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The end of the settlement: Yangon squat clearances uproot thousands

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A life’s worth of possessions are stacked in a heap on the ground. The owner of the ragged parcels, U Maw, looks in the other direction, at an imposing pile of timber that once was his home.

Yesterday morning, as soldiers looked on—fingers aching towards their triggers—U Maw had been forced to destroy what he once built on this land by his own labor. Around him, neighboring families had been ordered to deconstruct their homes, piece by piece, by themselves.

“We have no choice but to destroy the things that we built with our own hands. Otherwise the soldiers will destroy everything, and that will make everything useless,” U Maw said, despairingly.

On October 25, the Township General Administration Department of the Southern District of Yangon ordered the removal of businesses and settlements beside the Dagon-Thilawa Road. Three days later, approximately 100 people, including municipal leaders and armed security forces, arrived at the site, ready to perform a total clearance.

The eviction ran from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m., soldiers ripping apart the settlement’s famous dry food stores, slowly tearing down every obstacle in their path until they reached Kalawal village on the banks of the Bago River.

The morning of October 28 was an historic tragedy which had been long-delayed for Yangon’s squatters, an understated humanitarian disaster in Burma’s most developed urban area.

Whilst troops were beginning the destruction of Thanlyin’s settlements, a similar scene was already underway on the other side of town. 

To the north, in Hlaingtharyar, security forces had earlier closed the two arterial Bayintnaung Bridges that connect the township to central Yangon, leading to a huge backlog of trucks and cars blocking roads into Hlaing.

“There are between 7,000 and 8,000 squatters along the Yangon-Pathein highway, and half of them are moving this morning as a force of soldiers, police, members of YCDC [Yangon City Development Committee], and plainclothes security forces have arrived,” said a local man supporting the squatters. 

Military trucks entered Hlaingtharyar at around 6.30 a.m. yesterday morning, in tow: two bulldozers and some expectant prison vans.

“On seeing the convoy, some took their belongings; some even took pieces of their home,” the local man said.

“However, most of those moving were the wealthier few whose businesses had been doing alright; the working class residents didn’t leave. When I asked them what they would do, they said that they’d have to settle another empty plot because they’re unable to afford rent, and have nobody to go to for help,” he said.

The settlers from both sides of Yangon were moving following an ultimatum delivered by the military just three days previously. 

Settlements being torn down in Hlaingtharyar, north Yangon, yesterday

Despite the settlements hosting both homes and well-established small businesses for decades, the junta announced on October 25 that it was to demolish all homes. On the day of the announcement, 70 people were taken into temporary custody in Hlaingtharyar after protesting the order.

When troops returned, resistance was muted. 

“​​I believe the police and military had guns, most were threatened with detainment if they didn’t comply… Though it seems they are willing to do worse,” said one foreign social worker who had arranged transport for those fleeing the clearances.

“We had a small team […] taking lists of those who wanted to go to their hometowns and those who wanted to be moved to another location. However the volume is much much larger than we anticipated, originally we were told 100-150 people, then 1000-2000. Now there is a possibility of 20,000 in total, according to a contact.”

She told DVB that, due to the presence of troops, it had been too dangerous to transport those leaving yesterday. Her group will now ferry settlers today and into the weekend, “before the Tatmadaw burns everything”.

Whilst soldiers intimated those in Hlaingtharyar, a similar scene was unfolding in Thanlyin.

“The soldiers ordered us to sign an eviction notice, if not they said they will shoot us,” U Maw said.  

“Nobody dares to go against them as they carry weapons. I just had to watch them tear down the tents with bulldozers,” he added. 

 “They didn’t want anyone to take photos of the eviction, and it is still going on,” added a local Red Cross Society member. 

The Dagon-Thilawa Road settlements, Thanlyin, before the clearance

Like U Maw, a majority of the squatters with no place to go have congregated by the side of the road, watching others depart.

Established by the SLORC in 1998 as a resettlement for 300,000 migratory inhabitants of Yangon’s Downtown area, the settlements on the Yangon-Pathein Road also hosted thousands of people who fled the Ayeyarwady delta region following 2008’s Cyclone Nargis.

Under the NLD government, more than 250,000 squatter households had been issued resident certificates for Yangon Region, and plans were well underway to allow them to eventually get access to low-income housing.

Similarly, over 200 households have been located beside the No.2 Thanlyin Road for almost a decade, many of whom run small businesses; over 50 well-known dry food stores, fuel shops, and tea, coffee, and palm wine sellers lined the road, a source of both shelter and sustenance for local farm laborers from the surrounding fields of Thanlyin. Residents had made an agreement with Hluttaw representatives that they believed allowed them to stay.

Only now, with a dominant and unaccountable military rule over the land—held in the name of the state and military-backed landowners—have clearances become a reality.  

“Now it is all gone. They cut down the foundations of homes and destroyed everything: the place is empty now. Some people who have no place to go, like us, are sitting by the road with their belongings. I don’t know what to do,” said U Hla Htay, one of those now searching for a new beginning.

Pro-military rallies once again bolstered with paid stooges, witnesses say

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Two independent sources confirmed yesterday that a majority of recent pro-military protestors in a number of towns were paid by the military to attend rallies that were held on Monday. 

On October 25, pro-military rallies took place close to military bases in towns including Myitkyina and Putao in Kachin, in Pyin Oo Lwin, Madara, and Meiktila in Mandalay, as well as in Yangon, Naypyidaw, Lashio, Pathein, and Mawlamyine.

The protests come as tensions festering between those for and against Burma’s military institution have spilled out into open warfare, and when the eyes of Southeast Asia have fallen back upon Burma following the start of the ASEAN Summit.

One source, who preferred to remain anonymous to preserve the contingency of his activism work, said that, between 7 and 9 a.m., protests erupted in Aye Mya Tharyar ward and Panmatti village in Myitkyina. He says that the majority of protestors, if not all, were paid anywhere from K5,000 to K10,000 (US$2.8 – 5.6).

“It’s estimated that around 300 participated in the march, but bystanders dared not say anything, because it was held inside the military headquarters,” he said. “They chanted the slogans: ‘We don’t need UN support, who supports OIC,’ ‘We don’t want ASEAN,’ ‘Oppose the NUG and CRPH rioters, ‘oppose PDF, and ‘Myanmar military is our army.’”

In Kachin, the anonymous activist says the junta also played on ethnic tensions to bolster their numbers, noting that protests also consisted of those from Lisu and Shanni groups (some of whose leaders are strongly sympathetic to the military), Ma Ba Tha, the ultra-orthodox Buddhist group, and families of military personnel, who he says were ordered to attend. He added that this is not the first time the military has played on the tensions between the Lisu and Shanni People’s Army and the local Kachin Independence Army. 

“They have a feeling about the KIA, as they got arrested by the KIA and accused the KIA of asking for money,” the anonymous activist said. “By using those feelings, the Tatmadaw formed the Shanni People’s Army and Lisu People’s Army.”

Similar trends were reported in Pathein, where three-day rallies slowly garnered participants from October 25 to 27, peaking at 90 people on the second day, but falling to a mere 40 by October 27. 

Human rights activist U Tun Tun Oo reported that the majority of protestors in Pathein were recruited from the working class and poorer wards, with some offered up to K15,000 to participate. Despite trying to keep a safe distance from the protests himself, the activist says he could verify this through being in constant communication with those with pro-military allies.

“They are protesting, but look insecure. The pro-military protesters in Pathein were clearly either people who were out of money, informants (dalan), or members of the army. There really are not many people who support the military,” he said, echoing the theory that the protests were orchestrated to demonstrate alleged military support.

“In addition, these pro-military protests came across the country after the ASEAN’s meeting, which did not invite the junta leader to attend the summit,” he said, noting the suspicious trend of pro-military rallies appearing at times that the military feels insecure. 

Another anonymous source said that the military had used a similar tactic in other regions, paying up to K10,000 to people—largely those with low education and literacy levels—that soldiers had gathered.

Such bribery is certainly not a new tactic, and is reminiscent of junta-backed protests immediately following the coup, where protestors admitted to participating for between K2,000 and K10,000. After protests in many towns turned lethal, many others said that they had received orders, and in some cases weaponry, to cause violence towards pro-democracy protesters.

Appeal for Action

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OxyFeature

As editor in chief of one of the few remaining independent media organizations, we collect, check and spread the news about Burma. Through various credible contacts inside the military-ruled country, I receive heartbreaking messages about Covid-19 every day, which I think the international community ought to react to as an immediate urgency. One might ask why so alarming as every country around the world is facing the Covid-19 pandemic, but the case in Burma is different.

News of the deaths of close family, of best friends, of relatives, is no longer considered news at all. Loved ones failing in their desperate attempts to find oxygen, similarly, is no longer news. Families spending household savings to purchase faulty concentrators or overpriced and ineffective medicines; no longer news. The hundreds of deceased being cremated daily, the dark smoke of death lingering over Yangon both day and night; not news. The virus has spread across all layers of Burma’s society, indiscriminate and ruthless. Even the last of the frontline medical workers, not yet persecuted by the junta, are falling prey to Covid-19.

Since February’s coup, state hospitals will not admit a patient without “status” or a “connection” to the military nexus: even officers and their families have been denied treatment on arrival. Out of lack of resources or fear of reprisals, private hospitals have chosen to ignore the majority of patients, those lucky enough to find a bed have only been admitted under the proviso they bring their own supply of oxygen. As a result, people of all degrees of wealth, rank, and status have resorted to treating loved ones at home, with whatever medicine and equipment they can obtain, out of pure necessity.

Desperate for a cure, the Burmese people turned to Facebook for ‘magic solutions’. Social media is ablaze with all kinds of witchcraft and quackery, with endless posts containing well-repeated hearsay on topics ranging from techniques to save a life, to methods of increasing bodily oxygen levels, or potions that, once ingested, will certainly, remove the coronavirus. It is in no way strange to read such advice as inhaling the fumes of a hair-dryer to boost oxygen levels or to chew raw onion (three times a day) whilst absorbing the virus nullifying heat into one’s lungs.

We have tried hard to dispel these myths through our work, releasing broadcasts countering popular misconceptions and interviewing medical professionals to improve access to useful and correct knowledge. The examples above may sound preposterous to outsiders, but millions of Burmese, out of hope and desperate, have found refuge in such information.

Importantly, Burma has reached a point of total nihilism with regard to coronavirus facts and figures. The junta lacks the bandwidth, and certainly the motive, to promote data that in any way resembles realities on the ground. We receive anecdotal data from burial grounds, funeral services, and organizations thanklessly working to contain the outbreak. But, similarly, all this provides is rumour and numbers. The hard fact is that every single day, the news of many more dead and infected reaches us through the experiences of our households, our relatives, and our friends. And this news is always the most immediate. The experience of being so perpetually surrounded by death is hard to convey.

The whole world is vocally struggling to curb the spread of Covid-19. But, in the case of Burma, the people have been made voiceless. Our experience tells us that the military regime is either intentionally removing the last lifelines of help available to the Burmese people to quell challenges to their rule, or is woefully lacking in will and capacity to manage a crisis of their proportion. Before the February coup, Yangon had close to 20 well-functioning Covid-19 treatment centers. Now there are four, all essentially being left to fail, turning back almost all those who need life-saving attention. The military, whose targeting of medical professionals is well documented, has cornered itself. Instead of building emergency treatment centers and field hospitals, the regime is investing heavily in crematoriums.

Very soon, they recently announced, Yangon’s funeral pyres will have the capacity to cremate 3,000 corpses a day.

Burma needs immediate humanitarian intervention from the international community more than any time before. Burma desperately needs your attention and help now.

Aye Chan Naing

Chief Editor (DVB)

1st August 2021

Photos – MPA

How Retailers Can Cut Emissions

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When you need your company to have a new website or if you venture on updating your old webpage with a new look and functionality, the choices are versatile. Assuming that you will go the easy way and choose a theme for your WordPress website, the overall number of characteristics that you will need to keep in mind narrows down significantly.

All the WordPress themes that we have here have had a vast team of professional designers sketching, working and executing the ultimate visual look for it. With such a wide range of choices at hand, we strongly advise you to stick to the WordPress Theme that is based on your business’ or a closely related field.

I’m as proud of many of the things we haven’t done as the things we have done.EMMA DOE, Company CEO

When you need your company to have a new website or if you venture on updating your old webpage with a new look and functionality, the choices are versatile. Assuming that you will go the easy way and choose a theme for your WordPress website, the overall number of characteristics that you will need to keep in mind narrows down significantly. Often searching out the graphical symmetry in chaos, while still maintaining the personality and emotion of the subject. The excitement and anticipation as we waited to see the next piece of unpredictable chaos was electric.

Kachin Independence Army resumes offensive in Bhamo while regime starts counteroffensive in Hpakant

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At least 1,000 Hpakant residents have taken shelter at Kachin Baptist Church compounds in Kachin State since April 24. (Credit: Kachin News Group)

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and its allied resistance forces, resumed its offensive on the regime Military Operations Command (MOC) 21 in Bhamo Township of southern Kachin State – three days after the end of a 20-day ceasefire – on April 25.

A source close to the KIA told DVB on the condition of anonymity that it expanded its offensive from the MOC 21, to include the Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 47, as well as engineering, logistic and medical battalions in Bhamo, located 120 miles (193 km) south of the Kachin State capital Myitkyina and 58 miles (93 km) southwest of Laiza, the KIA headquarters.

The source added that airstrikes have been carried out on resistance forces stationed outside of the MOC 21. No casualties have been reported. The KIA offensive on Bhamo was paused from April 2-22 during a regime ceasefire, according to residents. On April 22, the regime extended its ceasefire to April 30, but the KIA did not.

The regime dispatched two military columns, totaling around 1,000 troops, based in Kamaing and Indawgyi towns of Hpakant Township to Hpakant town and surrounding villages under KIA control on April 23. Hpakant is located 214 miles (344 km) northwest of Bhamo and 94 miles (151 km) west of Myitkyina. 

KIA spokesperson Naw Bu confirmed to DVB on April 25 that a counteroffensive was underway but that regime forces had yet to reach Hpakant town, where KIA forces took control on April 23, 2024 after it seized the LIB 116 in Selzin village. 

At least 1,000 residents from villages located along the road into Hpakant town, including KIA-controlled Namya, Hsenghpayar and Kathmaw, fled their homes due to fighting between regime and KIA forces on April 24. No casualties have been reported. 

Many took shelter at Kachin Baptist Church (KBC) church compounds in Hpakant, a KBC official and residents told DVB on the condition of anonymity.

The KIA launched its offensive in southern Kachin on Dec. 4 and seized Mansi Township on Jan. 8. It captured Kanpaikti, a town on the Myanmar-China border in Waingmaw Township, on Nov. 20, along with the rare-earth mining hub of Pangwa in Chipwi Township on Oct. 19.

The KIA has seized 14 out of 18 towns in Kachin, as well as Mabein in northern Shan State, since it launched its state-wide offensive against regime forces in March 2024.

Myanmar earthquake aftershock fundraising concert

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The Myanmar Aftershock Fundraiser Concert was held at Thapae East in Chiang Mai, Thailand, on April 25. (Credit: DVB)

The Myanmar Aftershock Fundraiser Concert was held at Thapae East in Chiang Mai, Thailand. on April 25. The event featured performances by Vanilla Girl Band, In Se On, Mushi, Nomujinmn, and Triple Edge.

“We have a lot of people on-the-ground and a lot of organizations that reached out to us that wanted help, and we wanted to continue to find a way to support them,” said Kan Kyi, the event organizer and the lead vocalist for hip hop group Triple Edge.

All proceeds from the fundraiser will go toward earthquake relief efforts in the hardest-hit regions of Sagaing, Mandalay, and southern Shan State’s Inle Lake. The Myanmar Born Gurkha (MBG) Youth Association, based in Thailand, will distribute the funds to organizations in Myanmar, according to organizers.

Social engineering in Myanmar through humanitarian aid

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Post-Cyclone Mocha, the UN began humanitarian aid deliveries to parts of Rakhine State until travel authorizations were rescinded on June 7, 2023 (Credit: UN)

Guest contributor

Moe Gyo

In recent decades, Myanmar has become a major recipient of international humanitarian and development aid. Following natural disasters, periods of political transition, and humanitarian crises, Western international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have significantly increased their presence across the country. 

These INGOs often operate with mandates to alleviate suffering, promote human rights, and build institutional capacity. However, behind the ostensibly apolitical and benevolent nature of aid lies a more complex reality: aid serving as a vehicle for soft power and ideological influence.

The concept of social engineering, generally defined as the attempt to influence or control the behavior and beliefs of individuals and societies, can be applied to the ways in which Western INGOs operate in aid-receiving countries. 

In Myanmar, aid often carries with it the implicit transmission of Western values—ranging from liberal democracy and secularism to gender and identity politics. These imported ideals frequently conflict with deeply rooted cultural, religious, and social norms in Myanmar, leading to cultural dissonance, resistance, and, in some cases, the erosion of traditional values.

Traditional leaders, including Buddhist monks and village elders, have voiced concerns that foreign aid not only challenges national sovereignty, but also undermines moral and spiritual values. 

This backlash has contributed to the rise of cultural preservation movements, including nationalist rhetoric that paints INGOs as agents of Western domination. 

While such responses can veer into xenophobia or political manipulation, they reflect legitimate grievances about the lack of cultural sensitivity and reciprocity in aid programs.

Aid is rarely unconditional. INGOs, often funded by governments or philanthropic foundations with specific agendas, may require local organizations to align with donor values. Conditionality can lead to a form of ideological coercion, whereby communities feel pressured to accept foreign values to receive material support. 

This undermines local agency and reinforces the perception that aid is a tool of cultural imperialism. For example, grants may stipulate that recipients must adopt policies related to gender equality, secular education, or Western-style democratic governance. 

While these aims may be progressive from a donor’s perspective, they often clash with conservative and religious norms in Myanmar, especially in rural areas. 

This form of social engineering often occurs subtly, but its impacts are significant and far-reaching. Thus, it is important to understand the mechanisms through which values are transmitted and where local cultures and norms have been challenged or undermined.

Western INGOs often operate within normative frameworks that reflect the values of liberal democratic societies, including an emphasis on individual human rights, secularism, gender equality, and freedom of expression. 

These frameworks are embedded in everything from education and governance to healthcare and civil society development. INGOs rarely promote them overtly; instead, they are woven into training materials, project objectives, and capacity-building activities. 

While these ideals are foundational in donor countries, they may contrast sharply with the cultural, religious, and social fabric of Myanmar, which is deeply rooted in Buddhist morality, communal values, and hierarchical social systems. 

As a result, the values embedded in aid programs can produce friction, not only at the institutional level, but also within communities and families, where traditional norms still hold strong influence.

A particularly influential subset of normative frameworks adopted by INGOs is Western feminist theory, which shapes many gender-related interventions in Myanmar. 

These frameworks prioritize autonomy, equal participation in public life, and economic independence for women—principles often implemented through programs that encourage gender parity, reproductive rights, and women’s leadership. 

However, these ideals may overlook the cultural significance of women’s roles in Myanmar society, which are frequently connected to spiritual obligations, family responsibilities, and communal life. 

In many cases, programs based on Western feminism are viewed not as liberating, but as culturally disruptive, particularly in rural areas where kinship and religious traditions define gender norms.

Western INGOs have heavily invested in promoting women’s empowerment in Myanmar, with programs aimed at advancing gender equality, political participation, and economic independence. 

These interventions—especially those that focus on gender quotas for political representation or reproductive rights, including birth control—frequently encounter resistance, as they are seen by some as foreign impositions. 

For example, the introduction of gender quotas designed to increase female participation in local village governance has been met with skepticism in communities where leadership is traditionally held by men. 

Similarly, reproductive health programs promoting birth control and family planning can clash with local beliefs, where larger families are viewed not only as a spiritual blessing, but also as an economic asset. 

In such contexts, women who engage in these programs sometimes face ostracization or criticism, accused of abandoning their traditional roles and responsibilities.

Logical frameworks, or “log frames,” are widely used by Western INGOs and donor agencies to plan, monitor, and evaluate aid programs. Designed to enhance efficiency, accountability, and results-based management, log frames break down projects into measurable objectives, outputs, activities, and indicators. 

While this methodology helps donors track progress and justify funding, it also serves as a tool for social engineering by embedding specific assumptions about what constitutes progress, success, and impact.

These assumptions—often rooted in Western development ideals such as individual empowerment, gender equality, or democratic participation—are built into the structure of the log frame, thereby shaping not only how aid is delivered, but also what kinds of social change are prioritized.

In the context of Myanmar, the use of log frames can subtly impose external values by incentivizing local organizations to conform to donor expectations. 

For example, community-based organizations (CBOs) may be required to demonstrate progress using indicators like the number of women in leadership roles or the percentage of youth attending human rights workshops—metrics that reflect Western liberal priorities. 

To secure funding, local actors often tailor their language, strategies, and outcomes to fit within these pre-set frameworks, even when they do not fully align with local realities or needs. 

This process encourages the internalization of donor values and the gradual reshaping of cultural and institutional norms, making the log frame not just a management tool, but a mechanism for orchestrating societal transformation according to external blueprints.

Political correctness in language, as promoted by many Western INGOs, often emphasizes inclusive, non-discriminatory, and rights-based terminology. 

This includes reframing discussions around race, ability, and class in ways that align with global human rights discourse. In donor countries, this approach is seen as a way to foster respect, reduce harm, and promote equality. 

However, when these linguistic norms are introduced in culturally distinct settings like Myanmar, they can be met with confusion, skepticism, or outright resistance. 

The shift in language often feels foreign, not only because of translation issues, but also due to the disconnect between local worldviews and the ideological assumptions embedded in politically correct speech.

In Myanmar, where communication styles tend to be indirect, respectful of hierarchy, and deeply embedded in religious and cultural norms, the push for politically correct language can seem abrupt or even confrontational. 

For instance, local expressions that reflect traditional gender roles or religious beliefs may be discouraged or labeled as discriminatory by INGOs, even when they are central to community identity. This can lead to accusations of cultural insensitivity when language reforms are perceived as erasing local ways of speaking and thinking. 

Furthermore, the emphasis on politically correct language may privilege English-speaking, urban populations more familiar with these norms, further marginalizing rural voices and traditional perspectives in civil society and aid-related discourse.

Western INGOs frequently engage in education reform and capacity-building initiatives. However, these often privilege Western knowledge systems, Western curricula, and foreign pedagogical models. 

As a result, local languages, traditional education methods, and indigenous knowledge systems are marginalized. This also contributes to the rise of a local “NGO/CBO elite”—a class of local urban, English-speaking activists who are often disconnected from rural communities and traditional authority structures. 

These elites may become more loyal to international standards and funding mechanisms than to national or cultural priorities.

Traditional culture in Myanmar places immense importance on respect for elders, a value rooted in both religious and cultural practices. However, Western educational interventions, particularly those focusing on critical thinking, can sometimes undermine this respect. 

INGOs often promote Western-style pedagogy, which encourages questioning authority and promoting individual autonomy, in contrast to the deference to elders that is central to Myanmar’s traditional social fabric. 

This shift in educational norms can create generational divides, with younger people exposed to these new ways of thinking becoming more critical of their elders’ guidance. 

Programs that promote critical thinking as an essential educational skill challenge the social hierarchy, leading to tensions within families and communities. 

Such shifts undermine the authority of traditional leaders, including monks and village elders, who have long played central roles in guiding moral and social behavior.

Western INGOs have played a key role in building Myanmar’s civil society, providing funding, training, and international platforms for advocacy. However, this support has led to the emergence of an urban, donor-dependent NGO/CBO sector, often criticized for being disconnected from grassroots realities. 

These organizations may adopt donor language and priorities, rather than those of the communities they purport to serve. Many INGOs require English-language reporting, which excludes a large portion of local activists and fosters exclusionary hierarchies within the civil society landscape. 

Moreover, the professionalization of activism—driven by INGO demands—risks turning resistance into a career path rather than a social movement, thereby depoliticizing grassroots efforts and entrenching foreign agendas.

Myanmar’s experience with Western aid reveals the often-contradictory nature of humanitarian and development interventions. Conditionality in aid acts as a subtle yet powerful mechanism of ideological influence. 

Material support is too often tied to the adoption of values aligned with donor priorities. This transforms aid from a freely given humanitarian act into an exchange based on ideological compliance, blurring the line between assistance and coercion. 

Communities may feel compelled to compromise their own cultural norms in order to access resources, deepening the perception that foreign aid is a form of soft imperialism rather than solidarity. 

Ultimately, aid should not be about remaking societies in the image of the donor, but about enabling them to realize their own aspirations. True empowerment begins not with external blueprints, but with the recognition of a people’s right to define their own destiny.


Moe Gyo is a political consultant and strategist working on the Thailand-Myanmar border. 

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]

Myanmar regime defies earthquake ceasefire to continue deadly attacks, data shows

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Over 5,000 religious buildings, including this Buddhist temple, was destroyed by the earthquake on March 28, 2025. (Credit: Reuters)

Myanmar’s regime has kept up a deadly military campaign, including airstrikes and artillery assaults, despite announcing a ceasefire after a major earthquake killed thousands in March, according to the U.N. and data from a crisis monitor.

The March 28 quake, the worst natural disaster to hit the impoverished nation in decades, triggered a multi-national relief effort to support hundreds of thousands already ravaged by conflict and repeated international calls to halt the fighting.

On April 2, following similar moves by opposition armed groups, Myanmar’s military announced a 20-day ceasefire to support humanitarian relief. On Tuesday it said the temporary cessation had been extended until April 30 after rare high-level talks led by Malaysia’s premier.

But unreported figures from the U.N. show that the fighting has continued unabated and a Reuters analysis of data provided by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) found the frequency of regime aerial attacks has increased since the ceasefire announcement, compared to the six months prior.

A regime spokesperson did not respond to multiple calls from Reuters seeking comment.

Between March 28 and April 24, the military launched at least 207 attacks, including 140 airstrikes and 24 artillery barrages, according to data from the U.N. Human Rights Office, based on reports it had received.

More than 172 attacks have occurred since the ceasefire, 73 of them in areas devastated by the earthquake.

“It’s business as usual,” said James Rodehaver, Myanmar head for the U.N. Office on Human Rights.

“The ceasefire…should have involved stopping all military activity and repurposing your military to support the humanitarian response and that has not happened.”

Myanmar has been in crisis since the military seized power in February 2021, toppling the elected government of Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.

A brutal military crackdown on the opposition ignited a spiralling civil war, including in the previously peaceful central heartlands where protesters took up arms.

This grid of bar charts depicts the number of incidents and fatalities from airstrikes and drone attacks by Myanmar’s junta from Oct. 1, 2024 to April 18, 2025.

Civilian targets

Two weeks into the ceasefire, regime aircraft swooped over South Kan Ma Yaik village in southeastern Karen State on April 16, during Myanmar New Year celebrations, and dropped bombs that killed a pregnant woman and her unborn baby to the north of the settlement, an eyewitness told Reuters.

“The first bomb exploded near her house. Then she braced her children for a second bomb and shrapnel hit her body,” said the witness, who asked not to be named for fear of retribution.

“All the children were bleeding all over.”

Reuters could not independently verify the witnesses’ account but the ACLED data contains an entry for a regime attack on the village on April 16, including one fatality.

In the six months before April 2, the regime conducted an average of 7.6 attacks using aircraft or drones that killed more than five people daily, including civilians, according to data provided by ACLED.

Between April 2 and April 18, the military carried out an average of 9.7 aircraft or drone attacks every day, leaving more than six people dead each day, since the ceasefire was announced, ACLED data shows.

In all, 105 people were killed by regime aerial attacks during this period.

The data showed opposition groups only conducted three aerial attacks during the ceasefire, between April 2-18. Anti-regime groups in the country lack any conventional air force and rely on drones.

In contrast, the Myanmar Air Force includes Chinese and Russian-made fighter and ground attack aircraft, Russian attack helicopters and some heavy unmanned aerial vehicles, according to an International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) report last year.

The regime’s aerial attacks since the quake have been in the Sagaing Region and northern Shan State, where it is attempting to regain strategic positions, as well as in Kachin and Rakhine states, said ACLED Senior Analyst Su Mon.

“The military is still conducting aerial strikes that target civilian populations,” she said.

In its ceasefire announcements, on April 2 and April 22, the regime said that it would retaliate against a range of actions by resistance groups, including recruitment and territorial expansion.

In a few instances, the data indicated that the military was attacked by armed groups prior to launching an airstrike, the U.N.’s Rodehaver said.

Referring to the regime, he added: “Whenever you get attacked by… small arms fire, your response is to launch airstrikes on an area and you end up killing a dozen people who were not involved in the fighting at all. Is that a ceasefire?”

REUTERS

Naypyidaw sends delegation to Russia for Victory Day and drones; DVB Radio back on the airwaves inside Myanmar

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Military parade column at the Mandalay International Airport before departing Burma for Russia on April 23. (Credit: Regime media)

Naypyidaw sends delegation to Russia for Victory Day and drones

Naypyidaw sent a delegation to Russia on Wednesday to participate in a military parade for the 80th anniversary of Victory Day in Moscow, regime media reported. Sources close to the regime told DVB that the delegation was also tasked with purchasing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), or drones, from Russia.

Sources added that Myo Sett Aung, the leader of the delegation, bought at least 100 UAVs in Russia last month. These drones have been reportedly deployed to regime outposts in northern Shan State, southern Shan State, Karenni State, Bago Region, and the Northwestern Regional Military Command (RMC) in the Sagaing Region capital Monywa.

Fighting between regime forces and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) is underway in northern Shan, with Karenni resistance forces in Karenni, and with the Arakan Army (AA) and the People’s Defence Force (PDF) in Bago and Sagaing. Sources told DVB that the regime established a directorate specializing in drone warfare under its Ministry of Defence last year.

Regional counter-terrorism training to include Myanmar military

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chair Malaysia has drawn criticism from civil society in Burma for inviting the military to a counter-terrorism program that provides technical and tactical support. This includes an exercise scheduled for Malaysia in 2026 and a field training exercise in India in 2027. 

“ASEAN’s ongoing military cooperation with the Myanmar junta lays bare the utter hypocrisy of its Five-Point Consensus and Malaysia’s hollow calls for peace,” said Yadanar Maung, the Justice For Myanmar spokesperson. The Five Point Consensus is the ASEAN peace plan for Burma that was agreed to by Min Aung Hlaing on April 24, 2021, but not implemented upon his return to Naypyidaw. 

ASEAN chair Malaysia and its Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim met to discuss peace with Min Aung Hlaing in Thailand on April 17. DVB has documented that the regime carried out 252 attacks since it announced a ceasefire on April 2. The regime participated in the 14th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Experts Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, co-chaired by Malaysia and India in New Delhi March 19-20. 

DVB Radio back on the airwaves inside Myanmar

Following the March 28 earthquake, DVB has been providing daily updates on the death toll, the number injured, as well as daily news coverage of the response. Every day, the DVB data team collects the latest information from the six hardest hit regions by the quake. On Thursday, DVB launched a daily radio program to reach everyone inside Burma, via shortwave radio.

“Radio is a very old medium, but in times of crisis it is the most reliable and widely reached medium. We are happy that we have the chance to get back on the airwaves [in Burma to broadcast critical news] for earthquake victims, even if only temporarily,” said DVB Chief Editor Aye Chan Naing. If you want to support DVB, go to dvb.no/donate.

In the six weeks after Cyclone Mocha in 2023, DVB Radio broadcast into Arakan State daily via emergency shortwave radio. Since then, DVB has used its DVB News podcast to continue to provide critical news in the audio format. Find and listen to DVB Radio online or on the SW band at 9430 kHz 07:30 Myanmar time (01:00 UTC) and at 17500 kHz 19:30 Myanmar time (13:00 UTC). 

News by Region

A section of the Yangon-Naypyidaw-Mandalay highway road was destroyed during the March 28 earthquake. (Credit: CJ)

MANDALAY—Residents claimed that the March 28 earthquake caused over 200 cracks and 180 cases of road and soil damage on the Yangon-Naypyidaw-Mandalay highway, which connects Yangon to Mandalay. The road is 336 miles (540 km) long and spans 22 townships.  

“Some sections are being repaired but there are many sections which were destroyed,” a truck driver in Mandalay told DVB on the condition of anonymity. He added that the constant detours are costing him time and money. Businesses along the route have had to close.

AYEYARWADY—Six residents of Ngathaingchaung town, displaced from their homes and staying at a camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), were arrested in Yekyi Township on Wednesday. Ngathaingchaung is located 57 miles (97 km) north of the region’s capital Pathein. 

“Five boys and one girl, aged 17-20, were arrested at the military inspection gate,” a military source told DVB on the condition of anonymity. Residents claimed that 11 civilians have been arrested in Ngathaingchaung April 19-21 on allegations of supporting the PDF.

Residents of Thabaung, Yekyi, Myanaung and Kyangin townships, which are located close to the Rakhine Yoma (mountains) in Arakan State, said that the military has increased the number of its troops at checkpoints to carry out inspections and arrests. 

(Exchange rate: $1 USD = 4,410 MMK) 

Nyein Chan May on building solidarity for Myanmar democracy in Europe [AUDIO]

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Nyein Chan May is an intersectional feminist, a pro-democracy activist, a podcaster, and the co-founder of German Solidarity with Myanmar, based in Germany. She joins DVB Newsroom to discuss her work in Europe building solidarity for Myanmar’s democracy movement since the 2021 military coup.

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