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It’s time for India to rethink its Myanmar strategy post-Typhoon Yagi

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Guest contributor

Shalini Perumal

On Sept. 9, the remnants of Typhoon Yagi wreaked havoc across Myanmar, resulting in catastrophic flooding that has left a lasting mark on the nation’s already precarious humanitarian landscape. With over 419 confirmed deaths and approximately 887,000 people affected, according to the U.N., the disaster intensified the ongoing crisis stemming from the military coup in February 2021. 

In response, India launched Operation Sadbhav, dispatching 53 tonnes of emergency flood relief assistance valued at $1 million USD to Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. However, this gesture, framed as an act of solidarity, unfolds against a backdrop of complex political dynamics and longstanding challenges in India’s foreign policy towards Myanmar.

The impact of Typhoon Yagi highlights the vulnerabilities within Myanmar, a country grappling with both natural disasters and a political crisis ignited by the military’s ousting of the country’s elected civilian National League for Democracy (NLD) government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. 

The floods exacerbated an already dire situation for millions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), particularly for marginalized ethnic minorities such as the Rohingya, the Kachin, and the Karen communities. These groups have faced systemic discrimination, violence, and human rights abuses, leading to heightened humanitarian needs even before the cyclone struck. 

Reports indicate that approximately 1.3 million people are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, with urgent calls for food, clean water, medical supplies, and shelter. The U.N. has indicated the critical nature of the situation, stating that many affected areas remain difficult to access due to damaged infrastructure. 

India’s aid to Myanmar includes essential supplies such as food, medical kits, and hygiene products, aimed at alleviating the suffering of affected populations. This initiative is framed as a gesture of goodwill and regional solidarity, emphasizing India’s commitment to humanitarian principles. 

Yet, beneath this humanitarian veneer lies a complex web of geopolitical interests. India has long viewed Myanmar as a crucial partner in its Act East policy, which seeks to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian nations and counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region. 

The strategic significance of Myanmar cannot be overstated; it serves as a key conduit for India’s connectivity projects, including the ambitious Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP), which aims to link India’s eastern coastline with its northeastern states. 

However, India’s past approach to Myanmar has been criticized for prioritizing strategic interests over ethical considerations. Since the 2021 coup, India’s stance has been perceived as tacit support for the illegal junta in Naypyidaw, a position that has drawn ire from human rights organizations and international observers. 

By engaging with a regime that is widely condemned for human rights abuses, India risks complicity in the junta’s oppressive measures while attempting to maintain a façade of humanitarianism. 

This delicate balancing act raises critical questions: Can India genuinely assist the affected communities while simultaneously supporting a government engaged in egregious human rights violations? 

Critics argue that India’s continued engagement with the junta undermines its humanitarian efforts. Human rights advocates have long urged India to take a firmer stance against the military’s actions, emphasizing that true humanitarian assistance must be paired with a commitment to human rights and democratic governance. 

The juxtaposition of humanitarian aid and political complicity creates a perception that India prioritizes its strategic interests over the welfare of vulnerable populations. Moreover, the situation has profound implications for ethnic minorities, whose needs and rights are often overlooked. 

The humanitarian crisis caused by Typhoon Yagi raises important questions about representation and access to aid for these marginalized communities. India’s policy toward Myanmar must adapt to acknowledge these complexities and ensure that assistance reaches those who need it most. 

In addition to the immediate humanitarian needs caused by the floods, India faces a pressing challenge with the influx of refugees from Myanmar. Since 2021, tens of thousands have fled to India, seeking safety from escalating violence. The government’s response to these refugees has been inconsistent, often marked by increased scrutiny and, in some cases, denial of entry. The Rohingya, a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority from Myanmar, face particularly harsh treatment. 

Historically, India has adopted a stringent stance toward Rohingya refugees, citing national security concerns. This approach raises ethical questions about India’s commitment to humanitarian principles, especially when the very communities in need of protection are met with hostility. 

With over 45,000 Myanmar nationals currently seeking refuge in northeastern states, the challenge for India is twofold: safeguarding its borders while meeting its humanitarian obligations. As reports indicate that many refugees are fleeing the junta’s brutal crackdown, India’s policy towards them reveals significant tensions between national security and humanitarian responsibilities. 

The recent invitation extended to political and military opponents of the junta for a seminar in New Delhi indicates a potential shift in India’s stance. This engagement with non-state actors, including ethnic minority representatives, reflects an understanding that India’s policy must be more inclusive. However, it also raises questions about the sincerity of such initiatives given India’s historical engagement with the junta. 

As the conflict in Myanmar intensifies and ethnic tensions continue to rise, it is crucial for India to reevaluate its approach to the country. The Arakan Army’s expanding control over key regions poses a threat to India’s strategic initiatives with the illegal junta, notably the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, which has been positioned by the Indian government as essential for regional connectivity. 

To effectively navigate this shifting political landscape, India must recalibrate its engagement strategy, emphasizing collaboration with community-based organizations (CBOs). Engaging with CBOs is vital for several reasons. These organizations have deep local knowledge and insights into the needs and dynamics of affected communities, particularly marginalized groups. By supporting and partnering with CBOs, India can ensure that its humanitarian assistance is not only timely but also culturally sensitive and targeted effectively to those who need it most. 

The CBOs also often play an important role in advocating for human rights and social justice within their communities. Supporting their efforts can help amplify the voices of marginalized populations and promote accountability for human rights abuses, particularly in light of non-state actors like the Arakan Army’s reported violations against the Rohingya. This alignment with local advocates can strengthen India’s credibility and moral standing in the region. 

Moreover, strengthening ties with CBOs can facilitate greater community resilience, enabling affected populations to better cope with ongoing challenges. By investing in local initiatives and capacity-building, India can contribute to long-term stability and peace in Myanmar, which is essential for the success of strategic projects like the KMTTP. 

India’s humanitarian assistance to Myanmar cannot be separated from the broader issue of human rights and representation for marginalized communities. While the aid dispatched post-Typhoon Yagi signifies a commitment to humanitarian principles, it must also encompass advocacy for the rights of ethnic minorities. 

Historically, these groups have faced systematic marginalization, and the current humanitarian crisis only exacerbates their vulnerabilities. The U.N. and various human rights organizations have called for increased engagement with resistance authorities and civil society to ensure that assistance reaches those in dire need.

The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) has argued that the junta lacks the legitimacy and capacity to deliver aid effectively. Therefore, regional players like India must engage with all stakeholders, including non-state actors and the efforts of CBOs, to facilitate meaningful humanitarian efforts. 

As India navigates its humanitarian response to Myanmar, it must grapple with the complexities of its foreign policy and the implications for human rights. The assistance provided in the wake of Typhoon Yagi highlights India’s commitment to supporting affected communities but also indicates the challenges of reconciling humanitarian efforts with political realities. 

Going forward, India must adopt a more nuanced approach that prioritizes the rights and representation of ethnic minorities. Engaging in inclusive dialogue that condemns the junta’s illegal coup is crucial for any meaningful resolution to the ongoing crisis. Furthermore, India must align its foreign policy with its stated commitment to democracy and human rights, ensuring that humanitarian assistance does not become a tool for political expediency. 

The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar demands urgent relief efforts and sustainable solutions that address the root of political and social challenges. India must reaffirm its ethical commitments by advocating for the rights of marginalized communities and working towards lasting change.


Shalini Perumal is a creative international development professional who has worked previously in Mae Sot, Thailand at Mae Tao Clinic. She is currently a freelance journalist as well as Communications Officer at ActionAid India in New Delhi. The views expressed in the article are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the organization. 

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]

Kachin Independence Army accused of arresting reporters in Myanmar jade mining hub

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Tar Lynn Maung, who reports for the Red News Agency, and Naung Yo, a freelance reporter, were both arrested in Hpakant Township, Kachin State, on Sept. 29. (Credit: Social media)

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is accused of detaining two journalists in the jade-mining hub of Hpakant Township, located around 94 miles (151 km) northwest of the Kachin State capital Myitkyina, on Sept. 29. 

“We have not heard about the arrest as of yet,” Naw Bu, the KIA spokesperson, told DVB.

Tar Lynn Maung, who reports for the Red News Agency, and Naung Yo, a freelance reporter, were both arrested. Their current whereabouts remain unknown, according to locals. 

“A KIA soldier asked a People’s Defense Force member to meet Ko [Tar Lynn Maung] at a restaurant. Since Ko Tar knew the PDF member, he trusted him and went to the restaurant. He was unable to be contacted after that,” a source close to the reporter in Hpakant told DVB.

Naung Yo was arrested shortly afterwards on the same day while investigating Tar Lynn Maung’s arrest. The reason for their detention is unclear. But locals speculate that Tar Lynn Maung was detained for a social media post critical of the KIA.

On Sept. 23, 2023, Tar Lynn Maung was not seriously injured when a car operated by members of a local armed group reportedly rammed into his while driving through a village of Hpakant Township.

After the Feb. 1, 2021 military coup, Tar Lynn Maung left his job at the Ministry of Information and Communications to join the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), and an anti-coup protest group in Kachin State.

In late-2022, Nyaung Yo was released from prison after serving a one-year-and-seven-month sentence for covering the 2021 anti-coup protests.

Why is the Myanmar military carrying out airstrikes on Lashio?

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Several homes were destroyed by airstrikes in Lashio, northern Shan State, on Sept. 24. (Credit: Lashio Reconstruction)

Lashio, located in northern Shan State, is home to nearly 150,000 people. Its residents have been continually affected by the violence that has engulfed this region in recent months. In September, the Myanmar Air Force conducted at least 15 airstrikes, which has killed at least 9 and injured 42 civilians. The airstrikes are targeting areas controlled by the Brotherhood Alliance’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and has caused widespread destruction. Lashio residents are living in fear of futher retaliatory attacks. The MNDAA took control of Lashio after it seized the Northeast Regional Military Command (RMC) on Aug. 3.

Kachin resistance expands control over Myanmar rare earth mining hub

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Kachin Independence Army (KIA) soldiers cross a creek near Laiza, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) capital located in Kachin State near the China border, in January 2013. (Credit: Reuters)

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), along with its allied People’s Defense Force (PDF) seized control of two rare earth mining towns this week in northeastern Kachin State near the China border.

The KIA and PDF captured Tsawlaw town, located 120 miles (193 km) northeast of the Kachin State capital Myitkyina, on Wednesday, sources close to the military told DVB. 

The seizure of the town came three days after the KIA and PDF captured Chipwi, another center of valuable rare earth mining, located south of Tsawlaw. Local media reported that retaliatory airstrikes conducted by the Myanmar Air Force caused an unknown number of civilian casualties in Chipwi. 

“About two-thirds of the locals have fled now. Some have taken refuge in villages far from the town, while others remain in Chipwi—mostly the elderly and those who are unable to flee,” a Chipwi resident told DVB.

The fighting and closure of roads in the town has caused the price of goods to skyrocket and shortages of essential commodities, she added. Most residents of Tsawlaw and Chipwi have not returned to their homes since the KIA and PDF launched an offensive to capture both towns on Sept. 29. 

“They could also take control over rare earth mineral mining… the main goal is to cut off the financial resources of the Pangwa militia”

Than Soe Naing, a political analyst

Tsawlaw and Chipwi are located in the Kachin Special Region 1 in northeastern Kachin State, which is administered by the pro-military Kachin Border Guard Force (BGF). The Kachin BGF was formed in 2009 when the New Democratic Army – Kachin, an ethnic armed group that broke away from the Communist Party of Burma in 1989, agreed to come under the military’s chain of command.

“They [KIA] could also take control over rare earth mineral mining operations in the area. I believe the main goal is to cut off the financial resources of the Pangwa militia [Kachin BGF],” Than Soe Naing, a political analyst, told DVB.

Much of Myanmar’s lucrative rare earth minerals are extracted from mines that are operated by the Kachin BGF. Rare earth elements are vital components used in electronics – including batteries, cameras, computer chips – as well as glass and magnets. 

China imported over 40,000 tons of rare earth minerals from Myanmar in 2023, according to the country’s General Administration of Customs.

Myanmar’s rare earth mining trade was worth $1.4 billion USD last year, according to Global Witness, a human rights organization that investigates abuses linked to natural resource exploitation. The number of mining sites in the Kachin Special Region 1 increased by 40 percent since the military coup took place on Feb. 1, 2021, according to the group.

Kachin residents and activists have urged the KIA to prevent rare earth mineral mining in the state due its destructive impact on the environment.

The Chinese Embassy in Yangon has not responded to DVB’s request for comment regarding the fighting in the area near the Myanmar-China border.

Zahkung Ting Ying, the 84-year-old chief of the Kachin Special Region 1, directed the BGF and militias to “implement strict defense measures” last June in anticipation of the KIA offensive. KIA General Sumlut Gun Maw said the order “should not have been issued.”

The KIA has seized control of 12 towns in Kachin and northern Shan states, as well as Sagaing Region, since last year. It launched a major offensive across Kachin State on March 7

Newscast: Airstrikes on Lashio kills at least 9 and injures 42 civilians since September

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DVB Newscast for Oct. 4, 2024. The military has carried out at least 15 airstrikes on Lashio, located in northern Shan State, over the last month. The city is home to 150,000 people who fear more retaliatory airstrikes against the Brotherhood Alliance. Its Kokang forces, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), took control of Lashio after it seized the Northeast Regional Military Command (RMC) headquarters on Aug. 3.

Myanmar armed groups fail to reopen Asia Highway; Naypyidaw to send senior regime official to ASEAN summit

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A truck passes through the Myawaddy Trade Zone on the Asia Highway in Karen State in September. (Credit: CJ)

Karen armed groups fail to reopen Asia Highway

Karen armed groups failed to reopen the vital transport link, the Kawkareik-Myawaddy portion of the Asia Highway in Karen State, during a meeting that was held on Sept. 24. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the Karen National Army/Border Guard Force (KNA/BGF), and the KNU/KNLA Peace Council attended the meeting.

“A lot of [our] lower-level members are not in favour [of reopening the highway],” a senior official of the Karen National Union (KNU) told DVB. A DKBA spokesperson told DVB that his group is in favor of reopening the highway, claiming that it is what the public wants. The highway is critical for Burma-Thailand border trade. 

A trader told DVB that the closure of the highway has led to increased transportation costs and longer journey times for freight going to Yangon. Much of the Asia Highway has been under the control of the KNLA and People’s Defense Force (PDF) since March. The military has renewed its counter offensive to retake the highway since the second week of September.

Naypyidaw to send senior official to ASEAN summit

The military regime will send its Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Aung Kyaw Moe to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Laos on Oct. 9, Nikkei Asia reported. This is the first time Naypyidaw is sending a senior diplomat to the summit since ASEAN barred top regime officials from its meetings in 2022. 

The regime failed to adhere to the ASEAN Five Point Consensus, adopted in April 2021, which called for an end to all violence in Burma, the release of all political prisoners such as State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. It also stipulated that the regime should begin dialogue with anti-coup resistance groups. ASEAN will also meet with diplomats representing Japan, China, South Korea, and the U.S. during the summit.

Aung Kyaw Moe attended the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting last July. Laos, the current chair of ASEAN, announced plans to host an international conference to discuss Burma’s political crisis with the ASEAN Troika, which includes Indonesia, Laos, and Malaysia. The ASEAN Troika meeting on Burma, announced in July, has yet to take place. Malaysia will take over as ASEAN chair in 2025.

A Rohingya refugee carries a solar panel at the Balukhali refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, on Sept. 28. (Credit: Reuters)

US diplomat to discuss rights abuses in Burma with Thai officials

The U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Beth Van Schaack arrived in Bangkok, Thailand today and will hold talks with Thai officials about human rights abuses in Burma. She will also meet with civil society, experts, and organizations in Thailand.

“Ambassador Van Schaack will reiterate the U.S. commitment to seeking accountability for atrocities committed across Myanmar and to standing with and pursuing justice for survivors and victims,” the U.S. State Department said in a statement released on Wednesday. 

The statement called on Burma to create conditions conducive for the safe repatriation of Rohingya refugees. Van Schaack is scheduled to leave Thailand on Monday. Over 700,000 Rohingya were forced into Bangladesh after a 2017 military clearance operation in northern Arakan State that was labeled a genocide by the U.S. in 2022.

News by Region

CHINLAND—Stab wounds were found on the bodies of three boat drivers recovered in southern Chinland’s Paletwa Township on Sept. 20. They were a father, son and grandson and had been transporting goods between Paletwa and Arakan State’s Kyauktaw Township. Their family lost contact with them on Sept. 2. 

“We don’t know who killed them and why. The incident has made other boat drivers and commuters very worried,” a boat driver in Paletwa told DVB. Telecommunication services are unavailable in Paletwa. Merchants in Arakan have been conducting trade with India’s Mizoram State, via Paletwa, since the Arakan Army (AA) seized control of the township in January.

SAGAING—A civilian was injured and a school and hospital were damaged after the Burma Air Force conducted airstrikes on Maunghtaung village in Butalin Township, located around 23 miles (37 km) north of the Sagaing Region capital Monywa, on Wednesday. 

“Two fighter jets from Tada-U and Meiktila dropped bombs and fired bullets into the village,” a Butalin PDF member told DVB. Maunghtaung is located near Sipa village, where the PDF detained around 20 military personnel as prisoners of war during an attack on a column of 80 troops on Sunday. It claimed that over 50 military personnel were killed during the attack. 

SHAN—Chinese syndicates have set up cyber scam centers in Laihka Township, located around 90 miles (145 km) northwest of the Shan State capital Taunggyi, following crackdowns on their operations in northern Shan State in February.

“They exchange [Chinese yuan] for Burmese currency and spend large amounts, causing the prices of basic goods to triple. Locals have to rush to buy necessities because if they’re late, the Chinese will have already bought everything,” a Laihka resident told DVB. The cyber scam centers are guarded by pro-military militias. 

Residents of Muse, Mongyai, and Tangyan townships said that the military collected census data in the downtown areas of the towns on Tuesday. The three towns are the only urban centers the military still controls in northern Shan State. 

“They started collecting census data in the town on Oct. 1,” a Tangyan resident told DVB. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) has deployed troops in Tangyan since July 10. Ethnic armed groups control 18 out of northern Shan State’s 24 townships. The regime began its nationwide census on Tuesday, which will conclude on Oct. 15, in order to compile voter lists elections tentatively scheduled for November 2025.

(Exchange rate: $1 USD = 4,700 kyat)

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