Guest contributor
Naing Min Khant
In September, 39 prominent pro-democracy leaders, including political party members, 1988 Generation members, activists, and other interested persons, gathered at Ngwesaung in Ayeyarwady Region for an informal meeting.
Convened under Myanmar’s restrictive political climate, the participants sought to collect and align common ideas for addressing the country’s ongoing crisis since the 2021 military coup. The meeting drew significant attention from diplomats and international media, as it is seen as a potential alternative pathway for resolving the political crisis.
The meeting resulted in a seven-point initiative for the country’s path forward. Key elements included establishing a political agreement acceptable to all relevant stakeholders to create a federal democratic union, achieving a nationwide cessation of hostilities as a prerequisite for dialogue, and securing the release of all political prisoners, including jailed State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.
Additionally, the initiative called for international support to ensure the success of political dialogue, the establishment of a clear timeline for such discussions, a transitional mechanism involving all key stakeholders to oversee the process, and cooperation with the international community to address rehabilitation and remedies for the crisis.
This initiative became a debated issue, portraying the clear division between the moderates and radicals within the pro-democracy opposition to the military. This initiative reflects an effort by prominent figures who are still residing in Myanmar, to create an entry point for political dialogue. However, one pivotal question arises: Is such a political pact feasible amid the ongoing armed uprising?
The feasibility of a political pact depends on two critical factors: the preconditions that allow for dialogue and compromise and the cooperation of specific actors within both the regime and the opposition involved, according to a well-known insight from transitology in political science literature.
An impacted transition, often associated with democratic transitions, emerges when there is a balance of power or a stalemate between regime supporters and opponents. In such scenarios, neither side is strong enough to impose its preferred outcome outright, creating the conditions for both sides to compromise and settle for second-best options. This equilibrium provides the necessary space for negotiation and the possibility of a transitional pact.
However, for such a pact to succeed, it requires the cooperation of specific actors within both the regime and the opposition. Typically, these actors include soft-liners and hard-liners within the regime and moderates and radicals within the opposition.
A pact becomes feasible when soft-liners from the regime and moderates from the opposition find common ground and agree to collaborate on a transition. Without these dynamics, an impacted transition remains elusive, although some special and localised conditions exist for a successful pact.
Radicals vs. hard-liners
In Myanmar, radicals within the democratic opposition, particularly armed resistance groups emboldened by their recent victories, now dominate the discourse. Their voices, advocating for the outright defeat of the military, overshadow those of groups like the Ngwesaung initiative, who call for political dialogue to pave the way for a political pact acceptable to all stakeholders.
These radical forces, fueled by their growing confidence, prioritise military victory over negotiations. Meanwhile, the military remains entrenched, with no leadership willing to challenge Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Surrounded by loyal generals who support his hard-line position, the military’s rigid stance makes compromise seem unattainable.
This divide between the radical factions of the opposition and the hard-line military leadership leaves little room for the political dialogue necessary for a potential pact, making any meaningful negotiation increasingly unlikely.
Myanmar’s armed resistance groups have gained significant momentum following the military’s historical defeats, which have strengthened their resolve. During the second wave of Operation 1027, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) seized the Northeastern Regional Military Command (RMC), and the Arakan Army (AA) captured the Western RMC.
These victories, combined with the arrests of military command leaders and casualties among senior officers, have severely weakened the military’s strength. In addition, the resistance groups now control 91 towns, fueling their belief that the military can be completely defeated.
This growing confidence has removed the ideas of compromise and led towards the goal of total military defeat. As a result, the motivation for negotiation or settling for a transitional pact has significantly diminished, as resistance actors increasingly see the military’s collapse as achievable. In this environment, the preconditions for a negotiated political pact are unlikely.
On the other hand, the military’s leadership remains stubborn, failing to acknowledge the defeats, which further obstructs meaningful dialogue. The military is seemingly trapped with the 2008 constitution and conventional approach rather than an innovative measure of political resolution.
Under the 2008 Constitution, the military holds enormous power and privileges that it is unwilling to relinquish. From the military’s perspective, any political compromise would have to occur within the framework of this constitution, which is a non-starter for most opposition groups pushing for a federal democratic union.
Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing seems increasingly delusional from reality regarding the military’s performance. Despite the loss of two RMC headquarters to Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), he continues to participate in ceremonies, pretending that everything is normal, while ignoring the military’s historic humiliation.
This delusion is amplified by the leadership surrounding him, with his loyal generals providing vague and euphemistic reports, failing to communicate the gravity of the situation. When confronted with the truth, Min Aung Hlaing angrily dismisses their concerns.
This rubber-stamp leadership structure and the regime’s refusal to acknowledge the military’s defeats make it impossible for the military to engage in meaningful reflection or compromise. Without a willingness to negotiate outside the 2008 Constitution, the military’s position leaves no room for a political pact, making any successful transition highly unlikely.
Uniting for Myanmar’s future
While the seven-point initiative drafted at Ngwesaung is a noteworthy attempt to address Myanmar’s prolonged crisis, the conditions for its success are not yet in place. The initiative reflects genuine intentions to alleviate the suffering of the people and create a better future for Myanmar despite the immense security risks faced by those involved.
However, the timing is not right given the current dynamics that are essential for a successful political pact. The growing confidence of armed resistance groups and the military’s delusions and stubbornness leave little space for a political pact through dialogue.
As a result, the priority should be for the radicals and moderates within the democratic resistance to engage in dialogue, forging a mutual understanding of the best way forward for Myanmar’s democratic struggle.
Once a united and collective front is established, the resistance should present a credible and collaborative threat to the military. This united front, backed by strategic pressure, could force the regime into a political pact that would remove its hegemonic position in politics and pave the way for Myanmar’s democratic transition.
Although it is pretty rare to have soft-liners from the regime side to challenge the hard-line generals, the feasibility of a political pact would increase with soft-liners from the regime side. Thus, it is challenging in reality to implement the initiatives recommended by the Ngwesaung initiative.
Naing Min Khant is a program associate at the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar). He was a political science student at the University of Yangon who joined the civil resistance movement. He is currently studying Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Parami University. The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of ISP-Myanmar and Parami University.
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