Guest contributor

Myo Yan Naung Thein

Min Aung Hlaing, who has appointed himself as both regime leader and head of state, treated Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as an equal by placing him directly in front of the royal throne.

This is a gesture that is emblematic of the sovereign authority of a nation. This positioning is notable, as it is a privilege that National League for Democracy (NLD) President Win Myint had only extended to Chinese President Xi Jinping only four years ago. 

Min Aung Hlaing appeared visibly nervous and anxious during his conversation with Wang Yi, highlighting his desperation to win favor with Beijing.

The way Min Aung Hlaing engaged with Wang Yi, along with the distorted information propagated by regime media, reflects the current state of the military. From its lowest-ranking soldier to the commander-in-chief, it is demoralized and lacking in confidence. They are experiencing a significant decline in morale.

China is well aware of these vulnerabilities and desperation and is strategically leveraging the situation to its advantage. Many EROs find themselves heavily dependent on China, while the military is in dire need of Chinese backing. 

This creates an advantageous scenario for China, which is now attempting to leverage the situation in Myanmar to further its own agenda of transition by integrating the election promised by the military, which it has delayed for three years. 

Following Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyidaw, China appears to be accelerating its plans related to Myanmar. Recently, it has closed border crossings in Brotherhood Alliance-controlled areas and restricted access at the Namtit crossing, which is in “Wa State”–an autonomous zone controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). 

Additionally, China has limited the flow of goods at other border points and has reportedly warned the UWSA about the movement of weapons through its territory to the TNLA. This move is clearly to pressure the Brotherhood Alliance into adopting Beijing’s plan, 

On Aug. 20, Wang Yi invited the U.N. Special Envoy on Myanmar Julie Bishop to Beijing to discuss the ongoing situation in Myanmar and to incorporate the U.N. into its strategy. Bishop reportedly expressed her willingness to collaborate with China, highlighting her support for working alongside Beijing and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to address the crisis in Myanmar. 

However, as of now, there has been no clear strategy revealed regarding how China plans to integrate the U.N. into its approach for Myanmar’s transition.

On Aug. 28, China’s Special Envoy Deng Xijun met with General Gam Shawng, the vice-chairperson of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The KIA has been actively fighting against the military in Kachin State and Sagaing Region, playing a vital role in the uprising to the 2021 coup through its collaboration with the National Unity Government (NUG). 

The KIA has also provided training to the PDF in Sagaing. The KIA commander-in-chief has assumed leadership of what the NUG calls “Military Region One,” which encompasses nearly all of northern Myanmar. 

During the offensives in March, April, and June, the KIA reportedly captured over 75 military outposts, and it secured control of the last border trade route from Kachin State to China. 

China is also expected to engage in separate discussions with the TNLA, the MNDAA, and the Arakan Army (AA), which launched its offensive against the military in Arakan State on Nov. 13. 

Deng Xijun’s meeting with the KIA was believed to focus on its coordination with the NUG, which commands the majority of PDFs in Sagaing. China is seeking to exert pressure on all parties to stop fighting and pull them into its plan.

China seems resolute in executing its transition, as demonstrated by its initiatives to engage different stakeholders inside the country. The prevailing circumstances raise concerns for China, especially in relation to its own interests, and this period presents a strategic opportunity to enhance its influence.

China has increasingly viewed Myanmar as a client state, a perception that seems to be reinforced under Min Aung Hlaing’s regime. During an informal discussion with foreign ministers from China, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand at the 9th Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Wang Yi said that “there are three bottom lines to be adhered to — Myanmar should not be subject to civil strife, should not be detached from the ASEAN family, and should not be allowed to be infiltrated and interfered with by external forces.” 

Wang Yi’s choice of words and his characterization of Myanmar have led many political analysts to perceive his comments as reflective of a colonial attitude, implying that China considers Myanmar as its subordinate.

This was further highlighted during Wang Yi’s meeting with Min Aung Hlaing, where he warned that Beijing would not accept remarks that could damage bilateral relations or “smear” China. He explicitly cautioned the regime leader regarding his implications that China played a role in Operation 1027 in northern Shan State. 

Myanmar’s military generals are aware of their subordinate status, recognizing that China is manipulating everyone to serve its own interests, leaving them little choice but to comply. 

Min Aung Hlaing’s reception of Wang Yi as an equal clearly reflects this submission. Despite holding strong anti-Chinese sentiments, he is navigating rough terrain. 

Richard Horsey, the senior adviser on Myanmar at the International Crisis Group, noted: “There is a deep well of anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar, particularly within the military, and Min Aung Hlaing is known to harbor particularly strong anti-Chinese views.” 

It now seems that the regime is suppressing these feelings in an effort to appease China. Beijing’s initial strategy for Myanmar following the 2021 coup was to encourage negotiations between the military and the NLD, seeking a resolution within the framework of the 2008 constitution. 

The military is steadily losing its grip on power and control over territory, while the successes of EROs and PDFs have become increasingly apparent, and the role of the NUG has grown more significant. This shift has raised concerns in China about the future of its interests in Myanmar, especially regarding U.S. influence.

In response, China has decided to steer Myanmar’s transition to align with its own, likely through the elections promised by Min Aung Hlaing. Beijing does not appear to have a solid, well-defined plan for Myanmar’s transition; the elections proposed by the military seem to be the most feasible option. 

Some analysts express skepticism about the likelihood of these elections occurring, given that the military regime currently controls less than half of the country’s territory. Ultimately, with few alternatives available, the election plan remains the primary option for China’s strategic interests in Myanmar.

The most likely speculation about China’s plans for Myanmar, given its recent activities, involves: 

1) Creating a sustainable ceasefire 

2) Conducting elections

3) Starting the transfer of power and a transition

The status quo will remain unchanged even if elections are held.

The Union Election Commission (UEC) announced on Aug. 24 during a meeting with registered political parties in Naypyidaw that a general election is planned for November 2025. However, the UEC has barred the NLD, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), and the Arakan National Party (ANP)—genuine democratic parties with significant public support. 

Instead, it has permitted the military-proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and several smaller parties without popular support from the electorate to take part.

Since the 2021 coup, the military has reportedly lost control over more than 86 percent of Myanmar, as reported by experts at the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). 

In this context, a forthcoming election appears to be devoid of significance, as no substantial changes are anticipated, and the status quo is very likely to persist. 

China must adopt a pragmatic approach to the evolving situation in Myanmar. It is a misconception for China to believe that the NUG is influenced by the U.S. The NUG has demonstrated a willingness to collaborate with China for the betterment of Myanmar and has pledged to safeguard Chinese interests within the country in its 10 Point China Policy. 

Specifically, the NUG has articulated its commitment to implementing measures that protect Chinese economic investments and other socio-economic enterprises in Myanmar, while also ensuring that no organization poses a threat to the national security of neighboring countries.

To effectively secure its interests in Myanmar, China should actively engage with the NUG and foster cooperation with EROs. Supporting the NUG and EROs represents a practical strategy that could enhance stability in Myanmar while safeguarding Chinese interests. It is essential for China to reassess its assumptions and recognize the changing dynamics within the country

“The NUG’s policy toward China highlights the significance of maintaining friendly relations with neighboring countries, and both the NUG and revolutionary forces are dedicated to protecting Chinese investments,” said Kyaw Zaw, the NUG spokesperson, to The Irrawaddy.

“It is the resistance forces that are fostering friendships with China and the Chinese people while the regime and military sympathizers spread anti-China sentiment. One thing China can do is to pressure the regime politically and diplomatically, build people-to-people friendship and stand by the Myanmar people and help them accomplish their wishes. Doing so will help Myanmar become a stable and prosperous country at the earliest,” added Kyaw Zaw.

The NUG expressed hope that China could recognize the difference between those who promote positive relationships and those who aim to undermine them.

Myo Yan Naung Thein is the visiting researcher and co-chair of the Burmese Democratic Futures Working Group, University of Virginia. He has traveled across the U.S. speaking to students, church groups, policymakers and members of the Myanmar diaspora to build support for democracy and the return to civilian rule.

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