Guest contributor
Myo Yan Naung Thein
In August, China engaged in extensive diplomatic efforts concerning Myanmar. On Aug. 14, 2024, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi visited Naypyidaw as a follow-up to a recent meeting by Chinese Special Envoy Deng Xijun, who visited on Aug. 8.
Tensions surfaced when Min Aung Hlaing urged China to take action against the flow of raw materials entering Myanmar that could be used for military weapons production. He questioned Beijing’s stance on the presence of factories along the Myanmar-China border that manufacture arms, ammunition, and drones.
Deng Xijun arrived in Myanmar just three days after Min Aung Hlaing delivered an emergency address to his supporters. He accused an unnamed foreign power—widely and easily understood to be China—of providing assistance to the Brotherhood Alliance, suggesting that this was a key factor in the fall of the Northeastern Regional Military Command (RMC) headquarters.
This followed reports from Lashio, Shan State that included photos showing the capture of the Northeastern RMC and the arrest of its commanders by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).
Deng Xijun found Min Aung Hlaing with feelings of desperation and shock in the wake of the capture of one of its RMC since this was a first in Myanmar’s history. His emotional turmoil, marked by anxiety, anger, and fear, likely led to erratic behavior during the meeting, which contributed to complications in their discussions.
In light of the situation, it appears that Foreign Minister Wang Yi made an impromptu visit to meet with Min Aung Hlaing. The purpose of Wang Yi’s trip appeared to be to ease anxieties and concerns.
Wang Yi did reassure Min Aung Hlaing, who feared that China was supporting the Brotherhood Alliance, and perceived this as detrimental. Wang Yi told Min Aung Hlaing: “China opposes chaos and war in Myanmar, interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs by extra-territorial forces and any attempts to drive a wedge between China and Myanmar,” which was reported by Chinese state media.
Furthermore, Wang Yi emphasized that China “firmly supports Myanmar in safeguarding its independence, sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity,”
The statements made by Wang Yi clearly contradict China’s actions, considering its substantial involvement in Myanmar’s political landscape. Its interference became particularly apparent in July, especially during the second wave of Operation 1027.
In June, former President Thein Sein attended an event in Beijing commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Declaration of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. In July, regime deputy Soe Win attended a forum in Qingdao, Shandong province. Both invitations left Min Aung Hlaing out.
Reports emerged that China was seeking Min Aung Hlaing’s removal from power. While these claims regarding China’s intentions have not been fully substantiated, it is believed that it may be linked to the military’s violations of the Haigen Agreement, which was a Beijing-brokered ceasefire between the military and the Brotherhood Alliance in northern Shan State signed on Jan. 11.
China pressured the MNDAA to stop its offensive, which it launched on July 3 after it was apparent that the ceasefire was dead. In response, the MNDAA announced a temporary halt July 14-18 to coincide with a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.
On July 19, the MNDAA resumed its offensive but was later compelled to declare a unilateral ceasefire July 19-31 at China’s request. The second wave of Operation 1027 followed. As a result, fighting continued, and the MNDAA successfully captured the Northeastern RMC and the strategic town of Lashio.
China closed border trade in areas controlled by the Brotherhood Alliance. It also cut off telephone and electricity supplies to Laukkai, located in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone in northern Shan. The Muse Gate—the only border gate controlled by the military—was the only to remain open.
In July, leaders of the Brotherhood Alliance were summoned to China for a meeting, during which concerns were raised about the involvement of the People’s Defense Force (PDF) in the fighting, as reported by Myanmar Now. Given that the NUG and PDF are perceived by China as influenced by the U.S., China advised the Brotherhood Alliance to refrain from cooperating with them.
In August, the MNDAA announced its takeover of the Northeastern RMC and the arrest of its commanders. Shocked and enraged, Min Aung Hlaing delivered a speech implying that the Brotherhood Alliance was receiving support from China. Regime media portrayed it as a foreign invasion, framing the MNDAA as part of China’s encroachment.
Nationalists who supported the 2021 military coup organized protests against the MNDAA, characterizing it as a Chinese-led invasion, an event that appeared to be orchestrated by Min Aung Hlaing.
These events led to visits by Deng Xijun and Wang Yi to Naypyidaw to meet with Min Aung Hlaing. However, China’s involvement remains ambiguous, with uncertainty surrounding its support for the military and the Brotherhood Alliance.
It would be misleading to state that China fully backs the Brotherhood Alliance, as evidenced by its unilateral decisions to cut power and phone lines, and to close border trade in areas under its control. Clearly, China is exerting pressure on both sides.
According to available information, China gave tacit approval to the Brotherhood Alliance. When it secured significant victories, China then stepped in to facilitate the signing of the ceasefire agreement. This maneuver was intended to bolster its image and expand its influence over key players in Myanmar.
However, the situation seems to have ultimately slipped from China’s control since the Northeastern RMC and Lashio fell into the hands of the MNDAA.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s remark that “China opposes chaos and war in Myanmar” was altered in regime media to read: “China opposes the attacks on towns and villages by Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) in northern Shan State.”
Fears that China no longer supported the military and was backing the Brotherhood Alliance left many officers and soldiers feeling a profound sense of helplessness. Already demoralized by public disdain and a series of battlefield defeats, officers and soldiers may be more susceptible to desertion or surrender. Thus, a false narrative was crafted to reassure these soldiers that China was still on the military’s side and and not supporting the revolutionary forces.
Myo Yan Naung Thein is the visiting researcher and co-chair of the Burmese Democratic Futures Working Group, University of Virginia. He has traveled across the U.S. speaking to students, church groups, policymakers and members of the Myanmar diaspora to build support for democracy and the return to civilian rule.
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