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Why the Trump administration in the US must act on Myanmar

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Protesters, near Hledan Junction, in Yangon's Kamayut Township hold a sign of support for the recently-formed National Unity Government (NUG) in April 2021. (Credit: DVB)

Guest contributor

Harry Myo Lin

The struggle for democracy in Myanmar represents one of the most urgent human rights crises of our time. Since the military coup in February 2021, the regime in Naypyidaw has waged a brutal campaign against political dissidents, ethnic minorities, and faith-based communities. 

Entire villages have been burned to the ground, religious institutions have been desecrated, and thousands of civilians have been arrested, tortured, or killed. The military regime’s systematic violence has forced over a million people to flee their homes, creating a growing humanitarian disaster.

In the face of this oppression, the people of Myanmar continue to resist. The National Unity Government (NUG), made up of ousted elected officials and pro-democracy leaders, has emerged as the legitimate representative of the Myanmar people. 

The resistance also includes ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and grassroots protest movements and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) as well as People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), which have taken up arms against the military regime. Despite immense challenges, these groups remain determined to restore democracy.

The U.S. has a moral and strategic imperative to support Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement. The failure to act decisively would not only embolden the regime but also allow authoritarianism to take deeper root in Southeast Asia. 

Under President Trump’s leadership, the U.S. has an opportunity to stand on the right side of history by increasing diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian support for the resistance. Such action would not only align with American values but also serve key geopolitical interests in the region.

The moral responsibility to support Myanmar

For decades, the people of Myanmar have looked to the U.S. as a beacon of democracy and human rights. America’s founding principles—liberty, representative government, and the protection of individual rights—resonate deeply with those fighting for freedom in Myanmar. 

When the military overthrew the elected government in 2021, millions of people took to the streets, waving banners and chanting pro-democracy slogans that drew inspiration from American ideals.

Faith-based institutions have played a crucial role in sustaining this resistance. Religious leaders—including Christian pastors, Buddhist monks, Hindu pandits and Muslim imams—have risked their lives to provide food, shelter, and medical aid to those affected by the military’s crackdown. 

Many of these organisations have a long history of supporting Myanmar’s vulnerable populations, dating back to previous periods of military rule. Their deep community ties make them ideal partners for U.S. humanitarian assistance, ensuring that aid reaches those who need it most without being co-opted by the regime.

Furthermore, Myanmar’s diverse religious communities have suffered immense persecution under the regime. The military has not only targeted political dissidents but has also escalated attacks on religious minorities. 

Churches have been bombed, Temples have been torched, mosques have been raided, and Buddhist monks who speak out against the regime have been arrested, disappeared and murdered. The U.S., which has long championed religious freedom as a fundamental human right, cannot ignore these atrocities. Supporting Myanmar’s resistance is not just a matter of strategic policy—it is a moral obligation.

The geopolitical stakes: countering China’s influence

Beyond moral considerations, supporting Myanmar’s democratic movement aligns with U.S. strategic interests. Myanmar is a key battleground in the broader geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. 

Since the 2021 coup, the regime has become increasingly reliant on Beijing for economic and military support. China has provided diplomatic cover for the regime at the United Nations (U.N.), supplied weapons and surveillance technology, and continued major infrastructure investments under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 

These projects, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), are designed to give Beijing greater access to the Indian Ocean, strengthening its strategic foothold in Southeast Asia.

A democratic Myanmar, on the other hand, would likely align itself with countries that share democratic values and uphold human rights. The NUG has already expressed a desire to build stronger ties with Western democracies, particularly the U.S. 

If Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces succeed, the country could become a valuable regional partner, enhancing U.S. influence in Southeast Asia and counterbalancing China’s growing dominance.

Furthermore, Myanmar’s instability has broader security implications. The country has become a hotspot for illicit activities, including arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and human rights abuses linked to forced labor and human trafficking. 

The military’s corruption and criminal ties have only worsened these problems. A stable, democratic Myanmar could work with the U.S. and regional allies to combat these transnational threats, contributing to greater security in the Indo-Pacific.

Learning from past U.S. policy: The need for targeted support

The history of U.S. foreign aid in Myanmar offers valuable lessons for crafting an effective response. Previous administrations have oscillated between engagement and withdrawal, sometimes providing substantial assistance and at other times reducing aid due to shifting geopolitical priorities. 

Recent cuts in U.S. funding for humanitarian programs has severely impacted Myanmar’s vulnerable populations, leading to the closure of refugee camps and hospitals. Conversely, targeted assistance—such as aid to Rohingya refugees—demonstrated how well-allocated resources can alleviate suffering and promote stability, although in a limited way. 

A renewed U.S. strategy should include three key components:

  1. Increased humanitarian aid through faith-based and local organizations – directing funds to trusted religious and civil society groups ensures that humanitarian assistance reaches those in need without being intercepted by the regime. This includes support for displaced populations, medical aid, and educational programs for children affected by the conflict.
  2. Stronger sanctions against the regime and its financial networks – The U.S. should intensify economic pressure by freezing the assets of top military leaders and cutting off revenue sources that sustain the regime, such as state-owned enterprises and foreign investments that fund military operations. Restricting access to the global financial system and a jet fuel ban would make it harder for the regime to maintain power.
  3. Non-lethal assistance to the NUG and resistance forces – Providing technical support, communications equipment, and intelligence-sharing mechanisms would strengthen the NUG’s ability to coordinate resistance efforts. The U.S. could also explore ways to support the parallel governance structures that the NUG and other resistance organisations are establishing in liberated areas.

Building regional and international pressure

To maximise its impact, the U.S. must work closely with regional allies to isolate the regime more in terms of both diplomacy and economy. Thailand and India, as Myanmar’s neighbors, play crucial roles in shaping the country’s future. 

While Thailand and India have maintained ties with the regime, increased diplomatic pressure from the U.S. could push Bangkok toward a more neutral or pro-democracy stance and New Delhi, which shares a border with Myanmar and has its strategic interests in the region, could also be persuaded to take a firmer position against the regime.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has struggled to formulate a unified response to the crisis, with some member states advocating for stronger action while others prioritize stability over democratic restoration. 

The U.S. should leverage its influence to encourage ASEAN to enforce stronger diplomatic measures, such as suspending Myanmar from regional meetings and demanding concrete steps toward political transition.

Additionally, revising U.S. immigration policies to expedite asylum applications for persecuted religious minorities from Myanmar would reinforce America’s role as a sanctuary for the oppressed. 

Offering temporary protected status to those fleeing violence would provide immediate relief while sending a strong message that the U.S. stands with the people of Myanmar.

Myanmar’s Spring Revolution is a defining test of America’s commitment to democracy and human rights. The Trump administration has a unique opportunity to demonstrate global leadership by standing with Myanmar’s resistance movement. 

By increasing humanitarian aid, enforcing stricter targeted sanctions, and working with regional allies to isolate the regime, the U.S. can help shape the future of Southeast Asia while reaffirming its moral and geopolitical leadership.

Failing to act would not only betray America’s values but also cede influence to authoritarian powers like China and Russia. The time for decisive U.S. engagement is now. Supporting Myanmar’s fight for freedom is not just the right thing to do—it is a strategic necessity for regional stability and global democracy.


Harry Myo Lin is a Myanmar expert based in Austria with extensive experience across Myanmar and Asia, specialising in peacebuilding, International Relations, interreligious dialogue, and promoting freedom of religion and belief.

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]

Seed donation for farmers affected by conflict in Karen State

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Naw Zember Paw, the founder of Food Not Bombs Kawthoolei, speaks at the seed donation event at Sanimthoon Cafe in Chiang Mai, Thailand, on Feb. 23. (Credit: DVB)

A seed donation event for Karen State was held at Sanimthoon Cafe in Chiang Mai, Thailand on Feb. 23. The Thai and Myanmar communities came together to support Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and farmers in conflict-affected areas of Karen State.

“This program is very significant as it aims to help those in armed conflict areas, like our IDPs, who lack food security in their regions. This could be really helpful for them,” said Naw Zember Paw, the founder of Food Not Bombs Kawthoolei.

The seed donation event featured musical performance, a documentary film screening, and discussion on the theme of climate change and armed conflict, hosted by members of the Karen community in Thailand. Seed donations will be accepted at Sanimthoon Cafe in Chiang Mai until May 31. Check out our photo essay here.

Regime expands arsenal of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in what it calls ‘the year of the drone’

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Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing visited Zhongyue Aviation UAV Firefighting-Drone Co Ltd in Chongqing, China on Nov. 8. (Credit: Regime media)

Two suspected “suicide” drones struck Laiza, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) headquarters located 72 miles (115 km) south of the Kachin State capital Myitkyina, on Feb. 25. 

“We heard the two attacks [take place] but there were no casualties reported,” KIA spokesperson Naw Bu told the Voice of America (VOA), adding that it was the second “suicide” drone attack on Laiza since Jan. 24. 

A “suicide” drone is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed to carry explosives or other payloads and deliberately crash into a target and detonate upon impact.

A photo of one that allegedly struck Laiza was shared on social media by a local Kachin media outlet and a video was circulated on social media. 

One also struck a middle school in Tagaylaung village of Bilin Township, Karen State, on Jan. 16. The school was destroyed but the Karen National Union (KNU) reported there were no casualties.

The aforementioned drones were first seen in video footage released by the Arakan Army (AA) during fighting with regime forces over the Western Regional Military Command (RMC) headquarters in Arakan (Rakhine) State in December.

The Free Burma Rangers, a humanitarian aid group operating in resistance-held areas of Myanmar, shared photos of the destroyed drone on social media. 

“From the retrieval of part of that drone, it has the same configuration as a Chinese drone called the Sunflower 200 which itself is a copy of the Iranian Shahid 136 [drone] used across Ukraine [by Russia] over the last two years [of war],” Anthony Davis, a security analyst and consultant writer for Jane’s Defence Weekly, told DVB.

In 2024, the regime established a directorate specialized in drone warfare under its Ministry of Defence, and Davis said it is now calling 2025 “the year of the drone.” 

The regime began deploying domestically manufactured drones to 12 of its 14 RMC. Two remain under the control of resistance forces since the AA seized the Western RMC in Ann Township of Arakan State on Dec. 20, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) seized the Northeastern RMC in Lashio Township of northern Shan State on Aug. 3.

But Davis added that the regime manufactured drones are much smaller and technically less sophisticated than the Chinese version. The Sunflower 200 can carry a warhead around 40 kg. 

Given the damage the regime drone inflicted in Karen State, the warhead was likely only 5 kg, according to Davis.

“The regime bought between 2,000 to 3,000 agricultural rotary drones, quadcopters and hexacopters, from China and developed the capacity to weaponize them with Chinese assistance at the Meiktila air base. The majority of the missions are carried out by [them],” said Davis.

The Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) told DVB that resistance forces are unable to counter the regime’s use of suicide drones, since they can be deployed from the frontline. 

“Obtaining, purchasing, or even accessing military-grade [drone] jamming devices is extremely difficult for us,” Maui Pho Thaike, the KNDF deputy commander, told DVB. 

A member of the Kayan National Army (KNA) in Karenni State, named Ba Kone, told Al Jazeera English that military drones can fly at altitudes of 1,500 to 2,000 meters, beyond the reach of drone jammers.

Whether the increased use of drones will prove decisive on the battlefield remains debatable. The KIA reported regime drone attacks during the fight over control of Bhamo Township in Kachin State, which began on Dec. 4

Still, KIA-led resistance forces successfully captured the regime’s Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 236 on Feb. 20. The battle to seize the final regime outpost, the Military Operations Command (MOC) 21, in Bhamo continues. 

“[The military] is using drones increasingly but against a multiplicity of forces – different [People’s Defence Forces] different [Ethnic Armed Groups] – all across the country so it’s very difficult to bring together to concentrate that degree of effectiveness,” added Davis. 

A resistance group known as Federal Wings, which specialises in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and drone technology, announced that it is ready to provide technical assistance to any force opposing the 2021 military coup and wanting to utilize drones to attack regime forces. 

Besides its own increasing use of drones, the regime has now deployed piloted motorized paragliders to attack resistance forces in Mandalay, Magway, Sagaing, Bago and Ayeyarwaddy regions. There have been around 25 recorded attacks since the beginning of the year, according to Davis.

“Motorized paragliders offer notable advantages in terms of low-cost production, mobility, simplicity of operation [typically by three-man teams], extended flight time, and a heavy payload weight of 15 kg or considerably more depending on wing size. Paragliders also effectively circumvent counter-drone jamming technology,” he wrote in his latest report for Jane’s Defence Weekly.

DVB contacted the National Unity Government (NUG) regarding the regime’s increasing use of drones and motorized paragliders in attacks against resistance forces. But received no response.

Regime airstrikes kill 48 residents of Sagaing and Magway regions

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Six residents of Chaungma village, including two children, were killed by airstrikes in Chaung-U Township, Sagaing Region, on Feb. 25. (Credit: CJ)

The People’s Defense Force (PDF) in Chaung-U Township told DVB that 12 civilians, including two children, and one PDF member were killed in Chaungma and Nwekhway villages during a military offensive in Sagaing Region on Tuesday. Chaung-U is located 30 miles (48 km) northwest of the regional capital Monywa. 

“Villagers had to flee [their homes] as many were killed and injured,” a Chaung-U PDF information officer told DVB on the condition of anonymity.

Six of the 13 killed, including the two children, were residents of Chaungma village. Another seven were killed in Nwekhway village. Twenty houses in both villages were either damaged or destroyed in the attacks, which included a ground offensive with the use of artillery by the Burma Army, and airstrikes by the Burma Air Force.

Pro-military social media accounts claimed that the bodies of two PDF members, one rifle, 100 rounds of ammunition, and related materials during the operations were recovered by regime troops in Chaung-U.

At least 20 people were killed at a wedding ceremony for a PDF member in Sonkon village of Myaing Township, Magway Region, on Feb. 25. Myaing is located 40 miles (64 km) south of Chaung-U.

Airstrikes have also been carried out by the Air Force on Monywa, 25 miles (40 km) south of Chaung-U, and Kani, 35 miles (56 km) northwest of Chaung-U. 

The National Unity Government (NUG) stated that 15 people, including six children, were killed in Monywa and Kani by the regime’s “extensive and relentless aerial bombardment,” after it allegedly dropped 212 bombs Feb. 12-14.

Residents of Chaung-U and Monywa townships told DVB that there were a significant number of casualties and widespread destruction caused by these airstrikes. 

Most of Sagaing Region, outside of its urban areas, remain under resistance control. The PDF under the NUG hold the towns of Khampat, Shwe Pyi Aye, Maw Luu, Myothit, and Pinlebu. The five towns are located 176-232 miles (283-373 km) north of Monywa.

The Blood Money Campaign, a coalition of anti-coup activists, has documented 2,257 people killed and 3,417 injured in 4,022 airstrikes across Myanmar since the military coup on Feb. 1, 2021 up to Nov. 30, 2024.

It is calling on the international community to ban the sale, export, or transfer of aviation fuel to Myanmar, as well as a monitoring mechanism to be established and enforced by the U.N.

Since the 2021 coup, Blood Money Campaign has documented 711 airstrikes in Sagaing up to Nov. 30, 2024. In April 2023, 168 civilians were killed by airstrikes in Pazigyi village of Kanbalu Township, which is located 104 miles (167 km) north of Monywa.

Military piloted paragliders attack Arakan Army in Ayeyarwady Region

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Members of the Arakan Army march along the road from Arakan State into Ayeyarwady Region in January. (Credit: AA)

Residents of Thabaung Township in Ayeyarwady Region told DVB that military personnel are receiving air support from piloted motorized paragliders against the Arakan Army (AA), and allied resistance forces, near the Kinponchin Mountain, where fighting has taken place. Thabaung is located 28 miles (45 km) north of the regional capital Pathein.

“We saw [regime] troops shooting from paragliders in the sky,” a Thabaung resident told DVB. The regime in Naypyidaw has reportedly begun utilizing military piloted paragliders – typically in teams of three – in attacks on Mandalay, Magway, Sagaing, Bago and Ayeyarwaddy regions. 

“Motorized paragliders offer notable advantages in terms of low-cost production, mobility, simplicity of operation, extended flight time, and a heavy payload weight of 15 kg or considerably more depending on wing size. Paragliders also effectively circumvent counter-drone jamming technology,” wrote Anthony Davis, a security analyst and consultant, for the Jane’s Defence Weekly.

He added in his report for Jane’s that there have been around 25 recorded attacks since the beginning of the year. The AA reportedly shot down two military piloted paragliders near the regime’s Nyaungkyo outpost in Pandaung Township of Bago Region on Feb. 24. Pandaung is located 188 miles (302 km) northwest of the regional capital Bago.

The AA has expanded its Arakan offensive to neighbouring Ayeyarwady, Bago and Magway regions since December. It has seized 14 out of 17 Arakan townships, as well as Paletwa Township in southern Chinland. The regime controls the Arakan State capital Sittwe, the vital port town of Kyaukphyu, and the island of Manaung.

National League for Democracy party defends Aung San Suu Kyi and Htin Kyaw from allegations of genocide

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State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Htin Kyaw join a group photo after the opening ceremony of the 21st Century Panglong Conference in Naypyidaw in May 2017. (Credit: DVB)

The National League for Democracy (NLD) party, which was Myanmar’s democratically-elected government ousted in the military coup on Feb. 1, 2021, urged Argentina to reconsider arrest warrants for jailed State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Htin Kyaw.

“The court argued that beyond the discussion about whether or not the civilian government had control over the military during the ethnic cleansing operation, the reality is that the Rohingyas were being discriminated [against] in Rakhine State,” said Tomas Quintana, the former U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar and the legal representative for the case in Argentina brought by the Burmese Rohingya Organization UK (BROUK).

“[Rohingya faced] a pattern of systematic discrimination that the civilian government had a lot of resources under their [administration] to stop [but didn’t],” added Quintana.

The two civilian leaders are among 25, including military generals Min Aung Hlaing and Soe Win, who have had arrest warrants issued against them by the Argentine court under the legal principle of universal jurisdiction on allegations of genocide against the Rohingya

“This is a historic step towards justice for [the] Rohingya and everyone in Burma suffering under the Burmese military,” said Tun Khin, the BROUK president, in a press release on Feb. 14 after the 25 arrest warrants were announced in Argentina. 

“This brings a ray of hope to Rohingya who have suffered through decades of genocide, watching their families and culture be destroyed with impunity,” he added.

The case, opened in 2021, is based on a 2019 petition by BROUK which requested Argentina examine the role of Myanmar’s military leaders in genocide and crimes against humanity perpetrated against Rohingya in northern Rakhine State in 2017.

The NLD stated that the Argentine court failed to consider the military’s autonomy under Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution, which allowed it to operate independently of the civilian NLD administration, which governed Myanmar from 2016 up to the coup on Feb. 1, 2021.

Quintana told DVB that the court in Argentina brought up the fact that Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi traveled to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the U.N. high court at The Hague, to defend the military from The Gambia’s case under the genocide convention. This case is still ongoing.

The National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar, a civilian-led administration and alternative to the regime in Naypyidaw, called on the court in Argentina to withdraw the warrants against Aung San Suu Kyi and Htin Kyaw, calling them “a misguided and erroneous legal accusation” in its press release on Feb 18.  

“This is just a warrant, not a judgement. No one can ask [the court] to withdraw arrest warrants,” Kyi Myint, a veteran lawyer from Myanmar, told DVB.

The NLD pledged to establish the “Justice Seeking Committee for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Htin Kyaw” to advocate for the removal of their names from the 25 arrest warrants issued by the Argentine court on Feb. 14.

Aung San Suu Kyi has been held incommunicado by the regime since it staged the coup on Feb. 1, 2021. Htin Kyaw’s current whereabouts are unknown.

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