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The end of the settlement: Yangon squat clearances uproot thousands

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A life’s worth of possessions are stacked in a heap on the ground. The owner of the ragged parcels, U Maw, looks in the other direction, at an imposing pile of timber that once was his home.

Yesterday morning, as soldiers looked on—fingers aching towards their triggers—U Maw had been forced to destroy what he once built on this land by his own labor. Around him, neighboring families had been ordered to deconstruct their homes, piece by piece, by themselves.

“We have no choice but to destroy the things that we built with our own hands. Otherwise the soldiers will destroy everything, and that will make everything useless,” U Maw said, despairingly.

On October 25, the Township General Administration Department of the Southern District of Yangon ordered the removal of businesses and settlements beside the Dagon-Thilawa Road. Three days later, approximately 100 people, including municipal leaders and armed security forces, arrived at the site, ready to perform a total clearance.

The eviction ran from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m., soldiers ripping apart the settlement’s famous dry food stores, slowly tearing down every obstacle in their path until they reached Kalawal village on the banks of the Bago River.

The morning of October 28 was an historic tragedy which had been long-delayed for Yangon’s squatters, an understated humanitarian disaster in Burma’s most developed urban area.

Whilst troops were beginning the destruction of Thanlyin’s settlements, a similar scene was already underway on the other side of town. 

To the north, in Hlaingtharyar, security forces had earlier closed the two arterial Bayintnaung Bridges that connect the township to central Yangon, leading to a huge backlog of trucks and cars blocking roads into Hlaing.

“There are between 7,000 and 8,000 squatters along the Yangon-Pathein highway, and half of them are moving this morning as a force of soldiers, police, members of YCDC [Yangon City Development Committee], and plainclothes security forces have arrived,” said a local man supporting the squatters. 

Military trucks entered Hlaingtharyar at around 6.30 a.m. yesterday morning, in tow: two bulldozers and some expectant prison vans.

“On seeing the convoy, some took their belongings; some even took pieces of their home,” the local man said.

“However, most of those moving were the wealthier few whose businesses had been doing alright; the working class residents didn’t leave. When I asked them what they would do, they said that they’d have to settle another empty plot because they’re unable to afford rent, and have nobody to go to for help,” he said.

The settlers from both sides of Yangon were moving following an ultimatum delivered by the military just three days previously. 

Settlements being torn down in Hlaingtharyar, north Yangon, yesterday

Despite the settlements hosting both homes and well-established small businesses for decades, the junta announced on October 25 that it was to demolish all homes. On the day of the announcement, 70 people were taken into temporary custody in Hlaingtharyar after protesting the order.

When troops returned, resistance was muted. 

“​​I believe the police and military had guns, most were threatened with detainment if they didn’t comply… Though it seems they are willing to do worse,” said one foreign social worker who had arranged transport for those fleeing the clearances.

“We had a small team […] taking lists of those who wanted to go to their hometowns and those who wanted to be moved to another location. However the volume is much much larger than we anticipated, originally we were told 100-150 people, then 1000-2000. Now there is a possibility of 20,000 in total, according to a contact.”

She told DVB that, due to the presence of troops, it had been too dangerous to transport those leaving yesterday. Her group will now ferry settlers today and into the weekend, “before the Tatmadaw burns everything”.

Whilst soldiers intimated those in Hlaingtharyar, a similar scene was unfolding in Thanlyin.

“The soldiers ordered us to sign an eviction notice, if not they said they will shoot us,” U Maw said.  

“Nobody dares to go against them as they carry weapons. I just had to watch them tear down the tents with bulldozers,” he added. 

 “They didn’t want anyone to take photos of the eviction, and it is still going on,” added a local Red Cross Society member. 

The Dagon-Thilawa Road settlements, Thanlyin, before the clearance

Like U Maw, a majority of the squatters with no place to go have congregated by the side of the road, watching others depart.

Established by the SLORC in 1998 as a resettlement for 300,000 migratory inhabitants of Yangon’s Downtown area, the settlements on the Yangon-Pathein Road also hosted thousands of people who fled the Ayeyarwady delta region following 2008’s Cyclone Nargis.

Under the NLD government, more than 250,000 squatter households had been issued resident certificates for Yangon Region, and plans were well underway to allow them to eventually get access to low-income housing.

Similarly, over 200 households have been located beside the No.2 Thanlyin Road for almost a decade, many of whom run small businesses; over 50 well-known dry food stores, fuel shops, and tea, coffee, and palm wine sellers lined the road, a source of both shelter and sustenance for local farm laborers from the surrounding fields of Thanlyin. Residents had made an agreement with Hluttaw representatives that they believed allowed them to stay.

Only now, with a dominant and unaccountable military rule over the land—held in the name of the state and military-backed landowners—have clearances become a reality.  

“Now it is all gone. They cut down the foundations of homes and destroyed everything: the place is empty now. Some people who have no place to go, like us, are sitting by the road with their belongings. I don’t know what to do,” said U Hla Htay, one of those now searching for a new beginning.

Pro-military rallies once again bolstered with paid stooges, witnesses say

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Two independent sources confirmed yesterday that a majority of recent pro-military protestors in a number of towns were paid by the military to attend rallies that were held on Monday. 

On October 25, pro-military rallies took place close to military bases in towns including Myitkyina and Putao in Kachin, in Pyin Oo Lwin, Madara, and Meiktila in Mandalay, as well as in Yangon, Naypyidaw, Lashio, Pathein, and Mawlamyine.

The protests come as tensions festering between those for and against Burma’s military institution have spilled out into open warfare, and when the eyes of Southeast Asia have fallen back upon Burma following the start of the ASEAN Summit.

One source, who preferred to remain anonymous to preserve the contingency of his activism work, said that, between 7 and 9 a.m., protests erupted in Aye Mya Tharyar ward and Panmatti village in Myitkyina. He says that the majority of protestors, if not all, were paid anywhere from K5,000 to K10,000 (US$2.8 – 5.6).

“It’s estimated that around 300 participated in the march, but bystanders dared not say anything, because it was held inside the military headquarters,” he said. “They chanted the slogans: ‘We don’t need UN support, who supports OIC,’ ‘We don’t want ASEAN,’ ‘Oppose the NUG and CRPH rioters, ‘oppose PDF, and ‘Myanmar military is our army.’”

In Kachin, the anonymous activist says the junta also played on ethnic tensions to bolster their numbers, noting that protests also consisted of those from Lisu and Shanni groups (some of whose leaders are strongly sympathetic to the military), Ma Ba Tha, the ultra-orthodox Buddhist group, and families of military personnel, who he says were ordered to attend. He added that this is not the first time the military has played on the tensions between the Lisu and Shanni People’s Army and the local Kachin Independence Army. 

“They have a feeling about the KIA, as they got arrested by the KIA and accused the KIA of asking for money,” the anonymous activist said. “By using those feelings, the Tatmadaw formed the Shanni People’s Army and Lisu People’s Army.”

Similar trends were reported in Pathein, where three-day rallies slowly garnered participants from October 25 to 27, peaking at 90 people on the second day, but falling to a mere 40 by October 27. 

Human rights activist U Tun Tun Oo reported that the majority of protestors in Pathein were recruited from the working class and poorer wards, with some offered up to K15,000 to participate. Despite trying to keep a safe distance from the protests himself, the activist says he could verify this through being in constant communication with those with pro-military allies.

“They are protesting, but look insecure. The pro-military protesters in Pathein were clearly either people who were out of money, informants (dalan), or members of the army. There really are not many people who support the military,” he said, echoing the theory that the protests were orchestrated to demonstrate alleged military support.

“In addition, these pro-military protests came across the country after the ASEAN’s meeting, which did not invite the junta leader to attend the summit,” he said, noting the suspicious trend of pro-military rallies appearing at times that the military feels insecure. 

Another anonymous source said that the military had used a similar tactic in other regions, paying up to K10,000 to people—largely those with low education and literacy levels—that soldiers had gathered.

Such bribery is certainly not a new tactic, and is reminiscent of junta-backed protests immediately following the coup, where protestors admitted to participating for between K2,000 and K10,000. After protests in many towns turned lethal, many others said that they had received orders, and in some cases weaponry, to cause violence towards pro-democracy protesters.

Appeal for Action

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OxyFeature

As editor in chief of one of the few remaining independent media organizations, we collect, check and spread the news about Burma. Through various credible contacts inside the military-ruled country, I receive heartbreaking messages about Covid-19 every day, which I think the international community ought to react to as an immediate urgency. One might ask why so alarming as every country around the world is facing the Covid-19 pandemic, but the case in Burma is different.

News of the deaths of close family, of best friends, of relatives, is no longer considered news at all. Loved ones failing in their desperate attempts to find oxygen, similarly, is no longer news. Families spending household savings to purchase faulty concentrators or overpriced and ineffective medicines; no longer news. The hundreds of deceased being cremated daily, the dark smoke of death lingering over Yangon both day and night; not news. The virus has spread across all layers of Burma’s society, indiscriminate and ruthless. Even the last of the frontline medical workers, not yet persecuted by the junta, are falling prey to Covid-19.

Since February’s coup, state hospitals will not admit a patient without “status” or a “connection” to the military nexus: even officers and their families have been denied treatment on arrival. Out of lack of resources or fear of reprisals, private hospitals have chosen to ignore the majority of patients, those lucky enough to find a bed have only been admitted under the proviso they bring their own supply of oxygen. As a result, people of all degrees of wealth, rank, and status have resorted to treating loved ones at home, with whatever medicine and equipment they can obtain, out of pure necessity.

Desperate for a cure, the Burmese people turned to Facebook for ‘magic solutions’. Social media is ablaze with all kinds of witchcraft and quackery, with endless posts containing well-repeated hearsay on topics ranging from techniques to save a life, to methods of increasing bodily oxygen levels, or potions that, once ingested, will certainly, remove the coronavirus. It is in no way strange to read such advice as inhaling the fumes of a hair-dryer to boost oxygen levels or to chew raw onion (three times a day) whilst absorbing the virus nullifying heat into one’s lungs.

We have tried hard to dispel these myths through our work, releasing broadcasts countering popular misconceptions and interviewing medical professionals to improve access to useful and correct knowledge. The examples above may sound preposterous to outsiders, but millions of Burmese, out of hope and desperate, have found refuge in such information.

Importantly, Burma has reached a point of total nihilism with regard to coronavirus facts and figures. The junta lacks the bandwidth, and certainly the motive, to promote data that in any way resembles realities on the ground. We receive anecdotal data from burial grounds, funeral services, and organizations thanklessly working to contain the outbreak. But, similarly, all this provides is rumour and numbers. The hard fact is that every single day, the news of many more dead and infected reaches us through the experiences of our households, our relatives, and our friends. And this news is always the most immediate. The experience of being so perpetually surrounded by death is hard to convey.

The whole world is vocally struggling to curb the spread of Covid-19. But, in the case of Burma, the people have been made voiceless. Our experience tells us that the military regime is either intentionally removing the last lifelines of help available to the Burmese people to quell challenges to their rule, or is woefully lacking in will and capacity to manage a crisis of their proportion. Before the February coup, Yangon had close to 20 well-functioning Covid-19 treatment centers. Now there are four, all essentially being left to fail, turning back almost all those who need life-saving attention. The military, whose targeting of medical professionals is well documented, has cornered itself. Instead of building emergency treatment centers and field hospitals, the regime is investing heavily in crematoriums.

Very soon, they recently announced, Yangon’s funeral pyres will have the capacity to cremate 3,000 corpses a day.

Burma needs immediate humanitarian intervention from the international community more than any time before. Burma desperately needs your attention and help now.

Aye Chan Naing

Chief Editor (DVB)

1st August 2021

Photos – MPA

How Retailers Can Cut Emissions

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When you need your company to have a new website or if you venture on updating your old webpage with a new look and functionality, the choices are versatile. Assuming that you will go the easy way and choose a theme for your WordPress website, the overall number of characteristics that you will need to keep in mind narrows down significantly.

All the WordPress themes that we have here have had a vast team of professional designers sketching, working and executing the ultimate visual look for it. With such a wide range of choices at hand, we strongly advise you to stick to the WordPress Theme that is based on your business’ or a closely related field.

I’m as proud of many of the things we haven’t done as the things we have done.EMMA DOE, Company CEO

When you need your company to have a new website or if you venture on updating your old webpage with a new look and functionality, the choices are versatile. Assuming that you will go the easy way and choose a theme for your WordPress website, the overall number of characteristics that you will need to keep in mind narrows down significantly. Often searching out the graphical symmetry in chaos, while still maintaining the personality and emotion of the subject. The excitement and anticipation as we waited to see the next piece of unpredictable chaos was electric.

‘Ek Khaale’ the Rohingya visual restoration and storytelling project

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'Ek Khaale' is a Rohingya visual restoration and storytelling project started by Greg Constantine in 2020. (Credit: Ek Khaale)

The Ek Khaale visual restoration project was started by documentary photographer Greg Constantine and the Rohingya community in 2020. Ek Khaale means “Once Upon a Time” in the Rohingya language. It was launched in collaboration with Rohingya living inside Burma, as well as in the Bangladesh refugee camps, and the diaspora living in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Malaysia and Europe. Read more about it here.

It’s time for India to rethink its Myanmar strategy post-Typhoon Yagi

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Guest contributor

Shalini Perumal

On Sept. 9, the remnants of Typhoon Yagi wreaked havoc across Myanmar, resulting in catastrophic flooding that has left a lasting mark on the nation’s already precarious humanitarian landscape. With over 419 confirmed deaths and approximately 887,000 people affected, according to the U.N., the disaster intensified the ongoing crisis stemming from the military coup in February 2021. 

In response, India launched Operation Sadbhav, dispatching 53 tonnes of emergency flood relief assistance valued at $1 million USD to Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. However, this gesture, framed as an act of solidarity, unfolds against a backdrop of complex political dynamics and longstanding challenges in India’s foreign policy towards Myanmar.

The impact of Typhoon Yagi highlights the vulnerabilities within Myanmar, a country grappling with both natural disasters and a political crisis ignited by the military’s ousting of the country’s elected civilian National League for Democracy (NLD) government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. 

The floods exacerbated an already dire situation for millions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), particularly for marginalized ethnic minorities such as the Rohingya, the Kachin, and the Karen communities. These groups have faced systemic discrimination, violence, and human rights abuses, leading to heightened humanitarian needs even before the cyclone struck. 

Reports indicate that approximately 1.3 million people are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, with urgent calls for food, clean water, medical supplies, and shelter. The U.N. has indicated the critical nature of the situation, stating that many affected areas remain difficult to access due to damaged infrastructure. 

India’s aid to Myanmar includes essential supplies such as food, medical kits, and hygiene products, aimed at alleviating the suffering of affected populations. This initiative is framed as a gesture of goodwill and regional solidarity, emphasizing India’s commitment to humanitarian principles. 

Yet, beneath this humanitarian veneer lies a complex web of geopolitical interests. India has long viewed Myanmar as a crucial partner in its Act East policy, which seeks to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian nations and counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region. 

The strategic significance of Myanmar cannot be overstated; it serves as a key conduit for India’s connectivity projects, including the ambitious Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP), which aims to link India’s eastern coastline with its northeastern states. 

However, India’s past approach to Myanmar has been criticized for prioritizing strategic interests over ethical considerations. Since the 2021 coup, India’s stance has been perceived as tacit support for the illegal junta in Naypyidaw, a position that has drawn ire from human rights organizations and international observers. 

By engaging with a regime that is widely condemned for human rights abuses, India risks complicity in the junta’s oppressive measures while attempting to maintain a façade of humanitarianism. 

This delicate balancing act raises critical questions: Can India genuinely assist the affected communities while simultaneously supporting a government engaged in egregious human rights violations? 

Critics argue that India’s continued engagement with the junta undermines its humanitarian efforts. Human rights advocates have long urged India to take a firmer stance against the military’s actions, emphasizing that true humanitarian assistance must be paired with a commitment to human rights and democratic governance. 

The juxtaposition of humanitarian aid and political complicity creates a perception that India prioritizes its strategic interests over the welfare of vulnerable populations. Moreover, the situation has profound implications for ethnic minorities, whose needs and rights are often overlooked. 

The humanitarian crisis caused by Typhoon Yagi raises important questions about representation and access to aid for these marginalized communities. India’s policy toward Myanmar must adapt to acknowledge these complexities and ensure that assistance reaches those who need it most. 

In addition to the immediate humanitarian needs caused by the floods, India faces a pressing challenge with the influx of refugees from Myanmar. Since 2021, tens of thousands have fled to India, seeking safety from escalating violence. The government’s response to these refugees has been inconsistent, often marked by increased scrutiny and, in some cases, denial of entry. The Rohingya, a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority from Myanmar, face particularly harsh treatment. 

Historically, India has adopted a stringent stance toward Rohingya refugees, citing national security concerns. This approach raises ethical questions about India’s commitment to humanitarian principles, especially when the very communities in need of protection are met with hostility. 

With over 45,000 Myanmar nationals currently seeking refuge in northeastern states, the challenge for India is twofold: safeguarding its borders while meeting its humanitarian obligations. As reports indicate that many refugees are fleeing the junta’s brutal crackdown, India’s policy towards them reveals significant tensions between national security and humanitarian responsibilities. 

The recent invitation extended to political and military opponents of the junta for a seminar in New Delhi indicates a potential shift in India’s stance. This engagement with non-state actors, including ethnic minority representatives, reflects an understanding that India’s policy must be more inclusive. However, it also raises questions about the sincerity of such initiatives given India’s historical engagement with the junta. 

As the conflict in Myanmar intensifies and ethnic tensions continue to rise, it is crucial for India to reevaluate its approach to the country. The Arakan Army’s expanding control over key regions poses a threat to India’s strategic initiatives with the illegal junta, notably the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, which has been positioned by the Indian government as essential for regional connectivity. 

To effectively navigate this shifting political landscape, India must recalibrate its engagement strategy, emphasizing collaboration with community-based organizations (CBOs). Engaging with CBOs is vital for several reasons. These organizations have deep local knowledge and insights into the needs and dynamics of affected communities, particularly marginalized groups. By supporting and partnering with CBOs, India can ensure that its humanitarian assistance is not only timely but also culturally sensitive and targeted effectively to those who need it most. 

The CBOs also often play an important role in advocating for human rights and social justice within their communities. Supporting their efforts can help amplify the voices of marginalized populations and promote accountability for human rights abuses, particularly in light of non-state actors like the Arakan Army’s reported violations against the Rohingya. This alignment with local advocates can strengthen India’s credibility and moral standing in the region. 

Moreover, strengthening ties with CBOs can facilitate greater community resilience, enabling affected populations to better cope with ongoing challenges. By investing in local initiatives and capacity-building, India can contribute to long-term stability and peace in Myanmar, which is essential for the success of strategic projects like the KMTTP. 

India’s humanitarian assistance to Myanmar cannot be separated from the broader issue of human rights and representation for marginalized communities. While the aid dispatched post-Typhoon Yagi signifies a commitment to humanitarian principles, it must also encompass advocacy for the rights of ethnic minorities. 

Historically, these groups have faced systematic marginalization, and the current humanitarian crisis only exacerbates their vulnerabilities. The U.N. and various human rights organizations have called for increased engagement with resistance authorities and civil society to ensure that assistance reaches those in dire need.

The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) has argued that the junta lacks the legitimacy and capacity to deliver aid effectively. Therefore, regional players like India must engage with all stakeholders, including non-state actors and the efforts of CBOs, to facilitate meaningful humanitarian efforts. 

As India navigates its humanitarian response to Myanmar, it must grapple with the complexities of its foreign policy and the implications for human rights. The assistance provided in the wake of Typhoon Yagi highlights India’s commitment to supporting affected communities but also indicates the challenges of reconciling humanitarian efforts with political realities. 

Going forward, India must adopt a more nuanced approach that prioritizes the rights and representation of ethnic minorities. Engaging in inclusive dialogue that condemns the junta’s illegal coup is crucial for any meaningful resolution to the ongoing crisis. Furthermore, India must align its foreign policy with its stated commitment to democracy and human rights, ensuring that humanitarian assistance does not become a tool for political expediency. 

The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar demands urgent relief efforts and sustainable solutions that address the root of political and social challenges. India must reaffirm its ethical commitments by advocating for the rights of marginalized communities and working towards lasting change.


Shalini Perumal is a creative international development professional who has worked previously in Mae Sot, Thailand at Mae Tao Clinic. She is currently a freelance journalist as well as Communications Officer at ActionAid India in New Delhi. The views expressed in the article are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the organization. 

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]

Kachin Independence Army accused of arresting reporters in Myanmar jade mining hub

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Tar Lynn Maung, who reports for the Red News Agency, and Naung Yo, a freelance reporter, were both arrested in Hpakant Township, Kachin State, on Sept. 29. (Credit: Social media)

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is accused of detaining two journalists in the jade-mining hub of Hpakant Township, located around 94 miles (151 km) northwest of the Kachin State capital Myitkyina, on Sept. 29. 

“We have not heard about the arrest as of yet,” Naw Bu, the KIA spokesperson, told DVB.

Tar Lynn Maung, who reports for the Red News Agency, and Naung Yo, a freelance reporter, were both arrested. Their current whereabouts remain unknown, according to locals. 

“A KIA soldier asked a People’s Defense Force member to meet Ko [Tar Lynn Maung] at a restaurant. Since Ko Tar knew the PDF member, he trusted him and went to the restaurant. He was unable to be contacted after that,” a source close to the reporter in Hpakant told DVB.

Naung Yo was arrested shortly afterwards on the same day while investigating Tar Lynn Maung’s arrest. The reason for their detention is unclear. But locals speculate that Tar Lynn Maung was detained for a social media post critical of the KIA.

On Sept. 23, 2023, Tar Lynn Maung was not seriously injured when a car operated by members of a local armed group reportedly rammed into his while driving through a village of Hpakant Township.

After the Feb. 1, 2021 military coup, Tar Lynn Maung left his job at the Ministry of Information and Communications to join the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), and an anti-coup protest group in Kachin State.

In late-2022, Nyaung Yo was released from prison after serving a one-year-and-seven-month sentence for covering the 2021 anti-coup protests.

Why is the Myanmar military carrying out airstrikes on Lashio?

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Several homes were destroyed by airstrikes in Lashio, northern Shan State, on Sept. 24. (Credit: Lashio Reconstruction)

Lashio, located in northern Shan State, is home to nearly 150,000 people. Its residents have been continually affected by the violence that has engulfed this region in recent months. In September, the Myanmar Air Force conducted at least 15 airstrikes, which has killed at least 9 and injured 42 civilians. The airstrikes are targeting areas controlled by the Brotherhood Alliance’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and has caused widespread destruction. Lashio residents are living in fear of futher retaliatory attacks. The MNDAA took control of Lashio after it seized the Northeast Regional Military Command (RMC) on Aug. 3.

Kachin resistance expands control over Myanmar rare earth mining hub

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Kachin Independence Army (KIA) soldiers cross a creek near Laiza, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) capital located in Kachin State near the China border, in January 2013. (Credit: Reuters)

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), along with its allied People’s Defense Force (PDF) seized control of two rare earth mining towns this week in northeastern Kachin State near the China border.

The KIA and PDF captured Tsawlaw town, located 120 miles (193 km) northeast of the Kachin State capital Myitkyina, on Wednesday, sources close to the military told DVB. 

The seizure of the town came three days after the KIA and PDF captured Chipwi, another center of valuable rare earth mining, located south of Tsawlaw. Local media reported that retaliatory airstrikes conducted by the Myanmar Air Force caused an unknown number of civilian casualties in Chipwi. 

“About two-thirds of the locals have fled now. Some have taken refuge in villages far from the town, while others remain in Chipwi—mostly the elderly and those who are unable to flee,” a Chipwi resident told DVB.

The fighting and closure of roads in the town has caused the price of goods to skyrocket and shortages of essential commodities, she added. Most residents of Tsawlaw and Chipwi have not returned to their homes since the KIA and PDF launched an offensive to capture both towns on Sept. 29. 

“They could also take control over rare earth mineral mining… the main goal is to cut off the financial resources of the Pangwa militia”

Than Soe Naing, a political analyst

Tsawlaw and Chipwi are located in the Kachin Special Region 1 in northeastern Kachin State, which is administered by the pro-military Kachin Border Guard Force (BGF). The Kachin BGF was formed in 2009 when the New Democratic Army – Kachin, an ethnic armed group that broke away from the Communist Party of Burma in 1989, agreed to come under the military’s chain of command.

“They [KIA] could also take control over rare earth mineral mining operations in the area. I believe the main goal is to cut off the financial resources of the Pangwa militia [Kachin BGF],” Than Soe Naing, a political analyst, told DVB.

Much of Myanmar’s lucrative rare earth minerals are extracted from mines that are operated by the Kachin BGF. Rare earth elements are vital components used in electronics – including batteries, cameras, computer chips – as well as glass and magnets. 

China imported over 40,000 tons of rare earth minerals from Myanmar in 2023, according to the country’s General Administration of Customs.

Myanmar’s rare earth mining trade was worth $1.4 billion USD last year, according to Global Witness, a human rights organization that investigates abuses linked to natural resource exploitation. The number of mining sites in the Kachin Special Region 1 increased by 40 percent since the military coup took place on Feb. 1, 2021, according to the group.

Kachin residents and activists have urged the KIA to prevent rare earth mineral mining in the state due its destructive impact on the environment.

The Chinese Embassy in Yangon has not responded to DVB’s request for comment regarding the fighting in the area near the Myanmar-China border.

Zahkung Ting Ying, the 84-year-old chief of the Kachin Special Region 1, directed the BGF and militias to “implement strict defense measures” last June in anticipation of the KIA offensive. KIA General Sumlut Gun Maw said the order “should not have been issued.”

The KIA has seized control of 12 towns in Kachin and northern Shan states, as well as Sagaing Region, since last year. It launched a major offensive across Kachin State on March 7

Newscast: Airstrikes on Lashio kills at least 9 and injures 42 civilians since September

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DVB Newscast for Oct. 4, 2024. The military has carried out at least 15 airstrikes on Lashio, located in northern Shan State, over the last month. The city is home to 150,000 people who fear more retaliatory airstrikes against the Brotherhood Alliance. Its Kokang forces, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), took control of Lashio after it seized the Northeast Regional Military Command (RMC) headquarters on Aug. 3.

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