Sunday, June 8, 2025
Home Blog Page 4

The colonial logic of India’s Act East Policy in Myanmar

0
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets Myanmar regime leader Min Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC Summit, in Bangkok, Thailand, on April 4, 2025. (Credit: Reuters)

Guest contributor

Shalini Perumal

India’s Act East Policy, presented as a “progressive” framework for regional cooperation and economic integration, continues to showcase Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government complicity with Myanmar’s military junta. 

This policy, with its focus on “improving connectivity” and trade, disregards the complex political realities and historical grievances of these communities, perpetuating a colonial logic that prioritises the interests of the central state over the rights of marginalised populations.

It exhibits a disturbing continuity with colonial practices. As mentioned in a recent newsletter by Beyond Ah Na (formerly a podcast of the same name), the language of “engagement” employed by the current Indian government, despite its claims of a more nuanced approach, often serves as a strategic tool to legitimize its complicity with the junta and further its own geopolitical interests. 

The focus on connectivity projects, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) and the India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway, is central to its vision of “improving regional integration” and facilitating trade. 

However, these projects often involve significant social and environmental costs, particularly for ethnic communities living in the project areas. Land acquisition, displacement, and the disruption of traditional livelihoods are common consequences, often carried out with little regard for the rights and concerns of the affected populations.

Moreover, the engagement with the junta, even after the 2021 military coup, reveals a willingness to prioritise strategic interests over democratic values and human rights. This engagement, often justified in the name of maintaining stability and promoting economic development, lends legitimacy to a brutal and repressive junta that has committed widespread atrocities against the Myanmar people.

In this context, the rhetoric of “win-win” cooperation and mutual benefit rings hollow, masking a reality where the interests of powerful states and corporations are prioritised over the rights and well-being of marginalised communities. 

The Act East Policy’s underlying assumption that economic growth will automatically translate into progress and prosperity for all ignores the complex political and social dynamics at play in Myanmar, where historical grievances, ethnic tensions, and unequal power relations continue to fuel conflict and instability.

The emphasis on “connectivity” as a key driver of development and regional integration is a central feature of the Act East Policy. However, this focus on infrastructure development, particularly in the context of Myanmar, bears a striking resemblance to the colonial practices of the past.

During the colonial era, infrastructure projects such as railways, roads, and ports were primarily built to facilitate the extraction of resources and the control of territory. 

These projects often disregarded the needs and rights of communities, disrupting traditional trade routes, displacing peoples, and undermining indigenous economies. The benefits of these projects accrued primarily to the colonial powers and their allies, while the costs were borne disproportionately by the colonised.

The emphasis on connectivity, while driven by different motivations, shares a similar logic. The focus is on creating efficient transportation corridors and trade routes that serve the interests of India and other regional powers, often with little regard for the social and environmental consequences for indigenous and ethnic communities. 

The language of “development” and “progress” is used to justify these projects, masking the power imbalances and inequalities that they perpetuate.

The KMTTP, for example, aims to provide India with an alternative route to access its northeastern states, bypassing the narrow Siliguri Corridor. 

While this project is undoubtedly of strategic importance to India, its implementation has been fraught with challenges, including land acquisition issues, displacement of communities, and concerns about environmental impact. 

Communities have raised concerns about the lack of consultation and the failure to adequately address their grievances.

Similarly, the IMT Trilateral Highway, which seeks to connect India with Thailand via Myanmar, has faced numerous obstacles, including security concerns, funding shortfalls, and opposition from ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). 

The project has also been criticized for its potential negative impacts on local livelihoods and the environment.

In both cases, the pursuit of connectivity has taken precedence over the rights and concerns of the affected communities. The projects are often implemented in a top-down manner, with little meaningful participation or consultation with residents. 

This approach not only disregards the principles of democratic governance and self-determination but also undermines the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of these projects.

The Indian government’s use of the term “engagement” to describe its interactions with various actors in Myanmar, including the junta and EAOs, is another area of concern. 

While “engagement” may sound neutral and even constructive, in the context of Myanmar, it often serves as a euphemism for a more complex and morally ambiguous reality.

The use of the term “engagement” to describe India’s policy towards Myanmar is reiterated in an International Crisis Group Report titled “A Rebel Border: India’s Evolving Ties with Myanmar after the Coup.” 

As pointed out in the Beyond Ah Nah newsletter, International Crisis Group places emphasis on “engagement” which masks the underlying logic of India’s policy, which is driven primarily by strategic considerations. 

Beyond Ah Nah states: “The International Crisis Group has rebranded its framing of India–Myanmar relations. Disquiet on the Western Front is now A Rebel Border. The titles change. The priorities do not. We’re told that India’s policy is ‘evolving.’ 

That India is ‘fine-tuning’ its approach. That it now ‘engages’ with armed groups while maintaining ties to the regime. But beneath the careful balance-of-power narrative lies something far more dangerous: the continued treatment of Myanmar’s resistance not as a political force, but as a logistical necessity. This is not solidarity. This is supply chain management.”

India’s engagement with EAOs, for example, is not a reflection of its support for their political aspirations, but rather a pragmatic calculation of their ability to facilitate India’s connectivity projects and secure its borders.

The Indian government has often stated its commitment to supporting a peaceful and democratic transition in Myanmar. However, its continued engagement with the junta, which seized power in a coup and has committed widespread human rights abuses, casts serious doubt on its sincerity. 

Mind you, India continues to fund the junta. This engagement lends legitimacy to a regime that has lost all credibility in the eyes of the Myanmar people and undermines the efforts of the pro-democracy movement.

Moreover, the language of “engagement” often obscures the power imbalances and inequalities that characterise India’s relationship with Myanmar. 

India, as a much larger and more powerful state, is able to exert significant influence over its smaller neighbor. This influence is often used to advance India’s own strategic and economic interests, even when those interests conflict with the rights and aspirations of the Myanmar people.

In this context, “engagement” becomes a tool for managing a complex and volatile situation, rather than a genuine effort to promote dialogue, reconciliation, and democratic change. 

It is a language that prioritises stability and control over justice and human rights, perpetuating a colonial logic that views the region as a theater for great power competition, rather than a collection of sovereign nations with their own unique histories and aspirations.

The disregard for the sovereignty of ethnic communities in Myanmar is one of its most troubling aspects. Myanmar is a multi-ethnic state with a long history of conflict and tension between the central government and various EAOs. 

These organizations represent the interests of diverse ethnic groups, including the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Rakhine, and Shan, who have long sought greater autonomy and self-determination.

The focus on central government-led development projects, often implemented in areas inhabited by ethnic communities, threatens to further marginalise these groups and undermine their already precarious sovereignty. 

Land acquisition for infrastructure projects, for example, often disregards traditional land tenure systems and customary rights, displacing communities and disrupting their livelihoods.

Moreover, the influx of workers and businesses from other parts of Myanmar, facilitated by increased connectivity, can lead to further marginalisation of ethnic communities, who may find themselves competing for resources and opportunities with newcomers. 

This can exacerbate existing tensions and fuel resentment from ethnic and indigenous communities in Myanmar against the central government in India.

The emphasis on border security and management also poses a threat to the sovereignty of ethnic communities. India’s concerns about cross-border insurgency and illegal immigration have led to increased militarisation of the border areas, often with negative consequences for the local populations. 

Security forces have been accused of human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings, further alienating ethnic communities and undermining their trust in the state.

In addition, India’s efforts to fence and demarcate the border, often without adequate consultation with affected communities, can disrupt traditional cross-border trade and social networks, further fragmenting ethnic groups and undermining their cultural and economic ties.

The failure to adequately address the concerns and aspirations of ethnic communities not only violates their fundamental rights but also undermines the prospects for a lasting and sustainable peace in Myanmar. 

By prioritising the interests of New Delhi and external actors, India’s Act East Policy perpetuates a colonial logic that views ethnic communities in Myanmar as obstacles to development, rather than as legitimate stakeholders with a right to self-determination.

Modi’s BJP government has been a strong proponent of the Act East Policy, viewing it as a key component of its foreign policy and a crucial tool for advancing India’s strategic interests in the region. 

India’s strategic economic interests have led it to adopt a policy of “calibrated engagement” with the junta, which involves maintaining diplomatic ties, providing limited humanitarian assistance, and pursuing economic cooperation in areas of mutual interest. 

This approach, while presented as a pragmatic response to a complex situation, effectively legitimises the junta and undermines the efforts of the pro-democracy movement. 

The BJP government’s rhetoric of “engagement” and “dialogue” often serves to mask its complicity with the junta. While paying lip service to the importance of democracy and human rights, the government’s actions on the ground suggest a willingness to prioritise its own strategic interests, even at the cost of supporting a brutal and repressive regime.

This approach is not only morally questionable but also strategically short-sighted. By aligning itself with the junta, the BJP government risks alienating itself from the Myanmar people and undermining its long-term credibility and influence in the region.

It is time for India to undertake a decolonial turn in its approach to Myanmar. This requires a fundamental rethinking of the Act East Policy, moving beyond the narrow confines of strategic calculation and embracing a vision of regional cooperation that is grounded in the principles of justice, human rights, and respect for self-determination.

A decolonial approach would involve centring the voices of ethnic communities. The Indian government must recognise the legitimacy of ethnic communities and their right to self-determination. 

This requires engaging with EAOs as genuine political actors and incorporating their perspectives into the design and implementation of development projects. 

India must also prioritise the promotion of human rights and democracy in Myanmar. This requires holding the junta accountable for its crimes, supporting the pro-democracy movement, and advocating for a genuine and inclusive political transition.

Additionally, India must move beyond a narrow focus on infrastructure development and embrace a more holistic vision of connectivity that prioritises the needs and well-being of local communities. 

This requires ensuring that development projects are implemented (if at all) in a transparent and participatory manner, with full respect for environmental sustainability and social justice. 

India must critically examine and challenge the colonial crimes that continue to shape its foreign policy. This requires acknowledging the historical injustices inflicted upon marginalised communities, both within India and in neighboring countries, and working to redress those injustices.

Implementing a decolonial approach will not be easy but is necessary for the future of Myanmar. It will require a willingness and action to challenge deeply entrenched assumptions, to confront uncomfortable truths, and to prioritise moral considerations over short-term gains. 

By embracing a decolonial approach, India can move beyond the colonial logic of the Act East Policy and begin to build a new paradigm of regional cooperation based on mutual respect, solidarity, and a shared commitment to justice, human rights and the sovereignty of indigenous and ethnic communities. 


Shalini Perumal is a creative international development professional who has worked previously in Mae Sot, Thailand at Mae Tao Clinic. She is currently a freelance journalist as well as consultant at Finnish Refugee Council Myanmar.

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]

Two months after the Myanmar earthquake and Naypyidaw states over $800 million USD in damages

0
Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing inspecting earthquake damage at a government building in Naypyidaw on May 27. (Credit: regime media)

At a donation ceremony for earthquake relief held in Naypyidaw on Thursday, regime leader Min Aung Hlaing told the audience that a total of 3,739 have been killed, 5,104 have been injured, and 68 are still missing since March 28.  

“Our country Myanmar has been experiencing floods, cyclone occurrences, and droughts almost every year due to climate change disruptions…resulting in significant losses,” said Min Aung Hlaing during his speech on May 29 as reported by regime media.

He added that the quake has impacted 506,069 people and 162,167 households in 10 states and regions, including Sagaing, Mandalay, Magway, Naypyidaw and southern Shan State- the hardest hit during the quake.

At least 4,492 have been killed and 11,366 have been injured by the quake, according to DVB data. The regime’s Department of Meteorology and Hydrology has documented more than 100 aftershocks since March 28. 

“We’ve had to stay with relatives since the quake happened because we can’t afford to repair our house yet,” a Mandalay resident told DVB on the condition of anonymity.

The total cost of damage was 3,804,549 billion kyats ($858.77 million USD), according to the regime. 

This includes 51,210 residential houses, 11,338 government facilities, 6,730 mobile communication stations, 3,435 electricity poles, 6,469 pagodas and 5,588 other religious buildings in need of repair.

Another 2,409 basic education schools, 72 higher education institutions, 90 private schools, 384 public hospitals, 364 clinics and 650 transportation infrastructure were also damaged. Seventy-eight acres of cropland were destroyed and more than 130,000 livestock died.

The civilian-led National Unity Government (NUG) stated on April 7 that the earthquake severely damaged 32,368 homes, 5,324 religious buildings, 554 schools, as well as 4,603 roads and communication infrastructure. 

The regime has received nearly $137 million USD in foreign aid, based on figures released by donor countries, according to DVB data.

“We know that they’ve blockaded aid from getting into areas that desperately need it,” Tom Andrews, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, told DVB. 

The NUG called on the international community to ensure aid reaches “those in need, not those in power.” It has raised nearly 1.5 billion kyats ($340,000 USD) for quake relief through its Spring Development Bank (SDB) since March 28.

At the donation ceremony in Naypyidaw on May 29, Min Aun Hlaing told the audience that his regime has received an estimated $32 million USD in donations from domestic and international donors for earthquake relief. 

This was the second major fundraising event reported by regime media. The first took place on April 1, when donors contributed approximately $28.28 million USD.

“It’s a very intentional move by this military to obstruct international aid,” Khin Ohmar, the founder of the human rights organization Progressive Voice, told DVB.

Regime media reported that Min Aung Hlaing pledged to give one million kyats ($220 USD) to the family of each person who died in the quake. 

“In Pinlaung, families of the deceased were given just 300,000 kyats ($67.72 USD) per deceased person, and those with injured relatives received only 50,000 kyats,” said a resident in Pinlaung Township, which is located 67 miles (107 km) southwest of the Shan State capital Taunggyi.

The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) stated on May 17 that many families remain displaced from their homes and have been staying in temporary shelters over the last two months since the quake. 

It reported that nearly 509,400 people or 57 percent of the population still urgently needs food aid across the six hardest-hit regions and is calling for additional funding.

The Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), declared a one-month ceasefire beginning April 1, which was later extended to May 31. 

The NUG declared a unilateral two-week pause in offensive operations, limited strictly to defensive actions in all earthquake-affected areas, starting March 30. This ended on April 22.

The regime ceasefire April 2-30 was renewed May 6-31. DVB data states that the regime has carried out 669 attacks since April 2. It has killed at least 544 people and injured 1,148 others in 809 air and artillery strikes from March 28 to May 28.

Transitional justice in Myanmar event held in Thailand

0
Patrick Burgess, the Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR) president and co-founder, spoke and performed at the Transitional Justice for Burma event at The Commune CNX in Chiang Mai, Thailand, on May 23. (Credit: DVB)

An event called Transitional Justice For Burma was held at The Commune CNX in Chiang Mai, Thailand, on May 23. It was organized by Asia Justice And Rights (AJAR).

Two months since a post-earthquake ceasefire began in Myanmar [AUDIO]

0

t has been two months since a post-quake ceasefire was announced by the Brotherhood Alliance and the National Unity Government (NUG) in order to allow humanitarian assistance to reach those in need following ⁠a devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake⁠. Only the Brotherhood Alliance extended the truce until May 31.

A ceasefire was also announced by the military regime April 2-30, which it then renewed from May 6-31. But DVB has documented 669 attacks carried out by regime forces since then with a total 544 killed and 1,148 injured from March 28 to May 28. Stay tuned to DVB English News for more ⁠⁠⁠⁠Newscasts⁠⁠⁠⁠. We’re available wherever you get ⁠⁠⁠⁠podcasts⁠⁠⁠⁠. Follow or ⁠⁠⁠⁠subscribe⁠⁠⁠⁠.

Resistance forces seize military outpost in Karen State; Regime counteroffensive advances toward Chinland

0
A member of the Karen National Union erects its flag after capturing the regime Kanellay outpost in Myawaddy Township, Karen State, on May 28. (Credit: KNDO)

Resistance forces seize regime outpost in Karen State

The Karen Information Center (KIC), a media agency covering Karen State, reported that the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) captured the Kanaelay regime outpost located in Myawaddy Township of Karen State, along the Burma-Thailand border, on Wednesday. Myawaddy is located 81 miles (130 km) east of the Karen State capital Hpa-an.

The KNLA source told the KIC that the residents were not harmed since they were evacuated before the fighting took place and that an unknown number of regime troops fled the outpost. KNLA-led resistance forces have besieged four regime outposts in Myawaddy Township by blocking reinforcements from arriving since Thursday.

A frontline source told DVB that KNLA-led forces launched an offensive on Monday to seize the regime’s Thebawboe outpost in southern Myawaddy across from Thailand’s Mae Sot District. At least 2,000 residents from five villages fled across the border into Thailand’s Tak Province as the regime fired artillery from its Wawlay outpost on May 26, the source added. 

Over 1,600 arrested in 3 months from digital surveillance 

Pro-regime media reported on Tuesday that police arrested 1,657 “fugitives” nationwide between March 7 and May 21 through the use of the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS). The software—installed on computers at checkpoints and hotels—alerts police if individuals listed in its database appear, according to the Mandalay Police Force.

“It’s powered by Huawei as part of China’s contribution to [the regime’s] repression of its people. It mirrors in many ways systems being used in China,” Antonio Graceffo, an independent security analyst, told DVB. He added that the system mirrors the one used by Beijing which integrates artificial intelligence, digital identity cards and facial recognition technology. 

Regime authorities claim that they could identify a person using facial images alone, without requiring their national registration card number. They added that former prisoners released under amnesties would be added to the system’s database. DVB data has documented that 106,810 prisoners—including 8,873 political prisoners—were released in 18 amnesties since the coup on Feb. 1, 2021

Regime counteroffensive advances toward Chinland

Approximately 800 regime troops have been advancing toward Tedim Township in northern Chandland from Kalay Township in western Sagaing Region with intense fighting against resistance groups since May 21. Kalay is located 50 miles (80 km) southeast of Tedim, which is 117 miles (188 km) north of the Chinland capital Hakha.

“[Regime forces] want to retake the towns we have seized. Intense fighting has been occurring in Tedim Township, and residents have already fled,” Salai Htet Ni, the Chin National Front (CNF) spokesperson, told DVB. Casualties have been reported on both sides, although no specific number has been disclosed.

Chinland’s Khonumthung News agency reported that around 10,000 residents from villages in Tedim, and along the route from Kalay, have fled their homes. Chin resistance groups claim to control 90 percent of Chinland, including the Burma-India border town of Rikhawdar. The regime controls Tedim, Hakha, and Thantlang, 22 miles (35 km) west of Hakha.

News by Region

A fallen tree destroyed a thatched home in a village of Einme Township, Ayeyarwady Region, following a storm on May 28. (Credit: Myanmar Fire Services Department)

AYEYARWADY/YANGON—Sources told DVB that at least eight houses and an unknown number of schools were damaged by strong wind and rains that struck townships in Yangon and Ayeyarwady regions on Wednesday. “No injuries or fatalities to people or animals occurred,” a rescue worker in Ayeyarwady Region told DVB. 

The Myanmar Fire Services Department stated that it has conducted rescue operations in the affected townships of Yangon and Ayeyarwady. The regime’s Department of Meteorology and Hydrology has forecast more scattered rain with strong wind nationwide in the coming days.

CHINLAND/ARAKAN—The Chin Political Steering Committee (Rakhine State) on Wednesday urged the Arakan Army (AA) to release 63 Chin youths who were detained while attempting to go abroad for work and education, noting that some of the detainees are minors. The AA seized Paletwa Township in southern Chinland on Jan. 14, 2024.

Chin groups urged the AA to discuss its recruitment orders, which requires men aged 18-45 and women aged 18-25 in AA-controlled territory to serve two years. The AA order barred military service-aged residents of Arakan from leaving the state on May 22

A source close to the AA healthcare department told DVB that there were at least 400 cases of malaria and two deaths reported in 14 Arakan townships, as well as Paletwa in southern Chinland, so far this year. Most malaria cases were from merchants that returned from India and from those living in rural areas, the source added.

A resident from Kyauktaw Township told DVB on the condition of anonymity that AA healthcare workers sprayed mosquito repellent, but the measures were inefficient since they did not cover all the wards under its control. Last year, 20 malaria-related deaths were reported in AA-controlled territory. 

SHAN—Medical officers in Mandalay told DVB that the regime plans to transfer an unknown number of medical staff to Lashio by the end of this month. Lashio is located 107 miles (172 km) south of the Burma-China border town of Muse and 243 miles (391 km) north of the state capital Taunggyi.

“Orders have been issued, but no one is willing to go,” a Mandalay-based medical worker told DVB. Lashio General Hospital has reported a critical staff shortage and has reopened only the emergency department. The MNDAA completed its hand over of Lashio to regime control on April 22.

(Exchange rate: $1 USD = 4,430 MMK)

Watch: Sagaing Region faces devastating earthquake and now rising costs. Find DVB English News on X, Facebook, Instagram, Bluesky, Threads, TikTok & YouTube.

Bangladesh recalls ambassador from Myanmar

0
Bangladesh's interim leader Muhammad Yunus in Paris, France on Aug. 7. (Credit: Reuters)

Bangladesh has recalled its ambassador from Myanmar, a Bangladeshi foreign ministry official said on Thursday, after it acknowledged opening a communications line with a resistance group fighting its neighbour’s military regime.

Monowar Hossain, who had been serving in Myanmar’s capital Naypyidaw since mid-2023, was told to return to Dhaka with immediate effect, said the official, describing it as an “administrative decision” without giving further reasons.

Relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar have been strained by the Rohingya refugee crisis and border security concerns.

A Myanmar regime spokesperson was not available for comment.

More than 1.2 million Rohingya are sheltering in Bangladesh, with the U.N. warning that widespread hunger in western Arakan (Rakhine) State could trigger fresh displacement. Over 130,000 people are thought to have crossed in the past year, Bangladesh says.

Bangladesh’s National Security Adviser Khalilur Rahman said last week that Dhaka has opened informal communication channels with the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed group active in Rakhine, to maintain border stability.

Dhaka also remains engaged with the Myanmar regime to pursue a long-term solution to the Rohingya crisis, Rahman said, including potential support for a proposed U.N.-led humanitarian aid corridor in Rakhine.

But Bangladesh’s army opposes that.

“The army will not be involved in any activity that compromises the country’s security,” Colonel Shafiqul Islam, a senior Bangladesh army official, told media about the U.N. aid plan.

Feel the passion for press freedom ignite within you.

Join us as a valued contributor to our vibrant community, where your voice harmonizes with the symphony of truth. Together, we'll amplify the power of free journalism.

Lost Password?
Contact