older models on the Yangon circular line, at Yangon Central Railway Station. (Credit: Ethan Htun)

Yangon’s new trains on circular railway line

Fifteen new Diesel Electric Multiple Unit (DEMU) trains began running along Yangon’s circular railway line on Friday, according to Myanma Railway officials. Passengers complained about boarding and descending the new trains, while they were on a trial run along the Yangon-Bago railway line in October. 

“There was a slight delay. The city train was not fully operational. Merchants cannot load goods,” a Yangon railway station employee told DVB. Platforms at 36 railway stations in Yangon are being raised to accommodate the new trains. Platform work was expected to be completed by the end of November.

Regime media reported that an opening ceremony called “Modern Diesel Electric Multiple Unit (DEMU) Train Sets” was attended by Min Aung Hlaing at Yangon Central Railway Station in Mingalar Taung Nyunt Township. A round trip ticket on Yangon’s Circular Railway line costs 800 kyat ($0.18 USD), according to the ticketing office.  

Kachin Independence Organization abolishes ‘Special Region’

The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) announced on Thursday that it officially abolished the Kachin Special Region 1 – a designation given to an area of northeastern Kachin State along the Burma-China border – which was controlled by the pro-military Kachin Border Guard Force (BGF) until the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) took full control of the area, which is a hub for Burma’s lucrative rare earth mining, on Nov. 20

“We will continue to rebuild and develop with a humanitarian approach, without causing economic and social harm to the local population,” stated the KIO on Nov. 28. Kachin Special Region 1 consisted of Tsawlaw, Chipwi, and parts of Waingmaw Township in Kachin State. Pangwa, the capital of the special region, was seized by the KIA on Oct. 19.

China is the primary beneficiary of Burma’s rare earth mining industry, which has become increasingly significant due to the global demand for rare earth elements (REE). The REE are used in electronics, renewable energy technologies, and military applications. The KIO added that the region established in 1994 was “detrimental to the unity of the Kachin people.”

News by Region

The military destroyed Linphonlay monastery in Loikaw, Karenni State, with artillery on Nov. 27. (Credit: CJ)

KARENNI—Residents of Linphonlay village in Loikaw Township told DVB that artillery and arson attacks were carried out by the military during fighting against Karenni resistance forces on Wednesday. The Karenni Army (KA) spokesperson Phone Naing said that nearly 30 military personnel from the Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 80 were killed during fighting on Nov. 25-26.

“We saw smoke coming out from the burned homes from afar. The fighting is ongoing and the military is firing artillery and conducting airstrikes,” said a Loikaw resident on the condition of anonymity. Residents added that an unknown number of civilians have been killed. More than 300,000 people are living in displacement camps, according to the Karenni Interim Executive Council (IEC).

CHINLAND—The Chin National Army (CNA) told DVB that seven people, including four civilians and three Chin National Defense Force members, were killed by an airstrike carried out by the military on a clinic in Lumte village of Falam Township, located 71 miles (114 km) north of the Chinland capital Hakha, on Tuesday. Four others were reportedly injured. 

“It was primarily a medical treatment facility. The casualties include two hospital staff, two local civilians, and three members of the local public defense force,” said Salai Htet Ni, the CNA spokesperson. Chin resistance forces have seized 12 towns, including Rihkhawdar on the Burma-India border, from the military since the 2021 coup.

SAGAING—The KIA and its allied People’s Defense Force (PDF) seized control of a military outpost in Homalin Township, which was used by the pro-military Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA), on Saturday. Homalin has several gold mines and is located 331 miles (532 km) north of the Sagaing Region capital Monywa. 

“The outpost is located between Sagaing Region and Kachin State,” said a Homalin PDF spokesperson. He added that the fighting would intensify in the coming days as the resistance forces circled the town. The KIA-led resistance forces attacked the outpost on Nov. 22. More than 10 prisoners of war (POWs) were arrested.   

SHAN—The Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA) told DVB that a Buddhist monk was killed and two other monks were injured when the military opened fire on a vehicle along Hsihseng-Loikaw Road in Hsihseng Township of southern Shan State on Saturday. Hsiseng is 53 miles (85 km) south of the Shan State capital Taunggyi.

“The road where the incident was carried out is inside the territory of the Burma Army. But they said it was attacked by the PDF and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force,” said Khun Rein Yan, the PNLA spokesperson. The military claimed that the two injured monks were receiving medical treatment at Loikaw hospital. The Karenni State capital is 38 miles (61 km) south of Hsihseng.

YANGON—The Political Prisoners Network-Myanmar (PPNM) claimed that 500 prisoners, including political prisoners, were transferred from Insein Prison to Thayarwaddy Prison in Bago Region, on Saturday. It has received four transfers from Insein Prison so far this year, including nearly 1,000 political prisoners. Thayarwaddy Prison is located 67 miles (107 km) from Yangon. 

“We have not yet confirmed how many political prisoners were included in the transfer. We need to watch closely as [Thayarwaddy Prison] is well-known for [its harsh treatment of] political prisoners,” Thaik Tun Oo, the PPNM spokesperson, told DVB. Family members of the prisoners transferred to Insein have complained that they are not being notified.

(Exchange rate: $1 USD = 4,490 kyat)

Read: Building bridges: A holistic approach to Myanmar’s democracy by James Shwe.

Watch: International Criminal Court seeks arrest warrant for Myanmar’s Min Aung Hlaing. DVB English News is on X, Facebook, Instagram, Threads & TikTok. Subscribe on YouTube.

Third annual MOB Party celebrates Thai and Myanmar hip hop music

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Chiang Mai hip hop collective Triple Edge highlighted the MOB Party concert on Nov. 30. (Credit: DVB)

The third annual underground hip-hop concert, MOB Party, was held in the parking lot at Cool Muang Coffee near Tha Phae Gate in Chiang Mai, Thailand on Nov. 30. It featured Thai, Myanmar and international hip hop artists.

“It’s a way to bring people together through music, art, and partying, and to support those struggling in Burma,” said Kan Kyi, a hip-hop artist, producer and organizer of MOB Party.

Despite call for peace talks, military strikes Brotherhood Alliance in northern Shan State’s Kyaukme

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Residents of the Ingyintaung neighborhood of Kyaukme Township, northern Shan State, survey the destruction caused by airstrikes on Nov. 30. (Credit: TNLA)

The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) claimed that 10 civilians, including Buddhist nuns, were killed and more than 20 others were injured by airstrikes carried out by the military on the Ingyintaung neighborhood in Kyaukme Township of northern Shan State on Saturday. Kyaukme is located 66 miles (106 km) southwest of Lashio along the Mandalay Road. 

“Two 500-pound bombs landed on the neighborhood, killing civilians instantly. The injured civilians are receiving emergency treatment at the hospital. We are conducting a search party as there might have been more [killed],” the TNLA stated on Nov. 30. Twenty-five homes were also reportedly destroyed during the airstrikes, added the TNLA. 

Local media reported that one of the two 500-pound bombs landed at a convent school in Ingyintaung, which killed everyone inside. A Kyaukme resident said that regime troops were deployed in the neighborhood until the TNLA seized control of the town from the military on Aug. 5. 

The TNLA is a member of the Brotherhood Alliance, along with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Arakan Army (AA), which launched Operation 1027 on Oct. 27, 2023.

The Brotherhood Alliance and its allied People’s Defense Force (PDF) has seized control of 14 towns in northern Shan State and neighboring Mandalay Region after it launched an offensive on June 25.  

The TNLA announced on Nov. 25 that it was ready to hold peace talks with the regime in Naypyidaw. In August, Beijing issued a letter to the TNLA to cease its offensive against the military.

The Tai Students’ Union (aka Shan Students’ Union) condemned the military airstrikes on the TNLA in Kyaukme Township as the Shan residents were preparing to celebrate their new year on Nov. 30.

Building bridges: A holistic approach to Myanmar’s democracy

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Guest contributor

James Shwe

As Myanmar continues to grapple with the aftermath of the 2021 military coup and ongoing civil unrest, well-intentioned advocates are exploring various avenues to promote democracy in the beleaguered nation. 

However, a concerning trend has emerged: some groups are considering using religious freedom as a primary vehicle to gain access to the U.S. administration and advocate for Myanmar’s democratic future. This approach, while seemingly pragmatic, is fundamentally flawed and potentially harmful to the very cause it aims to support. 

Myanmar’s complex tapestry of ethnic and religious diversity demands a nuanced and inclusive approach to advocacy. The country’s population is predominantly Buddhist (87.9%), with significant Christian (6.2%), Muslim (4.3%), and other religious minorities.

By focusing solely on religious issues, advocates risk oversimplifying the multifaceted challenges facing Myanmar and could inadvertently alienate key stakeholders crucial for sustainable democratic reform. 

The military’s long-standing “divide and rule” strategy has expertly exploited religious and ethnic differences to maintain power. They have stoked Buddhist nationalist sentiments, supported ultra-nationalist monks who promote hate speech, and exploited crises like the Rohingya situation to undermine civilian government and international support. 

Recent reports indicate that the military has even attempted to arm and recruit Rohingya groups to create conflicts with other ethnic armed organizations, further complicating the situation.

This divide-and-rule tactic was inadvertently reinforced by single-issue advocates who sidelined the main issue of addressing the military dictatorship problem.

Any advocacy strategy that emphasizes religious divisions plays directly into the military’s hands, potentially exacerbating existing tensions and fueling resentment among communities. For instance, the military’s exploitation of the Rohingya crisis not only led to a humanitarian disaster but also undermined international support for the civilian government.

Moreover, recent U.S. administrations have had inconsistent approaches to religious freedom issues globally. Attempting to leverage religious connections for political gain could be seen as opportunistic and may not yield the desired results. It could also create a perception of favoritism, potentially delegitimizing broader efforts to promote inclusive democracy in Myanmar. 

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) released its Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Burma in October. It recommends that the U.S. government’s engagement with the Burmese opposition, including the National Unity Government (NUG) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), be contingent upon prioritizing religious freedom issues—expressly voluntary repatriation and restored citizenship for the Rohingya community—as a prerequisite for recognition and substantial engagement.

We believe this recommendation is problematic for several reasons:

  • It is not practically feasible given Burma’s current political and military situation.
  • It could seriously undermine the ongoing pro-democracy revolution. 
  • It overlooks the progress already made by opposition forces in addressing minority rights. 
  • It fails to consider the broader context of religious persecution affecting multiple communities in Burma.

This clearly demonstrates that advocacy strategies emphasizing religious divisions and single group issues are not very beneficial for the revolution holistically.

Instead, a more effective approach would involve:

  1. Addressing multiple aspects of human rights and democratic governance simultaneously, including freedom of expression, assembly, and political participation.
  2. Engaging with diverse stakeholders, including ethnic and religious minorities, civil society organizations, diaspora groups not affiliated with political activist organizations, and international partners.
  3. Emphasizing shared values of democracy, human rights, and inclusive governance that benefit all of Myanmar’s communities.
  4. Supporting local initiatives and grassroots efforts rather than imposing external agendas. For example, empowering interfaith dialogue initiatives that have shown success in building community trust.
  5. Advocating for international pressure on the military to respect the rights of all communities, not just specific groups, and to return to democracy with the military under the supervision of a civilian government elected under all-inclusive free and fair elections.

The path to democracy in Myanmar requires a comprehensive strategy that addresses the root causes of conflict and promotes reconciliation among all communities. Religious freedom should be part of this broader agenda, but not the sole or primary focus of advocacy efforts. 

To the U.S. Congress, State Department, and Burmese diaspora democracy activists: We urge you to resist the temptation of quick fixes or narrow approaches. The situation in Myanmar demands a holistic, inclusive, and long-term strategy that considers the complex interplay of ethnic, religious, and political factors at play. 

Diaspora groups can play a crucial role by providing insights into local contexts, facilitating connections between international actors and grassroots movements, and advocating for comprehensive policies that address Myanmar’s complex challenges. 

International cooperation is vital. Regional partners like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and global actors such as the U.N. should be engaged to create a united front in supporting Myanmar’s democratic transition. This could include coordinated sanctions on the military, support for civil society organizations, and diplomatic efforts to isolate the regime in Naypyidaw. 

By adopting a more inclusive and comprehensive approach to advocacy, we can work towards a stable, democratic, and pluralistic Myanmar that respects the rights of all its diverse communities. This strategy not only addresses immediate concerns but also lays the groundwork for lasting peace and democracy in Myanmar. 

The time for action is now. We call on policymakers to develop a comprehensive Myanmar strategy that goes beyond religious issues, engages all stakeholders, and addresses the root causes of conflict. 

We urge diaspora activists to broaden their focus and collaborate across ethnic and religious lines. And we implore the international community to maintain pressure on the military while supporting inclusive democratic initiatives. Only through such a holistic approach can we hope to see a truly democratic Myanmar emerge from its current crisis.


James Shwe is a Myanmar democracy activist in the U.S. and is a member of the advocacy groups Free Myanmar and the Los Angeles Myanmar Movement. He has been trying to organize and motivate the Myanmar diaspora to advocate for democracy in Myanmar.

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]

China’s Wagner? Beijing establishes private security company in Myanmar

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By Antonio Graceffo for Geopolitical Monitor

China is collaborating with the Myanmar military junta to establish a joint security company to protect Chinese investments and personnel in Myanmar. On October 22, 2024, the junta formed a working committee to draft a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the initiative, reflecting China’s growing concerns over the security of its projects, particularly those under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.

As a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CMEC comprises highways, railways, pipelines, and economic zones connecting China’s Kunming province to the deep-sea Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The economic corridor is vital to Beijing, providing direct access to the Indian Ocean and bypassing the strategically vulnerable Malacca Strait, a chokepoint critical to China’s energy and trade supply lines, particularly in the event of a conflict with the United States. Yet unfortunately for Beijing, many CMEC projects pass through some of Myanmar’s most volatile conflict zones.

Since pro-democracy opposition armies declared a “people’s defensive war” in 2021, Chinese projects, including oil and gas pipelines, have come under increasing threat. Notably, in January 2022, a local People’s Defense Force attacked the $800 million Tagaung Taung nickel processing plant.

More recently, the Chinese consulate in Mandalay was damaged in a bombing attack last month. While no group has claimed responsibility, both the People’s Defense Forces and the National Unity Government (NUG) have condemned the incident.

The announcement of a joint security company has sparked controversy in Myanmar, with many arguing that it could be perceived as a breach of the country’s sovereignty. Myanmar’s 2008 constitution prohibits the deployment of foreign troops on its soil, and the framing of this initiative as a Chinese “company” in a joint venture appears to be a strategic move to deflect accusations of a foreign military intervention.

By structuring the company as private and partially Burmese, Beijing can claim arm’s-length deniability, distancing itself from direct involvement while potentially directing the security force to carry out state-derived foreign policy objectives.

The deployment of a Chinese private security company (PSC) comes at a critical moment in the Myanmar civil war, and amid sustained financial and military support for the junta, including shipments of weapons and aircrafts.

But above all Beijing’s motivation for establishing the joint venture signals waning confidence in the junta’s ability to protect Chinese investments and personnel. Such concerns are underscored by the junta’s overstretched military forces, which have lost significant ground and numerous bases and outposts to pro-democracy rebels, further eroding the junta’s presence across Myanmar.

In late October 2024, Chinese authorities reportedly placed Peng Daxun, commander of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), under house arrest in Kunming, Yunnan Province, to pressure the group to withdraw from Lashio. The MNDAA’s capture of Lashio in August 2024 dealt a major blow to Myanmar’s junta.

Lashio, a strategic hub in northern Shan State, serves as a gateway to China’s Yunnan Province and central Myanmar along the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). Its control is vital for ensuring the flow of Chinese investments and trade.

China frequently claims to adhere to its official stance of non-intervention in the sovereign affairs of other nations, yet developments in the Myanmar civil war suggest an active involvement. By detaining Peng Daxun, Beijing seems to be stepping in where it perceives the junta has failed, underscoring its wider rationale for establishing a private security company in Myanmar.

Beijing already has numerous private security companies operating globally, including four in Myanmar, in areas where China has significant strategic and economic interests. The largest Chinese security companies include De Wei Security Group Ltd, Hua Xin China Security, Guan An Security Technology, China Overseas Security Group, and Frontier Services Group.

The idea of a Chinese security company is reminiscent of Russia’s Wagner Group, a private military company (PMC) that has been heavily involved in conflicts across Africa, the Middle East, and Ukraine. Wagner functions as an unofficial extension of Russian state power, providing military training, combat support, and securing strategic assets, often under the guise of protecting Russian interests abroad.

Its operations frequently involve direct combat roles, covert military activities, and securing resource-rich areas, making it an instrument of geopolitical influence for Moscow.

In contrast, Chinese private security companies primarily focus on safeguarding infrastructure projects, personnel, and investments linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Unlike Wagner, these companies avoid direct combat roles, instead specializing in site security, risk management, and logistical support.

However, the proposed firm in Myanmar will be a joint venture with the junta, introducing a new dynamic. It is already known that this company will facilitate arms shipments and deliveries to the junta. As a junta-aligned company, it may operate with fewer restrictions and potentially involve heavily armed personnel, diverging from the usual limitations imposed on Chinese PSCs.

The joint arrangement could also mean the company is not bound to adhere strictly to Chinese regulations, raising concerns that it might take on a more militarized role than typical Chinese security firms. In an extreme case, there is speculation that Chinese security firms could take an active role in the junta’s fight against pro-democracy forces, similar to the role that Russia’s Wagner Group has played in its engagements in Africa and the Middle East.

Incidentally, the joint private security company approach is also being attempted in Pakistan, where a string of recent attacks against Chinese citizens and economic interests have shaken faith in Islamabad’s ability to protect the CPEC corridor.

In response to the announcement, Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government (NUG) asserted that collaborating with the NUG and revolutionary forces is the only viable way to effectively protect Chinese investments and operations in Myanmar. The NUG further emphasized its commitment to safeguarding lawful investments and fostering friendly relations with neighboring countries. The messaging serves to reassure Beijing that, even if Myanmar transitions to democracy, it will continue to maintain trade relations with China.

Yet it seems for now that Beijing is not ready to abandon the junta, and amid a fraught outlook on the battlefield, the deployment of a Chinese private security company is the only way to ensure the junta’s survival. For its part, the NUG remains isolated, lacking in both recognition from Western powers and a direct line of communication with Beijing.

Ashley South on Conflict, Complexity, Climate Change & COP29 in Myanmar [AUDIO]

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Ashley South, the author of Conflict, Complexity and Climate Change: Emergent federal systems and resilience in post-coup Myanmar, returned to the DVB newsroom to discuss the UN Climate Change Conference COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan Nov. 11-22. He shared how nation states are beginning to take climate adaptation and mitigation seriously, except for Myanmar, which is one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to climate change.

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