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Editor in exile: One journalist’s daring escape from Myanmar

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Kyaw Min Swe was an influential journalist in Myanmar for more than 25 years. He now lives in exile with his family in Berlin, Germany. (Credit: AP)

Index travels to Germany to meet exiled newspaper editor Kyaw Min Swe, who faced torture and imprisonment at the hands of the military junta

Ian Wylie for Index on Censorship

This article first appeared in Volume 53, Issue 4 of our print edition of Index on Censorship, titled Unsung Heroes: How musicians are raising their voices against oppression. Read more about the issue here. The issue was published on 12 December 2024.

A black square was all it took. Veteran journalist Kyaw Min Swe was arrested by the Myanmar military junta in April 2023 after he blacked out his personal Facebook profile – a sign of despair at the bombing of Pazigyi, a village near his hometown in the Sagaing region, which killed more than 100 people including children.

Around 300 people had gathered for the opening of an office of the National Unity government in exile. Eyewitnesses reported that a fighter jet bombed the village before a helicopter fired on those escaping. It was one of the deadliest attacks on civilians since the military coup in 2021.

Kyaw, the former editor-in-chief of weekly newspaper Aasan (The Voice) and executive director of the Myanmar Journalism Institute, has been a journalist for more than 25 years. He had been detained before, but this time was different.

“On a popular Telegram account that monitors high-profile people like me, I was accused of supporting the People’s Defence Force [the PDF is the military wing of the exiled government] and opposing the military with that Facebook post,” he told Index. He was summoned to the military interrogation centre in Yangon to explain himself.

“I had nine days of torture – not physical, but mental: three interrogators, working in rotation, asking me the same questions and depriving me of sleep.

“They lied about arresting my reporters, pretending they had evidence of connections with the exiled government and the PDF, but they had nothing. I simply told them the truth: I’m a professional journalist, not pro-exiled government or anti-military, but I disagree with the coup.”

Later, he was bundled into a vehicle with a bag over his head.

“I was scared. This was different to my previous experiences,” said Kyaw, who was taken first to the police interrogation centre and then to Sanchaung Township police station, where he was charged under Section 505A of Myanmar’s Penal Code – used by the junta to target those seen to criticise the regime and carrying a maximum three-year prison sentence.

Insein in chains

After almost three months, including two spent in chains in the notorious Insein Prison, he was finally released – with an order to report weekly to police.

“From then on, I was monitored constantly,” he said. “The military actually offered me financial support, but they wanted to use me as propaganda and I knew that was professional suicide.”

While detained, Kyaw decided he and his family needed to leave Myanmar.

“It was no longer the right place for my kids,” he said.

He contacted a friend at Deutsche Welle, the German state broadcaster which part-funds the Myanmar Journalism Institute, and last October he fled Yangon under cover of darkness with his wife and two children.

The daring escape to Germany via Thailand included crossing rivers, trekking through jungles, climbing walls and sheltering in safe houses. Eight months later, with the help of the Exile Hub, an arm of German non-profit Media in Co-operation and Transition (MiCT), they finally found safety in Berlin in June 2024.

“For my kids it was like an adventure, but not for my wife, who spent seven months taking Xanax because she couldn’t sleep,” said Kyaw. “She was anxious every time she saw someone in a uniform. In Myanmar, she’d got used to hiding my laptop in the washing machine every time the doorbell rang.”

Myanmar’s censors

Over the course of his career in Myanmar, Kyaw has seen censorship fluctuate between brief periods of hope and progress to crushing repression.

Before 2011, the military junta imposed strict censorship on the press. Independent media was non-existent, with most newspapers being government-owned or strictly controlled, focusing on state propaganda. Kyaw’s media house, for example, was owned by the son of the military intelligence chief.

Journalists had to submit their work to the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division (PSRD) before publication, and any critical or sensitive content – particularly related to the military, politics or ethnic conflicts – was censored. Kyaw said his magazine was suspended six times, sometimes for infringements as minor as running adverts that mentioned neighbouring Thailand.

With the shift to a quasi-civilian government under president Thein Sein in 2011, Myanmar experienced a brief period of media liberalisation. As secretary at Myanmar’s Press Council, Kyaw helped draft a media law to protect journalists. The PSRD was abolished, private newspapers were allowed to publish daily, and journalists, for the first time, began to report on previously forbidden subjects.

Yet they still faced threats and prosecution. Kyaw was sued for defamation by the Ministry of Mines in 2012 for publishing a story about alleged misuse of public funds, based on a report from the parliamentary watchdog.

“The ministry demanded a front-page apology, but the parliament report was so clear, we politely declined,” he said.

The case dragged on for months and Kyaw faced dozens of court appearances before it was dropped, following pressure from human rights NGOs and a ministerial reshuffle. Kyaw took this as a sign of progress.

A false dawn

Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) came to power in 2016, but the military retained significant power and media freedom deteriorated again.

“We expected a lot from the NLD,” recalled Kyaw. “We self-censored and hesitated to criticise them because people loved them so much. We didn’t want to be labelled pro-military.”

Several high-profile cases of media repression occurred, notably the jailing of Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo for reporting military atrocities against the Rohingya.

In 2017, Kyaw was arrested in his newsroom along with columnist Ko Kyaw Zwa Naing after a military official complained about a satirical article published in response to a film commemorating Armed Forces Day. Charges against Ko Kyaw Zwa Naing were dropped, but Kyaw Min Swe remained in Insein Prison for two months, on trial for “online defamation’’ under the 2013 Telecommunications Law.

“They treated us decently because the international community was watching,” Kyaw recalled. “The military, and even the Press Council, wanted me to apologise, but I said, ‘I’m sorry, this is satire, a form of art. If I apologise, my career is gone’.”

The military coup of 2021 dramatically reversed any media freedoms that had been gained. The military seized control of all state media, revoking the licences of independent news outlets such as Mizzima, Myanmar Now and DVB.

“Every journalist was watched and monitored,” Kyaw said. “Many journalists were arrested, others were beaten at demonstrations on the street.”

Draconian laws were passed, including Section 505(A) of the Penal Code which criminalises “causing fear, spreading false news, or agitating against government employees”. Kyaw’s newspaper was forced to cease publishing when businesses switched their advertising to state-owned media.

Myanmar has become the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists, second only to China, according to Reporters Without Borders (RSF).

Several “exiled media” outlets such as The Irrawaddy have relocated to Thailand and rely on citizen journalists to provide content. Kyaw said he hoped bodies such as the Myanmar Journalism Institute might act as platforms to attract funding for exiled media, as well as for journalists still working inside the country for regional or ethnic media houses. But this can also be problematic.

“Some [exiled] Myanmar media report only what’s happening in the war, and only when it’s good news for the PDF and the exiled government. But Myanmar people have a right to know true information, free of bias, about the war, the economy or even natural disasters that are happening,” Kyaw said.

“Without that reporting, our people cannot prepare for the future.”

How China’s plan to seize Taiwan depends on Myanmar

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Min Aung Hlaing with China's Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of a summit in Kunming, China on Nov. 6. (Credit: Xinhua)

Guest contributor

Antonio Graceffo

China’s deep involvement in Burma extends beyond its support for the junta and engagement with groups like the United Wa State Army (UWSA). While these ties protect China’s investments and trade, they serve a larger geopolitical purpose.

With its economy under strain, China’s strategic ties to Burma are vital, particularly as China’s President Xi Jinping works to strengthen the economy ahead of any potential invasion of Taiwan, which could trigger a war with the U.S. 

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) is key to Beijing’s strategy, providing an overland route to the Bay of Bengal that bypasses the vulnerable Malacca Strait.

This route offers a buffer against the sanctions, blockades, and trade disruptions that a Taiwan conflict would likely bring. For China, Burma isn’t just a neighbor—it’s central to its economic and geopolitical survival.

China’s economy faces significant challenges, with slowing growth, rising debt, and struggles in key sectors like real estate and manufacturing. While the government is expected to meet its modest 2024 growth target of “around 5 percent,” this is far below the 8.9 percent annual growth average of just a few years ago

Industrial production grew 5.4 percent in November, slightly exceeding expectations, but this has done little to improve confidence as fixed-asset investment slowed to 3.3% over the first 11 months, and retail sales grew just 3 percent—their weakest pace in three months.

Foreign direct investment has declined steadily since 2022, reaching its lowest levels in decades, while youth unemployment remains above 17 percent under Beijing’s new metric, with older methods suggesting it exceeds 20 percent. 

The property sector, which accounts for about 25 percent of the economy, remains one of China’s biggest challenges. Despite stabilization efforts, it has yet to recover, with total developer liabilities reaching $12 trillion USD in 2023, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. 

Beijing’s stimulus measures—such as boosting borrowing, cutting interest rates, and stabilizing stock and property markets—have so far failed to resolve core economic issues or restore consumer confidence.

Economists predict that stronger stimulus measures will be required in 2025 to spur a meaningful rebound, especially as a second Trump administration looms in the U.S. with the prospect of intensified trade wars, higher tariffs, and new sanctions. 

However, even aggressive stimulus is unlikely to resolve structural issues like the property sector’s prolonged slump or the country’s severe demographic challenges, as China grapples with one of the worst aging crises in the world. 

China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is forecast to slow further to 4.5 percent in 2025, with new U.S. tariffs potentially shaving off up to one percentage point. Moody’s recently revised its 2025 GDP forecast to 4.2 percent, underscoring the difficulties ahead for the world’s second-largest economy.

While a weakening Chinese economy may delay an invasion of Taiwan—a potential relief for Taipei—it could spell trouble for Burma. As China’s economic challenges grow, so does the importance of safeguarding its economic interests in Burma. 

President Xi, driven by his personal ambition to rank alongside Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping as one of China’s paramount leaders, has tied his legacy to promises of economic prosperity and the “great rejuvenation” of China. 

This vision includes reclaiming territories once claimed by the Republic of China, such as disputed areas in Mongolia, India, Russia, and the South and East China Seas, as well as territory contested with Japan.

Ironically, while President Xi has made Taiwan the centerpiece of his rejuvenation agenda, Taiwan was never part of the Republic of China’s official map when it was established in 1912. 

Despite this historical inconsistency, President Xi views the seizure of Taiwan as essential to achieving his vision. Faced with a slowing economy and the inability to deliver the standard of living enjoyed by citizens of the U.S. or other Western nations, he may see taking Taiwan as the singular act that could secure his legacy.

However, before President Xi can turn his full attention to Taiwan, he must first succeed in Burma. Ensuring stability and control is vital to protecting China’s economic and strategic interests, which have become even more critical as the nation grapples with internal and external pressures. 

A military campaign to seize Taiwan would require enormous resources, including funding for troop mobilization, advanced equipment, and logistics. Such an invasion would also likely trigger severe economic sanctions from Western powers, cutting China off from key markets, technology, and financial systems. 

Compounding the challenge is China’s heavy reliance on energy and raw materials imported through vulnerable maritime routes, particularly the Malacca Strait. Any disruption to these routes could cripple China’s economy during a prolonged conflict.

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) is central to China’s strategy for mitigating these risks. Connecting Yunnan Province to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar, CMEC provides an overland trade and energy route that bypasses the Malacca Strait, a critical chokepoint that could be blocked during a Taiwan conflict. 

Infrastructure projects like the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and oil and gas pipelines ensure energy supplies and maintain trade flow even if maritime routes are disrupted. For President Xi, completing CMEC is imperative, as it would buffer China’s economy against sanctions and trade blockades, reducing its vulnerability to external pressure during a military confrontation.

Beijing’s involvement in Myanmar’s Shan and Arakan (Rakhine) states is driven by its economic interests, particularly the success of the CMEC. In Shan State, Beijing seeks to protect its border trade and access to resources like jade and rare earth minerals. 

However, conflicts involving ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), disrupt Chinese investments and trade. Similarly, in Arakan State, the Arakan Army (AA) campaign against the Myanmar military pose risks to CMEC projects, including the vital Kyaukphyu deep-sea port.

To stabilize Myanmar, Beijing has backed the junta’s 2025 elections under the military-drafted 2008 constitution and pressured EAOs to halt offensives. By December 2024, groups like the MNDAA and the TNLA had agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire. However, the AA continues its fight, recently capturing a strategically important regional military headquarters in Arakan State – the second to fall in Myanmar over the last four months. 

Beijing views a ceasefire, support for junta-led elections, and economic aid as the fastest path to completing the CMEC, a critical project for China’s economic resilience and strategic ambitions. 

While publicly advocating for peace and democracy, China’s actions reveal a pragmatic focus on securing its interests. Whether through backing select EAOs, deploying private security forces, or endorsing sham elections, Beijing remains committed to the success of CMEC.

Despite this determination, China’s efforts to stabilize Myanmar have largely backfired. Pressure on EAOs and support for the junta have fueled anti-China sentiment and diminished its influence. 

The reported detention of Peng Daxun, the MNDAA leader, has further alienated Beijing’s proxies, forcing them to choose between ceasing resistance or risking retaliation. 

Meanwhile, the broader resistance coalition rejects the junta’s elections and remains unwilling to negotiate, leaving Beijing’s strategy mired in setbacks and growing instability.


Antonio Graceffo, PhD, holds advanced degrees in economics and national security. A graduate of American Military University, he has spent more than 20 years in Asia, contributing to think tanks and international media.

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]

Jue Jue’s Safe Space hosts mental health conference

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Jue Jue Min Thu is the founder of Jue Jue’s Safe Space Organization. She spoke at the fourth annual mental health conference at Chiang Mai University on Jan. 24. (Credit: DVB)

A fourth annual mental health conference hosted by Jue Jue’s Safe Space, a non-profit mental health service for Myanmar communities, was held at Chiang Mai University (CMU) in northern Thailand from Jan. 23-24.

“I want to emphasize that the mental health conference is not just for mental health professionals. It’s for people who suffer not just for with mental illness, but the distress that we face daily by living under the military regime. So, we need to come together as a community to find solutions and ways to build a stronger and mentally healthy society in Myanmar,” said Jue Jue Min Thu, the founder of Jue Jue’s Safe Space Organization, which provides mental health services.

The conference at CMU was attended by over 100 people and provided mental health counselling and treatment to those in need. The funds raised from event will be used to help those needing mental health care due to the Myanmar crisis since the 2021 military coup.

Dr Phyu Pannu Khin spoke at the fourth annual mental health conference hosted by Jue Jue’s Safe Space Organization at Chiang Mai University on Jan. 24. (Credit: DVB)

Arakan Army confesses to killing Myanmar military prisoners of war in Rakhine State and pledges reform

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The Arakan Army (AA) released a photo showing Myanmar military senior officers captured alive, and taken as Prisoners of War (POWs), when the AA seized the Western Regional Military Command (RMC) headquarters on Dec. 20. (Credit: AA)

The Arakan Army (AA) has confessed to murdering two Myanmar military prisoners of war (POWs) in Arakan (Rakhine) State and has vowed to take measures to prevent extrajudicial killing from being perpetrated in the future. 

“It is also necessary to be aware that we have medically treated and cared for hundreds of POWs. This incident is entirely contrary to our policy. The perpetrators have been prosecuted and punished. We are committed to preventing such incidents from happening again while continuing our fight,” Khaing Thuka, the AA spokesperson, told Narinjara News.

The admission of guilt came after Fortify Rights, a regional human rights organization, released a report on Thursday based on leaked video footage allegedly showing the execution of two Myanmar military POWs by AA members in front of a shallow dirt pit in the ground.

Fortify Rights called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the attack as a war crime.

Khaing Thuka laid the blame on junior members of the AA for carrying out the killing, adding that those responsible for the attack had been killed in combat, or had faced disciplinary action.

The video is reported to depict events following the capture of the Military Operations Command No. 9 (MOC-9) in Kyauktaw Township last February. Kyauktaw is 60 miles (96 km) north of the Arakan State capital Sittwe.

In an interview with the BBC, Khaing Thuka claimed that the AA members were angered over the “unjust killing” of family members by Myanmar military personnel and had failed to control their emotions, or to follow international humanitarian law as stipulated in the Geneva Conventions.

The AA now controls 14 out of 17 townships in Arakan, including the Western Regional Military Command (RMC) headquarters in Ann Township, which it seized on Dec. 20. It is only the second ethnic armed group to capture an RMC after the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) seized full control of the Northeastern RMC in Lashio on Aug. 3.

The four Arakan townships remaining under regime control are the state capital Sittwe, the vital port town of Kyaukphyu, and the island of Manaung. The AA captured Paletwa Township in southern Chinland on Jan. 14, 2024. It has provided military support to the Chin resistance group known as the Chin Brotherhood.

The AA announced on Monday that intense fighting between it and the military is taking place near Arakan in areas bordering Bago, Magway and Ayeyarwady regions. It added that it has been engaged in battle with Light Infantry Divisions 88 and 99, along with troops from the weapons factories in Magway, since Jan. 11. 

Fighting in Arakan is taking place in Kamingan (Kammyinkan), Paneyaysan, and Kyakyesan villages of Ann Township, as well as along the Ann-Padan Road which connects Arakan to Magway. In Ayeyarwady, fighting has been reported at Point 369 Hill near Chinsu village of Yekyi Township, located 53 miles (85 km) north of the regional capital Pathein.

Concerns raised over National Unity Government plans to establish its first ministerial offices in Sagaing Region

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National Unity Government (NUG) Acting President Duwa Lashi La visits a People’s Defense Force (PDF) camp in May 2022. (Credit: Duwa Lashi La)

An airstrike was carried out by the Myanmar Air Force on Khampat town of Tamu Township on Monday. This is the second airstrike on Khampat, located 242 miles (389 km) northwest of the regional capital Sagaing, since the National Unity Government (NUG) announced plans to establish its first ministerial offices in Sagaing Region. 

On Jan. 16, airstrikes on Khampat and Kanan village in Tamu killed two, including a child, with at least seven others injured

“They might have expected that we might try to establish an office there. But our offices are in multiple locations,”  Kyaw Zaw, the NUG President’s Office spokesperson, told DVB. 

He added that most NUG ministers are inside the country administering areas under its control, which includes Khampat, Shwe Pyi Aye, Maw Luu, Myothit and Pinlebu in Sagaing Region, as well as Singu, Tagaung and Thabeikkyin in Mandalay Region

“On the ground, there is conflict within various mechanisms like the [NUG administration] and other revolutionary forces,” said Khant Wai Phyo, a member of the Monywa Strike Committee, which was established after the 2021 coup in Sagaing’s largest city and administrative centre.

The NUG administers areas under its control with what is called “The Three Pa’s” because they all begin with the Burmese letter Pa. This includes the people’s administration team, the people’s security team, and its armed wing, the People’s Defence Force (PDF). 

“[The] people interact with our ‘three pa’s’ system every day. The capabilities and ethics of the teams directly interacting with the public are crucial for gaining solid public support and trust,” said NUG Acting President Duwa Lashi La.

He has called twice for NUG ministers, currently in exile, to return to Myanmar. Last week, he announced reforms to address rising concerns in the NUG leadership and with its financing. NUG Prime Minister Mahn Win Khaing Than accused some members of “deviating from the revolutionary path.” 

“One of their shortcomings is that they don’t encourage more open debate, open criticism. I think they’re a very immature political movement, that they don’t welcome people trying to justifiably criticize them,” David Mathieson, an independent analyst on conflict and human rights in Myanmar, told DVB.

Resistance forces such as the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) and the Mandalay PDF have announced plans to relocate to Myanmar’s “Anyar” or dry zone located in the country’s upper central plains, which includes Sagaing Region. 

A PDF member there said that there is a need from the NUG to help unify various local PDF units under a central command structure. This would possibly avoid further confusion and conflict on the frontline. He added that this is how inclusive political dialogue can be achieved in the future.

Nway Oo from the PDF Civil Defence and Security Organisation of Myaung (CDSOM), in Myaung Township, believes that conflict is inevitable while attempting to govern remotely, but once the NUG establishes its ministerial offices inside the country that any problems will be resolved quickly.

Zaw Tuseng, the founder and president of Myanmar Policy Institute (MPI), told DVB last year that establishing a federal unit in Sagaing Region modelled on bottom-up federalism, as proposed by resistance groups, is necessary. 

Soe Win Swe, a politician in Sagaing, expressed concerns that the NUG governance model may diverge from this type of federalism – due to its perceived top-down structure – as some NUG ministers were members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party and government from 2015-21, before it was ousted in the 2021 coup. 

Airstrikes carried out by the Myanmar Air Force pose a significant security concern as Sagaing is one of the most frequently targeted by the regime’s indiscriminate aerial bombardments. 

At least seven civilians were killed and nearly 10,000 were displaced from their homes in Pale town, by airstrikes, in November.

The most devastating airstrike in Myanmar’s history took place on Apr. 11, 2023, when up to 168 civilians, including 38 children, were killed in Pazigyi village of Kanbalu Township. Pazigyi residents were attending the opening of the NUG administrative office in the village.

In Sagaing, over 1.2 million people have been displaced from their homes due to the conflict since the 2021 coup. The U.N. states that this is 35 percent of the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), which is over 3.5 million nationwide.

Ma Thida on A-Maze: Myanmar’s struggle for democracy from 2011-23 [AUDIO]

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Ma Thida is a Burmese medical doctor, writer, human rights activist and former prisoner of conscience. She founded and served until 2016 as president of PEN Myanmar, whose mission includes monitoring issues related to freedom of expression, organizing discussions about literature with the public, developing a culture of literature in Myanmar, promoting creative writing, and making literature a part of the country’s educational curriculum. Ma Thida is the author of the book A-Maze: Myanmar’s Struggle for Democracy, 2011-2023. ⁠Read an excerpt here⁠.

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