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The end of the settlement: Yangon squat clearances uproot thousands

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A life’s worth of possessions are stacked in a heap on the ground. The owner of the ragged parcels, U Maw, looks in the other direction, at an imposing pile of timber that once was his home.

Yesterday morning, as soldiers looked on—fingers aching towards their triggers—U Maw had been forced to destroy what he once built on this land by his own labor. Around him, neighboring families had been ordered to deconstruct their homes, piece by piece, by themselves.

“We have no choice but to destroy the things that we built with our own hands. Otherwise the soldiers will destroy everything, and that will make everything useless,” U Maw said, despairingly.

On October 25, the Township General Administration Department of the Southern District of Yangon ordered the removal of businesses and settlements beside the Dagon-Thilawa Road. Three days later, approximately 100 people, including municipal leaders and armed security forces, arrived at the site, ready to perform a total clearance.

The eviction ran from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m., soldiers ripping apart the settlement’s famous dry food stores, slowly tearing down every obstacle in their path until they reached Kalawal village on the banks of the Bago River.

The morning of October 28 was an historic tragedy which had been long-delayed for Yangon’s squatters, an understated humanitarian disaster in Burma’s most developed urban area.

Whilst troops were beginning the destruction of Thanlyin’s settlements, a similar scene was already underway on the other side of town. 

To the north, in Hlaingtharyar, security forces had earlier closed the two arterial Bayintnaung Bridges that connect the township to central Yangon, leading to a huge backlog of trucks and cars blocking roads into Hlaing.

“There are between 7,000 and 8,000 squatters along the Yangon-Pathein highway, and half of them are moving this morning as a force of soldiers, police, members of YCDC [Yangon City Development Committee], and plainclothes security forces have arrived,” said a local man supporting the squatters. 

Military trucks entered Hlaingtharyar at around 6.30 a.m. yesterday morning, in tow: two bulldozers and some expectant prison vans.

“On seeing the convoy, some took their belongings; some even took pieces of their home,” the local man said.

“However, most of those moving were the wealthier few whose businesses had been doing alright; the working class residents didn’t leave. When I asked them what they would do, they said that they’d have to settle another empty plot because they’re unable to afford rent, and have nobody to go to for help,” he said.

The settlers from both sides of Yangon were moving following an ultimatum delivered by the military just three days previously. 

Settlements being torn down in Hlaingtharyar, north Yangon, yesterday

Despite the settlements hosting both homes and well-established small businesses for decades, the junta announced on October 25 that it was to demolish all homes. On the day of the announcement, 70 people were taken into temporary custody in Hlaingtharyar after protesting the order.

When troops returned, resistance was muted. 

“​​I believe the police and military had guns, most were threatened with detainment if they didn’t comply… Though it seems they are willing to do worse,” said one foreign social worker who had arranged transport for those fleeing the clearances.

“We had a small team […] taking lists of those who wanted to go to their hometowns and those who wanted to be moved to another location. However the volume is much much larger than we anticipated, originally we were told 100-150 people, then 1000-2000. Now there is a possibility of 20,000 in total, according to a contact.”

She told DVB that, due to the presence of troops, it had been too dangerous to transport those leaving yesterday. Her group will now ferry settlers today and into the weekend, “before the Tatmadaw burns everything”.

Whilst soldiers intimated those in Hlaingtharyar, a similar scene was unfolding in Thanlyin.

“The soldiers ordered us to sign an eviction notice, if not they said they will shoot us,” U Maw said.  

“Nobody dares to go against them as they carry weapons. I just had to watch them tear down the tents with bulldozers,” he added. 

 “They didn’t want anyone to take photos of the eviction, and it is still going on,” added a local Red Cross Society member. 

The Dagon-Thilawa Road settlements, Thanlyin, before the clearance

Like U Maw, a majority of the squatters with no place to go have congregated by the side of the road, watching others depart.

Established by the SLORC in 1998 as a resettlement for 300,000 migratory inhabitants of Yangon’s Downtown area, the settlements on the Yangon-Pathein Road also hosted thousands of people who fled the Ayeyarwady delta region following 2008’s Cyclone Nargis.

Under the NLD government, more than 250,000 squatter households had been issued resident certificates for Yangon Region, and plans were well underway to allow them to eventually get access to low-income housing.

Similarly, over 200 households have been located beside the No.2 Thanlyin Road for almost a decade, many of whom run small businesses; over 50 well-known dry food stores, fuel shops, and tea, coffee, and palm wine sellers lined the road, a source of both shelter and sustenance for local farm laborers from the surrounding fields of Thanlyin. Residents had made an agreement with Hluttaw representatives that they believed allowed them to stay.

Only now, with a dominant and unaccountable military rule over the land—held in the name of the state and military-backed landowners—have clearances become a reality.  

“Now it is all gone. They cut down the foundations of homes and destroyed everything: the place is empty now. Some people who have no place to go, like us, are sitting by the road with their belongings. I don’t know what to do,” said U Hla Htay, one of those now searching for a new beginning.

Pro-military rallies once again bolstered with paid stooges, witnesses say

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Two independent sources confirmed yesterday that a majority of recent pro-military protestors in a number of towns were paid by the military to attend rallies that were held on Monday. 

On October 25, pro-military rallies took place close to military bases in towns including Myitkyina and Putao in Kachin, in Pyin Oo Lwin, Madara, and Meiktila in Mandalay, as well as in Yangon, Naypyidaw, Lashio, Pathein, and Mawlamyine.

The protests come as tensions festering between those for and against Burma’s military institution have spilled out into open warfare, and when the eyes of Southeast Asia have fallen back upon Burma following the start of the ASEAN Summit.

One source, who preferred to remain anonymous to preserve the contingency of his activism work, said that, between 7 and 9 a.m., protests erupted in Aye Mya Tharyar ward and Panmatti village in Myitkyina. He says that the majority of protestors, if not all, were paid anywhere from K5,000 to K10,000 (US$2.8 – 5.6).

“It’s estimated that around 300 participated in the march, but bystanders dared not say anything, because it was held inside the military headquarters,” he said. “They chanted the slogans: ‘We don’t need UN support, who supports OIC,’ ‘We don’t want ASEAN,’ ‘Oppose the NUG and CRPH rioters, ‘oppose PDF, and ‘Myanmar military is our army.’”

In Kachin, the anonymous activist says the junta also played on ethnic tensions to bolster their numbers, noting that protests also consisted of those from Lisu and Shanni groups (some of whose leaders are strongly sympathetic to the military), Ma Ba Tha, the ultra-orthodox Buddhist group, and families of military personnel, who he says were ordered to attend. He added that this is not the first time the military has played on the tensions between the Lisu and Shanni People’s Army and the local Kachin Independence Army. 

“They have a feeling about the KIA, as they got arrested by the KIA and accused the KIA of asking for money,” the anonymous activist said. “By using those feelings, the Tatmadaw formed the Shanni People’s Army and Lisu People’s Army.”

Similar trends were reported in Pathein, where three-day rallies slowly garnered participants from October 25 to 27, peaking at 90 people on the second day, but falling to a mere 40 by October 27. 

Human rights activist U Tun Tun Oo reported that the majority of protestors in Pathein were recruited from the working class and poorer wards, with some offered up to K15,000 to participate. Despite trying to keep a safe distance from the protests himself, the activist says he could verify this through being in constant communication with those with pro-military allies.

“They are protesting, but look insecure. The pro-military protesters in Pathein were clearly either people who were out of money, informants (dalan), or members of the army. There really are not many people who support the military,” he said, echoing the theory that the protests were orchestrated to demonstrate alleged military support.

“In addition, these pro-military protests came across the country after the ASEAN’s meeting, which did not invite the junta leader to attend the summit,” he said, noting the suspicious trend of pro-military rallies appearing at times that the military feels insecure. 

Another anonymous source said that the military had used a similar tactic in other regions, paying up to K10,000 to people—largely those with low education and literacy levels—that soldiers had gathered.

Such bribery is certainly not a new tactic, and is reminiscent of junta-backed protests immediately following the coup, where protestors admitted to participating for between K2,000 and K10,000. After protests in many towns turned lethal, many others said that they had received orders, and in some cases weaponry, to cause violence towards pro-democracy protesters.

Appeal for Action

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OxyFeature

As editor in chief of one of the few remaining independent media organizations, we collect, check and spread the news about Burma. Through various credible contacts inside the military-ruled country, I receive heartbreaking messages about Covid-19 every day, which I think the international community ought to react to as an immediate urgency. One might ask why so alarming as every country around the world is facing the Covid-19 pandemic, but the case in Burma is different.

News of the deaths of close family, of best friends, of relatives, is no longer considered news at all. Loved ones failing in their desperate attempts to find oxygen, similarly, is no longer news. Families spending household savings to purchase faulty concentrators or overpriced and ineffective medicines; no longer news. The hundreds of deceased being cremated daily, the dark smoke of death lingering over Yangon both day and night; not news. The virus has spread across all layers of Burma’s society, indiscriminate and ruthless. Even the last of the frontline medical workers, not yet persecuted by the junta, are falling prey to Covid-19.

Since February’s coup, state hospitals will not admit a patient without “status” or a “connection” to the military nexus: even officers and their families have been denied treatment on arrival. Out of lack of resources or fear of reprisals, private hospitals have chosen to ignore the majority of patients, those lucky enough to find a bed have only been admitted under the proviso they bring their own supply of oxygen. As a result, people of all degrees of wealth, rank, and status have resorted to treating loved ones at home, with whatever medicine and equipment they can obtain, out of pure necessity.

Desperate for a cure, the Burmese people turned to Facebook for ‘magic solutions’. Social media is ablaze with all kinds of witchcraft and quackery, with endless posts containing well-repeated hearsay on topics ranging from techniques to save a life, to methods of increasing bodily oxygen levels, or potions that, once ingested, will certainly, remove the coronavirus. It is in no way strange to read such advice as inhaling the fumes of a hair-dryer to boost oxygen levels or to chew raw onion (three times a day) whilst absorbing the virus nullifying heat into one’s lungs.

We have tried hard to dispel these myths through our work, releasing broadcasts countering popular misconceptions and interviewing medical professionals to improve access to useful and correct knowledge. The examples above may sound preposterous to outsiders, but millions of Burmese, out of hope and desperate, have found refuge in such information.

Importantly, Burma has reached a point of total nihilism with regard to coronavirus facts and figures. The junta lacks the bandwidth, and certainly the motive, to promote data that in any way resembles realities on the ground. We receive anecdotal data from burial grounds, funeral services, and organizations thanklessly working to contain the outbreak. But, similarly, all this provides is rumour and numbers. The hard fact is that every single day, the news of many more dead and infected reaches us through the experiences of our households, our relatives, and our friends. And this news is always the most immediate. The experience of being so perpetually surrounded by death is hard to convey.

The whole world is vocally struggling to curb the spread of Covid-19. But, in the case of Burma, the people have been made voiceless. Our experience tells us that the military regime is either intentionally removing the last lifelines of help available to the Burmese people to quell challenges to their rule, or is woefully lacking in will and capacity to manage a crisis of their proportion. Before the February coup, Yangon had close to 20 well-functioning Covid-19 treatment centers. Now there are four, all essentially being left to fail, turning back almost all those who need life-saving attention. The military, whose targeting of medical professionals is well documented, has cornered itself. Instead of building emergency treatment centers and field hospitals, the regime is investing heavily in crematoriums.

Very soon, they recently announced, Yangon’s funeral pyres will have the capacity to cremate 3,000 corpses a day.

Burma needs immediate humanitarian intervention from the international community more than any time before. Burma desperately needs your attention and help now.

Aye Chan Naing

Chief Editor (DVB)

1st August 2021

Photos – MPA

How Retailers Can Cut Emissions

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When you need your company to have a new website or if you venture on updating your old webpage with a new look and functionality, the choices are versatile. Assuming that you will go the easy way and choose a theme for your WordPress website, the overall number of characteristics that you will need to keep in mind narrows down significantly.

All the WordPress themes that we have here have had a vast team of professional designers sketching, working and executing the ultimate visual look for it. With such a wide range of choices at hand, we strongly advise you to stick to the WordPress Theme that is based on your business’ or a closely related field.

I’m as proud of many of the things we haven’t done as the things we have done.EMMA DOE, Company CEO

When you need your company to have a new website or if you venture on updating your old webpage with a new look and functionality, the choices are versatile. Assuming that you will go the easy way and choose a theme for your WordPress website, the overall number of characteristics that you will need to keep in mind narrows down significantly. Often searching out the graphical symmetry in chaos, while still maintaining the personality and emotion of the subject. The excitement and anticipation as we waited to see the next piece of unpredictable chaos was electric.

Thailand presses on with Cambodia border fence after 2025 clashes

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A section of the border fence between Thailand and Cambodia in Pong Nam Ron district, Chanthaburi province, where a reinforced concrete barrier topped with mesh panels and concertina razor wire was built by the Development Military Command under the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, in Thailand, on July 22, 2026. (Credit: Reuters)

Thailand has completed the first section of a permanent border ​fence along parts of its frontier with Cambodia, ‌the Thai military said on Wednesday, as tensions persist between the two Southeast Asian neighbours following two rounds of fighting last year.

Chief of ​Defence Forces General Ukrit Boontanon described the 0.8 mile (1.3 km) stretch ​of reinforced concrete panels topped with steel mesh and ⁠concertina wire in the eastern Pong Nam Ron district as “stable, ​strong and durable”, saying it had been designed for long-term ​security.

“The concrete wall panels here have been test-fired. We have confirmed they can protect against small-arms fire,” Ukrit told reporters during a media tour ​of the site.

Ukrit said the military planned to build more ​than 4.3 miles (7 km) of additional fencing connected to the existing section, ‌while ⁠assessing other areas of the 508 mile (817 km) frontier where terrain and environmental conditions would allow similar construction.

“Each area has different conditions,” he said. “We will build where it is beneficial and where it ​can be done ​without creating ⁠future problems.”

Troops remain deployed on both sides of the Thailand-Cambodia border, where longstanding territorial disputes erupted ​into violent clashes with the use of air ​strikes and ⁠artillery in July and December last year, killing nearly 150 people and displacing 300,000.

The July outbreak was settled after five days ⁠following ​an intervention by U.S. President Donald Trump, ​but clashes flared up again for 20 days in December before both sides ​agreed to a bilateral ceasefire.

REUTERS

Thai Prime Minister to discuss river pollution during regime leader Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Bangkok

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Thailand’s Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul at the ASEAN 47th Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on Oct 26, 2025. (Credit: Reuters)

The Thai prime minister said today that he would raise the ongoing toxic contamination in a river in northern Thailand with the Myanmar regime leader during his official visit early next month.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said Thailand would seek cooperation directly from Min Aung Hlaing, who will be on an official visit to Bangkok on August 3-4, as the issue concerns both countries.

Thailand will use the upcoming visit to press for Myanmar’s full cooperation in addressing toxic contamination in the Kok River, Anutin said, adding, “The matter between neighbouring countries should first be discussed and resolved between ourselves… This will not be just a ceremonial visit involving a banquet or an inspection of the guard of honour.”

“We will hold substantive discussions on issues that are beneficial to both countries,” Anutin insisted.

He added that Myanmar regime Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe met him last week, when Thailand conveyed its concerns ahead of Min Aung Hlaing’s visit.

The Kok River, the source of which is in Myanmar’s Shan State before flowing through Thailand’s Chiang Rai Province, has become the focus of growing concern after repeated tests detected elevated levels of arsenic and other heavy metals.

Thai civil networks and local and foreign researchers believe the contamination is linked to upstream gold and rare earth mining operations in Myanmar, many of which are backed by Chinese investors.

The issue has sparked a series of public protests in Thailand.

On July 6, environmental groups and local residents marched to the Chinese Consulate-General in Chiang Mai to demand action over what they described as cross-border pollution from mining operations in Myanmar.

Two days later, activists gathered outside the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok, urging Beijing to help address the alleged environmental impacts of Chinese-backed mining projects and calling for greater protection of communities along the Kok, Sai, Ruak and Mekong rivers.

Anutin added that the two sides would also discuss other cross-border issues, including agricultural burning, efforts to combat the production of illicit drugs and other matters of mutual concern.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow said during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila that Min Aung Hlaing’s upcoming visit to Thailand is part of a dual-track approach.

“There are pressing bilateral issues we have to deal with, issues of … transnational crime, scams and the issue of drugs,” he said, adding that the approach did not mean abandoning ASEAN’s long-standing five-point peace plan.

Myanmar’s senior regime officials, including Min Aung Hlaing, have been formally excluded from ASEAN’s major meetings since he seized power in a 2021 coup that toppled Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratically elected government.

Myanmar is being represented by its regime foreign affairs permanent secretary at the ongoing Manila meeting.

According to AFP, Sihasak also said he has asked his ASEAN counterparts to think about “how we measure progress” at a recent meeting in Bangkok with Myanmar regime Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe.

“If the government in Myanmar provides access [to Suu Kyi] for the ASEAN special envoy, is that a measure of progress? If there’s some reduction of violence, let’s say along the Thai-Myanmar border … is that progress?”

“Our point was that we have to be realistic,” he said. “It’s not going to happen overnight. Some progress would come incrementally.”

ThaiPBS World

Deadly neglect behind bars: Medical fatalities in Myanmar prisons reach 148

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Tun Myint, a farmer who was convicted of providing support to the People’s Defense Force and sentenced to 10-years in prison, died from a stroke in Bago Region’s Paungde Hospital on July 12. (Credit: PPNM)

A 72-year-old farmer imprisoned under anti-terrorism laws has died following a stroke in Bago Region, marking the latest death linked to severe medical neglect inside Myanmar’s penal system.

The death of Tun Myint at Paungde Hospital on July 12 highlights a catastrophic healthcare crisis across the regime’s prison network, where dozens of political detainees continue to succumb to curable illnesses, untreated interrogation injuries, and restricted emergency care.

The death of Tun Myint: Healthy before conviction

According to the Political Prisoners Network Myanmar (PPNM), Tun Myint was in good health prior to his arrest by regime forces.

On November 21, 2022, he was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison under Section 50(J) of the Counter-Terrorism Law for allegedly providing financial support to the People’s Defence Force (PDF)—the armed wing of the democratic opposition designated as a “terrorist organization” by the regime in May 2021.

“He suffered from a stroke and lacked adequate medical care,” PPNM stated, noting that Tun Myint is the second political prisoner from Paungde Prison to die from substandard medical treatment since last year.

Nationwide toll: 148 deaths across 32 facilities

Data released by PPNM reveals that between July 2021 and May 2026, at least 148 political prisoners have died in 32 detention centers across Myanmar due to systemic delays and severe restrictions on healthcare services.

The fatalities are heavily concentrated in major urban correctional facilities:

Correctional Facilities with Highest Medical Death Rates
├── Insein Prison (Yangon): Accounts for 34.5% of all documented medical deaths
└── Obo Prison (Mandalay): Accounts for 12.8% of all documented medical deaths

Demographics and causes of death

The monitoring group’s casualty logs reveal that while the majority of those dying behind bars are working-age men, the toll spans across all demographics, including minors and the elderly.

Demographic CategoryPercentage / Breakdown
Men86% of total deceased political prisoners
Women13% of total deceased political prisoners
LGBTQ+ Detainees1% of total deceased political prisoners
Primary Age BracketMajority aged 36 to 55 years old
Extreme Age GroupsIncludes 2 minors under 17 and several elderly prisoners over 70

PPNM emphasized that detainees are dying from curable diseases due to strict administrative “time restrictions” on medical assistance and deliberate refusals by prison authorities to transfer critically ill inmates to external public hospitals.

Primary causes of death documented across the 32 prisons include:

  • Untreated Interrogation Injuries: Internal bleeding, organ damage, and physical trauma inflicted during initial torture sessions.
  • Infectious Diseases & Malnutrition: Rapid spread of tuberculosis, severe skin infections, and malnutrition in overcrowded cells.
  • Surgical Delays: Chronic, long-term illnesses left unmanaged due to a lack of qualified medical staff and equipment inside prison walls.

Demands for international accountability

The escalating death toll occurs against the backdrop of a massive, ongoing detention campaign executed by the regime. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), at least 31,539 people have been arrested for anti-coup political activity or perceived dissent since the 2021 military takeover.

In response to the growing fatalities inside facilities like Paungde, Insein, and Obo, PPNM has called on international human rights bodies and the United Nations to hold the regime in Naypyidaw and its Myanmar Prisons Department directly accountable for gross medical negligence and systematic prisoner rights violations.

Min Aung Hlaing to visit Bangkok for talks with Thai Prime Minister

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Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing with Thailand's Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow in Naypyidaw on April 22. (Credit: Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

In a major diplomatic development signaling a shift in Southeast Asian regional engagement, Myanmar regime leader Min Aung Hlaing is set to meet with Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul in Bangkok Aug. 6-7.

The visit will mark Min Aung Hlaing’s second official trip to an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member state since being inaugurated as president by a pro-military parliament on April 10, following tightly controlled elections.

The upcoming bilateral summit comes as Thailand pushes a “dual-track” approach to address pressing border crises, even as internal debate deepens over ASEAN’s long-stalled peace plan.

A ‘dual-track’ border focus: Scams, drugs, and security

Speaking to reporters in Manila, Thai Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow confirmed the August bilateral sit-down, emphasizing that Bangkok must pragmatically manage urgent national security issues stemming from its shared 1,501-mile (2,416 km) border with Myanmar.

Key priorities for the bilateral talks include:

  • Transnational Crime & Scam Networks: Dismantling industrial-scale cyber scam centers operating along the border that exploit thousands of foreign traffic victims.
  • Narcotics Trafficking: Stemming the flow of illicit drugs pouring through porous border corridors.
  • Conflict Facilitation: Exploring whether Thailand can help facilitate informal dialogue between Naypyidaw and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) stationed along the border zone.

While Sihasak stated he will explicitly remind Min Aung Hlaing of his commitments under ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, he managed expectations regarding any sudden political breakthroughs.

“Our point was that we have to be realistic,” Sihasak noted. “It’s not going to happen overnight. Some progress will come incrementally.”

Resistance and rejection

The upcoming summit takes place against a backdrop of open resistance to regional diplomatic frameworks from Naypyidaw itself. O

n July 9, Myanmar’s pro-military parliament—dominated by the proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)—officially labeled ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus “irrelevant,” further highlighting the gap between ASEAN expectations and regime policy.

Despite this pushback, regional diplomats are seeking ways to restructure their engagement. Speaking in Manila on July 21, Philippine Special Envoy Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro—representing the 2026 ASEAN Chair—announced that the regional bloc is actively considering appointing a permanent special envoy to Myanmar.

Lazaro conceded that ASEAN’s traditional yearly rotation system, tied to the rotating chairmanship, has “not really been effective” in maintaining long-term political momentum.

Backlash over ‘informal’ engagement

The diplomatic push has exposed deep fractures within the regional bloc and civil society:

Recent Regional Engagement Timeline
├── July 9, 2026: USDP-led parliament declares 5PC "irrelevant"
├── July 12, 2026: Special Envoy Lazaro holds informal talks with regime FM Tin Maung Swe in Bangkok
├── Mid-July 2026: Lazaro meets separately with NUG & SCEF resistance representatives in Pattaya
└── July 21, 2026: ASEAN considers permanent special envoy appointment to replace yearly rotation

Lazaro drew heavy criticism after breaking a five-year precedent on July 12 by holding informal face-to-face talks in Bangkok with regime Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe, before holding separate consultations in Pattaya with opposition figures from the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF).

Rights groups, including ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) and the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), strongly condemned the direct meeting with the regime foreign minister, warning that engaging senior regime representatives rewards military atrocities while eroding ASEAN’s own peace roadmap.

In response, Lazaro forcefully defended the bloc’s diplomatic maneuvers, slamming her critics for spreading what she termed “malicious and misleading” distortions of regional peace efforts, maintaining that direct, multi-stakeholder dialogue remains the only viable path to de-escalation.

SpaceX & Microsoft added to Burma Campaign UK ‘Dirty List’ over Myanmar military links

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Members of the Myanmar diaspora in the U.K. stage a "Proof of Life" rally, demanding the regime in Naypyidaw provide independent verification that jailed State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi is alive, in front of the Myanmar embassy in London on July 21. (Credit: CJ)

Human rights advocacy group Burma Campaign UK has officially added Elon Musk’s SpaceX—the parent company of satellite internet provider Starlink—alongside 53 other international corporations to its infamous “Dirty List”.

The updated registry highlights foreign companies accused of directly or indirectly aiding Myanmar’s military regime through business operations, technology transfers, energy services, or commercial partnerships. The addition of 53 new entities from 17 countries (including the U.S., U.K., and E.U.) brings the total number of blacklisted corporations to 228.

The Starlink paradox: Education lifeline vs. tool for criminals

SpaceX’s inclusion follows an urgent appeal by 255 Myanmar civil society organizations (CSOs) regarding Starlink internet service disruptions across the country.

The CSOs described the satellite service as a “matter of life and death,” noting that over 800,000 students rely on Starlink connections to access 6,000 virtual schools operated by the underground National Unity Government (NUG).

However, Burma Campaign UK warned that the technology is a double-edged sword:

  • Unsanctioned Exploitation: Illicit Starlink terminals and international telecommunications hardware continue to be actively exploited by military-owned enterprises and affiliated criminal networks along Myanmar’s porous borders.
  • Lack of Oversight: Big tech firms have failed to implement effective safeguards to prevent their hardware and infrastructure from being co-opted by state-backed illicit actors.
Burma Campaign UK "Dirty List" Expansion
├── New Additions: 53 international corporations across 17 countries
├── Total Blacklisted Companies: 228 entities
└── Key Western Tech & Energy Additions:
    ├── Tech Sector: SpaceX (Starlink), Microsoft, Oracle, Cisco, Fortinet
    └── Oil & Gas Sector: Halliburton, SLB (Schlumberger)

‘Big Tech Is the New Big Tobacco’

Burma Campaign UK noted that the corporations were added to the list following exhaustive reviews of corporate registry records, U.N. documentation, and local civil society reports. The group contacted almost all affected firms prior to publication, offering them an opportunity to clarify their operations or cut ties with the military regime.

Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK, issued a scathing rebuke of multinational corporations operating in conflict zones: “No company can claim to have ethical or socially responsible policies and at the same time be linked to the genocidal Burmese military,” Farmaner stated.

“Big techs are the new big tobacco, operating without ethics, seemingly happy to provide services to the Burmese military regardless of their human rights record.”

Funding an air war executed ‘Every 2.5 hours’

The rights group stressed that international corporate engagement directly fuels the regime’s military logistics, particularly its devastating aerial campaign against civilian communities.

According to data compiled by DVB, regime forces have carried out at least 3,576 aerial attacks nationwide since March 2025, killing at least 2,510 civilians.

Military Operation MetricDocumented Figure
Airstrikes Executed (Since March 2025)3,576 attacks
Confirmed Civilian Deaths from Air Campaign2,510 fatalities
Frequency of Junta Airstrikes1 airstrike every 2.5 hours

“The Burmese military carries out an airstrike every two and a half hours. It is inexplicable that so many companies appear unconcerned that they are providing assistance to the military,” Farmaner added.

“That’s incredibly expensive and the Burmese military couldn’t do it without help from international companies which help arm them, finance them, and provide technology to them.”

Myanmar resistance coalition wants ‘stronger penalties’ from ASEAN on regime in Naypyidaw

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ASEAN foreign ministers are joined by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand during the Gala Dinner for the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Manila, Philippines, on July 21. (Credit: ASEAN)

The Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF)—Myanmar’s premier resistance coalition—has called on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to execute an “inclusive and results-oriented” diplomatic effort to resolve the country’s multi-layered crisis since the military coup on Feb. 1, 2021.

In a formal message dispatched to the July 20-24 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila, Philippines, on Monday, the coalition urged regional leaders to move beyond rhetoric and impose concrete consequences on the military regime in Naypyidaw for its persistent refusal to implement the regional peace roadmap.

Enforcing the Five-Point Consensus

National Unity Government (NUG) Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung told DVB that the SCEF is explicitly demanding stronger penalties against regime leader Min Aung Hlaing if his administration continues to ignore the Five-Point Consensus agreed upon in April 2021.

While backing the core objectives of the regional bloc’s peace plan, the SCEF emphasized four non-negotiable pillars for any viable peace track:

  • An Immediate Halt to Civilian Attacks: Ending the regime’s campaign of aerial bombardments and ground offensives.
  • Unrestricted Humanitarian Delivery: Guaranteeing aid reaches conflict zones through cross-border and local channels without military blockades.
  • Inclusive Stakeholder Dialogue: Rejecting exclusionary or separate engagement channels that favour the regime.
  • Unconditional Release of Political Prisoners: Freeing all arbitrarily detained figures, including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

The SCEF stated that it has the “strongest claim” to democratic legitimacy and effective ground control in Myanmar because it unites lawmakers elected in the 2020 general election alongside major “Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations,” which are ethnic armed groups opposed to the 2021 coup.

The SCEF Resistance Coalition (Established March 30, 2026)
├── Civilian & Legislative Core: National Unity Government (NUG) & CRPH
└── Ethnic Armed Partners (EROs):
    ├── Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)
    ├── Karen National Union (KNU)
    ├── Chin National Front (CNF)
    └── Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)

The ‘Proof of Life’ Campaign

The diplomatic push comes amid lingering anxieties surrounding top civilian leaders detained since the February 1, 2021 coup:

The human rights group ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) has allied with the SCEF, calling directly on Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (the 2026 ASEAN Chair) and Timor-Leste President José Ramos-Horta to exert maximum diplomatic pressure for the immediate release of all political detainees.

ASEAN’s diplomatic backlash

The regional bloc faces severe internal friction over its handling of Naypyidaw. Following a tightly controlled 2025–26 election widely condemned as a “sham” by the NUG, SCEF, and international monitors, Min Aung Hlaing resigned as military commander-in-chief and was inaugurated as president on April 10.

Recent ASEAN Diplomatic Timeline
├── April 10, 2026: Min Aung Hlaing inaugurated as President following sham elections
├── July 12, 2026: Special Envoy Lazaro holds "informal" meeting with regime FM Tin Maung Swe in Bangkok
└── July 13–15, 2026: Special Envoy holds separate talks with NUG, SCEF, and EROs in Pattaya

Although ASEAN officially maintains a policy excluding senior regime representatives from high-level summits, its 2026 Chair Special Envoy on Myanmar Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro broke a five-year precedent by convening an “informal” meeting with regime Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe in Bangkok on July 12.

Lazaro subsequently held separate consultations with NUG and SCEF representatives in Pattaya. The move drew fierce condemnation from APHR and the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), who warned that engaging the regime rewards it while undermining ASEAN’s own peace plan.

Lazaro slammed her critics, stating that they are spreading “malicious and misleading” distortions of regional peace efforts.

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