Thursday, July 23, 2026
မြန်မာ
Home Blog Page 82

People’s Defence Force seizes military outposts in Bago Region and Mon State

By
English Editor
-
0
The People’s Defence Force, which operates in Mon State and Bago Region, after seizing the two regime outposts on an unspecified date and at an unknown location. (Credit: PDF)

The People’s Defence Force (PDF) operating in Mon State’s Bilin Township and Bago Region’s Shwegyin Township stated on Sunday that 13 regime troops were killed during a battle to seize two regime outposts April 7-12. 

It added that the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) seized control over the two outposts from regime forces.

Shwegyin, located 64 miles (102 km) north of the region’s capital Bago, is located in Karen National Union (KNU) Brigade 3 territory. Bilin, located 69 miles (111 km) north of the Mon State capital Mawlamyine, is located in KNU Brigade 1 territory.

The PDF and allied resistance forces killed five, wounded 10 others, and detained two regime troops during five days of fighting before seizing the Bilin’s Laykay outpost on April 12, it stated on April 12.

Eight regime troops were killed while at least 30 others abandoned the Letyet outpost in Bago’s Shwegyin when it was seized by the PDF on April 7. 

Over 13,000 residents from 13 villages in Bilin were displaced from their homes due to the fighting, according to the KNU. 

At least 30 homes and two monasteries in Bilin were either damaged or destroyed by airstrikes carried out by the Myanmar Air Force April 1-5, the KNU added.  

At least 10 regime troops were killed and 20 others were injured by KNLA-led resistance forces, including the PDF, during a rescue of over 300 civilians used by regime forces as “human shields” in Yei Twin Gone village tract of Bago’s Nyaunglebin Township on an unspecified date, according to the National Unity Government (NUG).

It added that at least 11 PDF and KNLA members were killed during this operation. Nyaunglebin, 50 miles (80 km) north of Bago and 73 miles (117 km) west of Shwegyin, is in KNU Brigade 3 territory.

The Dhamma of accountability: Why Myanmar’s New Year celebrations cannot wash away the truth

By
CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS
-
0
As Myanmar’s military regime stages “Grand Thingyan” celebrations to manufacture a sense of normalcy, the rituals are being used to obscure ongoing violence, displacement and suffering. (Photo by Paula Bronstein / Getty Images)

Originally published on ABC

In the practice of immigration law, the world is often defined by the cold, binary reality of statutes and different visa criteria. Yet, as mid-April 2026 approaches, the atmosphere within the Myanmar diaspora is heavy with a familiar tension. This is Thingyan, the festival of Samkrānti, a word derived from Sanskrit meaning “transition”. It is a time intended to purify the spirit for the New Year — yet this year, the concept of transition is being weaponised.

On 3 April, the military-led government formalised the transition of Min Aung Hlaing to the presidency. To project an image of stability to the international community, the state has orchestrated “Grand Thingyan” celebrations. From a legal perspective, however, this is ritual without substance, a performative “wash” designed to entrench impunity and distract from the collapse of the rule of law.

The inspiration for this reflection comes from my annual Easter meditation retreat — a time of silence that stands in stark contrast to the loud, state-mandated festivities currently being prepared in the capital cities of Myanmar, even as so many places in the regions still suffer from constant bombings and airstrikes from the junta. To understand the gravity of this distortion, one must look to the legacy of Sayagyi U Ba Khin (1899–1971).

Long before his student S.N. Goenka (1924–2013) globalised the practice of Vipassana, U Ba Khin served as the first Accountant General of a newly independent Burma. He was a man who inhabited two worlds: government finance and the silent discipline of the Dhamma. For U Ba Khin, the “Vipassana way of thought” was not an escape from civic duty, but the engine of it. He believed that a state official could only serve the public if they first mastered their own mind, rooting out corruption through self-observation. He proved that integrity is the ultimate foundation of the state.

Today, that legacy is being inverted. The current leadership’s transition into a nominally civilian presidency is an attempt to use the machinery of the state to hide from reality. As a lawyer working with those forced to flee, I see the human cost of this deception daily. It is written in the case files of the more than 3.7 million people now internally displaced across Myanmar, families who have been stripped of their homes and their legal standing.

The tragedy is compounded by the lingering aftermath of the 2025 earthquake, which little more than a year ago left millions without shelter. While the regime uses high-pressure water hoses to entertain crowds at state pavilions, millions of survivors are still denied the basic “cleansing” of clean water and humanitarian aid due to military blockades.

In the Vipassana tradition, we are taught the law of Anicca, the fundamental truth that all things are impermanent. We learn that suffering arises when we cling to illusions. The regime’s attempt to manufacture a “new start” through a fake presidency and a festive ritual is an illusion that the international community must not validate.

In my own work, meditation serves as a brief weekly window of clarity, but the law remains the tool for justice. Both require us to see things as they truly are, rather than how we wish them to be. The “Silent Thingyan” currently being practised by the people of Myanmar, a collective refusal to celebrate under the shadow of tyranny, is a more authentic expression of the New Year than any state-sponsored party. It is a demand for a return to the integrity modelled by U Ba Khin: a state where the law serves the people, and the truth is no longer a casualty of power.

True renewal for Myanmar will not come from a ritual. It will come from a restoration of the Dhamma of accountability and the safe, dignified return of those who have been forced into the void of displacement.

Ko Ko Aung is a Sydney-based immigration lawyer and human rights advocate for the Myanmar diaspora. He maintains a weekly practice of Vipassana meditation, which informs his professional focus on institutional integrity and the rule of law.

India recognizes Min Aung Hlaing as Myanmar president

By
CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS
-
0
Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh at Yangon International Airport, where he was received by Indian Ambassador Abhay Thakur and Zaw Phyo Win, the Director-General of Strategic Studies and Training at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to participate in the presidential inaugural ceremony of Min Aung Hlaing on April. 9. (Credit: Embassy of India, Yangon, Myanmar)

Guest contributor

Shalini Perumal

History has rarely been kind to those who trade human rights for a seat at a dictator’s table.

The arrival of Indian Minister of State (MoS) Kirti Vardhan Singh in Yangon this week to attend the inaugural ceremony of Min Aung Hlaing as President marks a new “milestone” in Indian foreign policy. 

As Singh stepped off the plane to be greeted by the illegal military junta’s top brass, the message from New Delhi is deafeningly clear: the “world’s largest democracy” has officially moved from cautious engagement to the active legitimization of a junta that seized power in a bloody 2021 coup.

Are we truly surprised anymore? The trajectory of New Delhi’s support for the junta has been trending toward this moment for years, sacrificing democratic principles at the altar of “pragmatic” realpolitik.

The ceremony Kirti Vardhan Singh is attending is the culmination of the sham electoral process held from December 28, 2025 to January 25, 2026. 

These elections were widely condemned by the international community as a farce. Major opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), were dissolved; their leaders remain in prison or exile.

By sending a high-ranking minister to the inauguration, New Delhi isn’t just maintaining diplomatic channels; it is providing the junta with the international seal of approval it desperately craves to combat its status as a global pariah.

India’s embrace of the junta in Naypyidaw is a calculated betrayal of democratic values, representing the final collapse of its once moral high ground. 

While India was a vocal supporter of pro-democracy forces in Myanmar in the early 1990s, the current trajectory reveals a chilling indifference to human life. 

This decay has been fueled by the rise of a chauvinistic Hindu nationalism under the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), whose India First ideology has effectively weaponized security to mask a blatant disregard for international law and human rights. 

By framing universal human rights as mere “Western impositions,” the BJP-led government has created a vacuum of accountability, prioritizing cold, civilizational posturing over the lives of those being slaughtered across the border.

This isn’t just “pragmatism”—it is active complicity. While the world watched in horror and imposed sanctions following the 2021 coup, New Delhi shamefully chose a calibrated response that ensured the blood-stained military remained well-equipped. 

By continuing to supply dual-use technology and military hardware—including sonar systems and radar equipment—India has effectively underwritten the brutal junta’s ability to wage war on its own people. 

As airstrikes decimate civilian villages nationwide, New Delhi hides behind the hollow excuses of countering Chinese influence and securing borders. In the BJP’s narrow pursuit of regional hegemony, the Myanmar people are treated as nothing more than collateral damage in a geopolitical game.

The MoS visit to the INS Sandhayak ship in Yangon harbor is perhaps the most pointed symbol of this military-to-military embrace. 

Under the cynical banner of its “MAHASAGAR” initiative, New Delhi is signaling a readiness to tether the Indian Navy to a military force accused by the United Nations of systemic crimes against humanity. 

Ostensibly an acronym for Maritime Heads for Active Security And Growth for All in the Region, MAHASAGAR is marketed as a strategic initiative led by the Indian Navy, acting as a specialized outreach framework for maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In reality, it serves as a convenient diplomatic shroud.

By framing this outreach as a “security necessity,” New Delhi provides itself with the ultimate “geopolitical bypass,” allowing it to deepen military cooperation with the junta while dodging the moral accountability usually expected of a global democracy.

 What the BJP-led government hails as a strategic vision for regional growth is, for the people of Myanmar, a dark validation of their oppressors. 

Under this security-first positioning, the Indian Navy is no longer just a guardian of the seas; it has become a primary instrument for legitimizing a pariah regime, proving that for the current leadership in New Delhi, growth for all does not include those fighting for their lives against a military dictatorship.

India often argues that “you cannot choose your neighbors.” While true, you can choose how you engage with them. By officially recognizing Min Aung Hlaing, India is betraying the people of Myanmar. 

The vast majority of Myanmar’s youth and ethnic nationalities have rejected the junta. By siding with the generals, India is alienating the future leaders of the country. 

India is also undermining global democratic solidarity. The BJP-led government is effectively carrying water for a junta that survives on brutality. 

Finally, India is fuelling regional instability. A regime that rules only through fear and fire cannot provide any long-term stability. 

The current visit by Kirti Vardhan Singh is the final nail in the coffin. We should not be surprised, but we should be deeply concerned about what is to come.

Shalini Perumal is a creative international development professional who has worked previously in Mae Sot, Thailand at Mae Tao Clinic, consulted for Finnish Refugee Council Myanmar, and served as a Writer/Researcher at Insight Myanmar Podcast. She is currently a freelance journalist working on a novel.

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]

A coup coronation — Washington didn’t but Beijing did

By
CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS
-
0
Myanmar military leader Min Aung Hlaing, who ousted the elected government in a 2021 coup, presides an army parade on Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw on March 27, 2021. (Credit: Reuters)

Guest contributor

James Shwe 

When Vietnam’s National Assembly elected To Lam as President on April 7, the U.S. State Department sent a warm congratulatory letter the same day. 

When Min Aung Hlaing took the presidential oath in Naypyidaw on April 10, more than fifty foreign delegates from over twenty countries attended. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s special envoy, Jiang Xinzhi, was the most prominent guest. 

India’s Minister of State for External Affairs hand-delivered a congratulatory letter from Prime Minister Narendra Modi, invoking New Delhi’s “Neighbourhood First” policy. Russia, Belarus, Cambodia, and Thailand sent senior delegations. 

Washington sent nothing. Japan — which halted all new official development aid to Myanmar after the 2021 coup — sent nothing either.

That contrast tells you everything the junta’s million-dollar lobbying operation cannot: the United States knows the difference between a partner and a coup leader. 

What it must now decide is whether to act on that knowledge — before the window of diplomatic leverage closes further.

A transition in name only

Min Aung Hlaing resigned as Commander-in-Chief on March 30 to satisfy Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution — which he himself has never amended. 

His handpicked replacement immediately reaffirmed commitment to Min Aung Hlaing’s own military doctrine. The armed forces did not change hands. They were secured.

In his address to parliament, Min Aung Hlaing repeated long-standing and unfounded allegations of voter fraud in the 2020 election and declared that Myanmar had returned to a democratic path through a “clean” vote. 

He pledged “appropriate amnesties to support social reconciliation, justice, and peace” — but democracy advocates called the gesture superficial. He outlined no ceasefire plans and gave no indication that Aung San Suu Kyi, held since the 2021 coup, would be released.

The cabinet confirms the same conclusion. Of 30 Union Ministers, 12 are individually sanctioned by the U.S., E.U., U.K., Australia, or Canada — 40 per cent. 

Eighteen ministers — 60 percent — have confirmed careers in the Tatmadaw, the highest military saturation of any Myanmar cabinet since at least 1988. 

Even the previous government’s token ethnic inclusion has been removed: Jeng Phang Naw Taung, a Kachin civilian who held a combined portfolio under the regime, was dropped entirely.

Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe’s entire recent career is China and North Korea — Ambassador to Beijing and concurrently to Pyongyang. 

Every major economic portfolio is held by a sanctioned minister; under Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designation, the Finance Minister cannot access the U.S. dollar clearing system or engage credibly with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank. 

This is a government built for durability under siege, not for effective administration.

Officials ostensibly removed from the cabinet have simply been repositioned. On inauguration day, Min Aung Hlaing signed into existence a Union Consultative Council (UCC) and named 11 members. 

Six of the eleven — 55 per cent — are individually sanctioned by the U.S., E.U., or Canada: chairman Soe Win (OFAC and E.U.), Ko Ko Hlaing (OFAC), Than Swe (E.U., former Ambassador to Washington 2012–2021), Admiral Moe Aung (E.U., former Navy Commander-in-Chief), Mahn Nyein Maung (OFAC and E.U., former Karen National Union leader), and Dwe Bu (Canada).

Ko Ko Hlaing — whose removal from the President’s Office was supposed to signal reform — was quietly embedded in the UCC covering those same domains.

Myanmar Now’s reporting describes the council as a vehicle designed to “sideline close allies while preserving their status and co-opting other political actors without empowering them.”

Ethnic representation is present in name only — former leaders stripped of command authority. 

The new Commander-in-Chief Ye Win Oo is not on the UCC, confirming that Min Aung Hlaing does not need it to retain control of the military. 

The parallel is the one Myanmar Now draws directly: Ne Win installed himself as president through a rubber-stamp parliament, formally relinquished the army chief position, and continued to exercise ultimate control until nationwide protests forced him from power in 1988.

The structure is familiar. Only the name is new.

The lobbying machine, exposed

The junta has spent millions to obscure this in Washington.

Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) filings show the DCI Group holds a $3 million USD annual contract with Myanmar’s Ministry of Information.

Within hours of the April 3 election, a propaganda website — MyanmarDemocracyNow.com — appeared describing the events as a “peaceful transition of power.”

Its own footer carries the mandatory FARA disclosure identifying it as material distributed on behalf of the junta. 

That is not speculation. It is a legally required statement.

The lobbying has already produced one visible return: in July 2025, OFAC removed several Myanmar-linked entities from the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list following a letter from Min Aung Hlaing to President Donald Trump. 

Core sanctions on senior generals remain — and those same generals now sit in the new cabinet.

A US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 2026 report documented 379 religious sites destroyed and 259 clergy and civilians killed in places of worship in 2025 alone, and has recommended Congress ban Countries of Particular Concern from hiring U.S. lobbyists. 

The BRAVE Burma Act, which passed the House unanimously, has now been introduced in the Senate with bipartisan sponsorship from Senators Van Hollen, Young, McConnell, and Merkley.

Accountability on multiple fronts

On April 6, a coalition of Indonesian civil society figures — including former Attorney General Marzuki Darusman — filed a criminal complaint accusing Min Aung Hlaing of genocide. 

It was accepted under Indonesia’s new penal code, the first such case within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) under universal jurisdiction.

Argentina has already issued arrest warrants for 25 Myanmar officials; Timor-Leste has launched its own legal proceedings.

Yet the International Criminal Court (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber I has still not issued the warrant

ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan applied for in November 2024 — more than sixteen months ago. Putin’s warrant took 23 days. Gaddafi took six weeks. Every month of inaction strengthens the message of impunity.

The fuel that keeps the bombs falling

Iran’s shadow fleet delivered approximately 175,000 metric tonnes of jet fuel between October 2024 and December 2025. 

Imports surged 69 per cent in 2025, enabling more than 1,022 airstrikes on civilian targets — displacing nearly 3.7 million people, the largest internal displacement crisis in Southeast Asia. 

Canada is the only country to have categorically banned aviation fuel exports to Myanmar. The BRAVE Burma Act would extend that pressure. The Senate must act.

The question the inauguration poses

Beijing attended. New Delhi sent a congratulatory letter from Prime Minister Modi himself. Washington did not.

ASEAN did not recognize the inauguration, and the Philippines has made clear Min Aung Hlaing will not receive political representation at the May summit. 

The democratic resistance has built the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union — the most institutionally coherent opposition since the coup. Southeast Asian courts are now accepting genocide complaints that ASEAN itself has refused to hear.

The lobbyists are claiming normalization is achievable. The cabinet, the sanctions lists, the fuel dependency, the sixteen-month ICC delay, and the empty seat at the inauguration say otherwise.

The question is not whether Min Aung Hlaing is Myanmar’s president. The question is whether Washington will treat his inauguration as a reason to engage, or as a deadline to act.

James Shwe is a Myanmar American professional engineer and advocate for democracy in Myanmar, affiliated with the Los Angeles Myanmar Movement.

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]

Myanmar military coup leader takes presidency to tighten grip on power

By
English Editor
-
0
Myanmar military leader Min Aung Hlaing, who ousted the elected government in a 2021 coup, presides an army parade on Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw on March 27, 2021. (Credit: Reuters)

Min Aung Hlaing, who as Myanmar ’s military commander had led the Southeast Asian nation with an iron fist since seizing power from Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government in 2021, was sworn in as an elected president on Friday.

His inauguration came after a general election judged by U.N. experts and rights groups to be neither free nor fair, with the National League for Democracy (NLD) party among many not taking part. He faces the major challenge of ending the civil war that began when he ousted the NLD and jailed its leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The transition back to a nominally democratic government is widely seen as an effort to keep the army in power behind a facade of civilian rule.

Min Aung Hlaing’s ascent to the presidency follows a tradition of military strongmen installing themselves as the nation’s top leader and seeking to legitimize their rule through unfair elections.

He will be serving a five-year term after his April 3 election by parliament.

Most cabinet members also have military links

Twenty-eight of the 30 new cabinet members, also sworn in on Friday, are current or former generals, lawmakers from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), or members of the previous military government.

The pro-military bloc holds nearly 90 per cent of the seats in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Myanmar’s bicameral legislature.

“Myanmar is back on the path to democracy and moving toward a better future,” Min Aung Hlaing, 69, said in a speech after being sworn in.

He also pledged to strive for peace with warring ethnic rebels and restore normal relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has pressured Myanmar because of concern over its political instability.

Min Aung Hlaing took the oath of office alongside First Vice President Nyo Saw, a former general and close adviser to him, and Second Vice President Nan Ni Ni Aye, an ethnic Karen politician from the USDP, in the newly renovated parliament building in the capital Naypyitaw. It was damaged in last year’s earthquake.

Civil war prevented voting in some areas

The general election in December and January was widely criticized, in part because the polls were not held in large parts of the country due to the ongoing civil war.

“The junta’s elections were held in only 42 per cent of Myanmar’s territory, under a restrictive legal framework that barred legitimate political competition to the advantage and benefit of the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party,” the Bangkok-based Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) said in a report issued Friday.

“Every aspect of the staged elections, from its election management body to the design of the electoral system and the selection of political parties, was carefully engineered to ensure a predetermined outcome,” it said.

Min Aung Hlaing, who had attained the rank of senior general, last week relinquished his post of commander-in-chief because the constitution prohibits the president from simultaneously holding the top military position. A close aide, Ye Win Oo, took over the powerful job.

Major role in Rohingya crisis

In 2017, under the NLD government, Min Aung Hlaing oversaw a harsh counterinsurgency campaign against the Rohingya Muslim minority that drove hundreds of thousands into Bangladesh. The campaign was condemned internationally and some accused the army of being complicit in genocide.

Since the 2021 army takeover, nearly 8,000 civilians have been killed and some 22,208 political detainees remain jailed, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a rights monitoring group. Total deaths in the ongoing conflict are estimated to be much higher.

Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s 80-year-old former leader, is serving a 27-year prison term on charges widely viewed as spurious and politically motivated. Her NLD party won back-to-back landslide election victories in 2015 and 2020 against the USDP, but was forced to dissolve in 2023 after refusing to register under new military rules post 2021-coup.

AP

Only 12 percent of conscripts return home after two-year military service ends

By
English Editor
-
0
Conscripts from the first batch drafted into military service in 2024 during a ceremony marking the completion of their two-year service in Loikaw, Karenni State, on April 3. (Credit: Regime media)

An estimated 631 male conscripts from the first batch of 5,155 new recruits, who began training on April 8, 2024, have reportedly been allowed to return home after completing their mandated two years of military service under the regime’s conscription law, according to sources close to the regime.

Naung Yoe, a military defector who joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) after the 2021 military coup, told DVB that the number of those discharged is limited and as part of a “propaganda effort” by the regime in Naypyidaw.

“The low percentage of conscripts allowed to be discharged suggests that many were either forced to remain in the service or were killed in combat across the country,” said Naung Yoe, who is also a researcher from the Myanmar Defense & Security Institute (MDSI).

MDSI is a group of military defectors who track the regime’s human rights abuses on behalf of the CDM, which is the non-violent resistance movement opposed to a return to military rule in Myanmar.

“We believe that some of the survivors have been permitted to withdraw in order to be used for recruitment propaganda,” he added.

Those discharged after completing their two-years of military service included 385 conscripts in the Karenni State capital of Loikaw on April 3.

Another 246 were reportedly recalled from the “frontline” and sent back to their families on April 6, although pro-regime media did not disclose the locations or provide further details.

The conscription law, enforced on Feb. 10, 2024, requires a minimum of two years of service for males aged 18 to 35 and females aged 18 to 27. The first batch completed its term on April 8, according to MDSI.

A source close to a family with a son who was conscripted told DVB that the number discharged after completing their two-years of military service appears “incomplete,” leaving many families uncertain of the fate of their conscripted sons and brothers.

“Families don’t know whether their sons are dead or alive. They hear nothing back,” the source told DVB on the condition of anonymity. “The silence makes them believe the worst like their sons were killed.”

The regime said those who have completed training are now serving in military units nationwide, fulfilling what it described as their “responsibilities for national defence and security.” 

But it refuses to disclose how many conscripted males are serving in the military.

Nationwide conscription has now reached its 23rd round with the 21st round of conscripts reported to have completed training earlier this month, according to the regime.

MDSI estimates that the number of conscripts has reached nearly 100,000.

The regime stated in 2024 that around 5,000 conscripts would be drafted into the military per round, but the total number of conscripts in each intake has not been publicly disclosed.

Officially known as the “People’s Military Service Law,” conscription was enacted in 2010 under former military ruler Than Shwe.

1...818283...2,911Page 82 of 2,911

EDITOR'S PICKS

LONG READS

FOLLOW US

ABOUT DVB

The Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) publishes daily independent news and information across Myanmar and around the world by satellite TV and the internet. DVB was founded in 1992 and is registered as a non-profit association in Thailand.

© Democratic Voice of Burma 2024.

Contact
Contact