Guest contributor
James Shwe
Our intention in this discussion is critical: it is not to abandon anyone, but to protect the revolution and use our limited political capital wisely. The issue is not whether Burmese Temporary Protected Status (TPS) holders deserve compassion, but not to do harm than good in approaching the current TPS policy by avoiding a public battlefield with the administration from whom we are seeking delicate help for advocacy and diplomacy for the revolution, while the junta is trying to spin the atmosphere to seek favour.
A bird’s‑eye view of impact
From a distance, TPS is one of many tools on the U.S. policy table toward Myanmar, alongside sanctions, scam‑center crackdowns, trafficking investigations, and support for humanitarian and democratic forces.
Attacking the administration head‑on over TPS now may be an unwise use of political capital if it undermines their broader willingness to act aggressively against the junta and its financial networks.
The administration has already framed the TPS termination in terms of “supposed improvements of security and stability” in Myanmar, which contradict to the assessment of State Department and reference of upcoming elections that majority of Myanmar and international community declared as a sham.
If we make TPS the central confrontation, we risk crowding out the far more consequential agenda: using U.S. power to sanction junta cronies, target scam center money flows, and push back against Chinese‑linked criminal and political interference in Myanmar.
That broader agenda directly affects the lives of millions inside the country who face displacement, food insecurity, and lack of basic services.
Unknowns about who benefits
Another reason for caution is that, in reality, we do not have a clear, transparent picture of the full background of all TPS applicants. Public sources give numbers but not detailed profiles. In this information vacuum, it is reasonable to worry that junta relatives, business associates, or quiet supporters may be taking advantage of the program alongside genuine revolutionaries and at‑risk activists.
At the same time, many of the most committed revolutionaries are already risking their lives on the ground, in liberated areas, in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, or on the borders, rather than seeking personal security abroad.
Because of these unknowns, presenting TPS litigation as a clear moral line between “us” and “them” is risky and potentially divisive. A more honest stance is to admit that we do not know exactly who all the beneficiaries are—while insisting that any policy response should not inadvertently reward junta‑linked actors at the expense of those fighting and suffering inside the country.
Avoiding media jousting and partisan traps
The U.S. Congress has already shown strong, bipartisan support for the Burmese people and the revolution through multiple Myanmar‑related bills and sanctions measures. One of the diaspora’s greatest strengths is this bipartisan backing.
If we escalate TPS into a high‑profile, partisan lawsuit and media campaign against the administration, we walk straight into a political landmine: we risk polarizing our issue and weakening the very bipartisan coalition that has been advancing Burma legislation and sanctions.
High‑visibility “jousting in the media” over TPS also invites hostile narratives: that the movement is mainly about securing immigration benefits, or that it is defending an unknown group that might include security concerns, rather than prioritizing the safety and freedom of people facing airstrikes, hunger, and repression inside Myanmar. Those narratives help neither our moral cause nor our strategic goals.
What and how we should challenge
There are, however, aspects of the TPS decision that are legitimate and important to challenge. The administration’s assessment that conditions in Myanmar are stable enough for TPS to end is at odds with U.N. and U.S. State Department, as well as humanitarian reports that describes deepening conflict, massive displacement, and widespread food insecurity.
The reliance on a “roadmap” and electoral process widely viewed as a sham, and on the junta’s promises of safety, deserves to be called out firmly as a misreading of reality. More than 150 organizations have already urged the U.S. government to extend and re-designate TPS for Burma on the basis of ongoing insecurity and persecution.
Those are strong grounds for legal and advocacy work—but they do not require a Burma‑branded, headline‑grabbing lawsuit against the administration. Instead, legal experts in our community can cooperate discreetly with established human rights and immigration groups, contributing evidence on country conditions and human rights violations as part of broader coalitions.
A cautious, intentional path
Given all of this, the intentional choice should be:
- To avoid a high‑profile, partisan TPS court battle and media campaign that could damage our bipartisan support and the administration’s willingness to act decisively against the junta.
- To focus public and political pressure on correcting the misstatements about Myanmar’s safety, exposing the sham nature of the “election” narrative, and demanding tougher sanctions and law enforcement actions against junta‑aligned and Chinese‑linked networks.
- To support TPS holders and other at‑risk individuals through quiet legal work and coalition‑based human rights advocacy, rather than making TPS the main banner of the revolution.
This approach keeps our intentions clear: we are not abandoning vulnerable people in the U.S., but we refuse to step on political landmines that could weaken the broader revolutionary cause.
James Shwe is a Myanmar democracy activist in the U.S. and is a member of the advocacy groups Free Myanmar and the Los Angeles Myanmar Movement. He has been trying to organize and motivate the Myanmar diaspora to advocate for democracy in Myanmar.
DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]
