Guest contributor
Salai Dokhar
In Myanmar, armed resistance groups pursue different military and political objectives and employ various strategies. These can be broadly categorized into four main types:
1. Groups under Chinese influence: These groups engage the military in ways that align with China’s interests while pursuing their own ethnicity-based political and military agendas.
This category includes the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and several other armed groups in northern Shan State. These groups do not necessarily seek full independence or a federal democratic system; instead, their positions are largely shaped by their strategic relationship with China, regardless of who forms the central government. This reflects a pragmatic “give-and-take” approach in their dealings with China. Therefore, international observers who analyze the current composition of the Spring Revolution and highlight the absence of these groups often reveal a limited understanding of the political realities in Myanmar.
2. The Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF): This body promotes federal democracy in Myanmar. It includes four ethnic armed groups, the NUG, the CRPH, and elements within the National League for Democracy (NLD) party that support armed resistance. This bloc is leading the revolution based on federal democratic principles rooted in the spirit of the Panglong Agreement. It is actively engaging with federal units and ethnic armed groups that exercise territorial control and provide public services. It is also working in coordination with emerging interim administrations—such as the Sagaing Federal Unit Interim Government, the Magway Federal Unit Interim Government, and the Mandalay Region Interim Political Implementation Committee—encouraging them to become members or supporters. This can be understood as a consolidating force aimed at bringing together groups that genuinely represent the people through governance and the delivery of public services.
3. The Arakan Army (AA): This group has its own clearly defined political objectives. Once it achieves its goals, it aims to pursue a model of “coming-together federalism,” or potentially a confederate arrangement, or even a status similar to the UWSA territory with full governing authority. Even without formally declaring full independence, it has a clear objective of liberating the entire Rakhine territory through military means. It seeks to end its historical exclusion from the nation-building narrative and instead position itself as a nation-builder—or potentially move toward establishing a new nation state.
4. The Spring Revolution Alliance (SRA): These groups have strong military and political objectives. They do not fall under the direct influence of any ethnic armed group or the NUG; instead, they are consolidating into cohesive self-defense forces. These groups are formed from newly emerging armed organizations led by a younger generation of leadership, with the primary objective of removing the military through armed struggle. Although relatively new, they are organized in a systematic manner, and many of their members have significant combat experience. For example, members of the Chin Brotherhood have captured multiple towns in Chin State; the KNDF has taken control of several towns in Karenni State; and some members have participated in major operations such as Operation 1027 and military campaigns in Rakhine State alongside the AA.
The remaining category includes two major Shan armed organizations that maintain direct or indirect relationships with the SCEF, even though they are not formal members.
They are neither fully under Chinese influence nor fully aligned with the revolution, but they maintain cooperative relations with the SCEF.
At the same time, some ethnic armed groups—such as the Pa-O Federal National Council and Mon State Federal Council—have not yet joined any major bloc, and remain within the framework of the NUCC.
The NUCC itself appears to be moving either toward rejoining the SCEF or gradually fading in influence, as many of its members are civil society organizations.
Meanwhile, seven members of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatory alliance (often referred to as the “7 NCA”) have not become active participants in the armed revolutionary movement.
Therefore, for international observers, it becomes clearer that the Spring Revolution, which began with thousands of fragmented groups, has now gradually coalesced into four main political-military blocs: SCEF, SRA, the Northern Shan group, and the AA.
This development is highly significant.
Remaining Challenges
Some may wonder why the People’s Defense Force (PDF) is not prominently highlighted in this analysis. However, about a month ago, dozens of local PDFs in Magway publicly announced their acceptance of, and cooperation with, the Magway Federal Unit Interim Government.
Similarly, many local forces in Sagaing, Mandalay, and other federal units have come under the command of their respective unit governments.
Therefore, in this sector, the outcomes of coordination between the SCEF and unit-level governments or councils—such as the Magway Federal Unit Interim Government, the Sagaing Federal Unit Interim Government, and the Mandalay Interim Governing Council—will become increasingly important.
The inclusion of all remaining forces into the SRA and the SCEF remains both critically important and highly challenging, though there is hope that this consolidation can be achieved in the near future.
The Spring Revolution in Myanmar possesses far greater strength and coordination than is often recognized by external observers.
If a balanced and unified offensive emerges among the Northern Shan forces, the SCEF, the SRA, and the AA, even regime leader Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw—and those who continue to support or accommodate his leadership—will be compelled to acknowledge the growing momentum and viability of the revolution’s success.
Even in a worst-case scenario, where the conflict moves toward negotiated settlement, it is clear that meaningful peace talks will require the full participation of these key political and military blocs.
The common criticism that the Spring Revolution is too fragmented—“too many groups to negotiate with”—no longer reflects the evolving reality on the ground.
Increasing coordination among revolutionary actors is already reshaping the political landscape.
What is becoming evident is that the Spring Revolution is moving, through greater unity and strategic alignment, toward a decisive phase that could determine the future of military rule in Myanmar.
The central question is no longer whether the movement has the capacity to challenge the regime, but whether Min Aung Hlaing will choose to relinquish power and engage in a genuine political dialogue.
His options are narrowing: he can cling to power until his system collapses, step aside and allow a transition that opens space for peace, or face outright defeat and eventual accountability for his actions.
In this context, it is both inaccurate and counterproductive for international observers to continue blaming Myanmar’s revolutionary forces for a lack of unity.
Equally concerning is the persistent gap in understanding within parts of the international community, which has limited effective support for the Myanmar people and, at times, unintentionally prolonged the junta’s survival through premature or misguided political engagement.
Salai Dokhar is an international advocate for Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement, a peace advocate for resistance groups, a leading figure in the India for Myanmar movement, and a young politician from Chin State, Myanmar.
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