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Airstrikes kill 28 military family members at detention camp; Arakan Army seizes village in Ayeyarwady Region

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Survivors identify the bodies of those killed by airstrikes at the Arakan Army's detention camp in Mrauk-U, Arakan State, on Jan. 18. (Credit: AA)

Airstrikes kill 28 military family members at detention camp

The Arakan Army (AA) claimed that a total of 28 people, including children, were killed and 25 others were injured by airstrikes carried out by the Burma Air Force on an undisclosed location near Ram Creek in Mrauk-U Township of Arakan State on Saturday. The AA seized control of Mrauk-U, located 88 miles (142 km) northeast of the Arakan State capital Sittwe, last February. 

The death toll included children aged two, eight, 11 and 12, as well as those over age 60. They were members of military families scheduled to be released, who had been detained by the AA in Mrauk-U since fighting ended, according to the AA. The military has intensified its aerial bombardments on areas under AA control in recent months as it has seized 14 out of Arakan’s 17 townships.

So far this month, airstrikes have killed over 40 civilians in Ramree Township and at least nine in Kyauktaw Township. The Blood Money Campaign, a coalition of anti-coup activists, is calling for a global aviation fuel ban on Burma. The U.N. urged both the regime in Naypyidaw, which seized power after the 2021 military coup, and the AA to adhere to their obligations under international humanitarian law. 

Arakan Army seizes village in Ayeyarwady Region

The Burma Air Force also carried out airstrikes on Bawmi village of Shwethaungyan town, located 43 miles (69 km) northwest of the Ayeyarwady Region capital Pathein, after it was seized by the AA on Saturday. This is the second village in northern Ayeyarwady to come under AA control since Jan. 10.

“Homes were destroyed and no one who was left behind in the village would have survived,” a Shwethaungyan resident told DVB on the condition of anonymity. Military personnel withdrew from Bawmi village on Jan. 18 after fighting with the AA ended. Residents said that over 200 homes were destroyed by airstrikes on Friday. 

A source close to the military told DVB that 80 soldiers were injured and 100 are still missing in Bawmi. The AA took control of Magyizin village of Shwethaungyan town, which is located 20 miles (32 km) south of Gwa Township in southern Arakan, after it seized full control of Gwa on Dec. 29. The Burma Navy has stationed its warships off the coast of Ayeyarwady.  

Chin National Front members allegedly arrested in India

India’s Mizoram State authorities announced that they arrested five members believed to belong to the Chin National Front (CNF), including a senior leader, with six AK-47 rifles, 10,050 rounds of ammunition, and 13 magazines during a raid near Saithah village in Mizoram’s Mamit district, the Hindustan Times newspaper reported on Thursday. 

“One of [the five arrested] is a member of CNF but not the [Chin National Army]. The weapons and ammunition are also not for the CNF,” Salai Htet Ni, the CNA spokesperson, told Chin World on Jan. 17 in response to the arrests. Indian police accused the CNF members of smuggling the weapons from neighbouring Bangladesh into India.

The authorities also accused a Bangladeshi armed group called the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF-P) of being involved in the weapons smuggling. Mizoram State shares a 316 mile (510 km) long border with Chinland. The CNF is a founding member of the Chinland Council, one of the two factions of the Chin resistance formed after the 2021 coup.

News by Region 

Makeshift homes located next to the railway tracks in North Okkalapa Township of Yangon. (Credit: DVB)

YANGON—North Okkalapa Township residents told DVB that more than 16 households, near Paywatseikkon train station in Tadagyi ward, have been ordered to leave their homes by Feb. 1. The 16 households are planning to file an appeal at the township court. Residents claimed that they received “smart” identification cards from the National League for Democracy (NLD) government which allows them to remain in their homes.

“More than 60 people are staying in the area,” said a Tadagyi ward resident. A Myanma Railways employee told DVB that the residents are being evicted to make way for a new Yangon Circular Railway project planned by the regime’s Ministry of Rail Transportation. North Okkalapa has four train stations and all households near them may soon be facing eviction. 

MAGWAY—A resistance group calling itself the Brave Warriors for Myanmar claimed that nine military personnel, including two officers, were killed during its attack on the regime’s No. 21 Defense Equipment Factory in Seikphyu Township on Saturday. Seikphyu is located 73 miles (117 km) south of the regional capital Magway. 

“The number of casualties, deaths and damages could be increasing. We are quite satisfied with this mission,” the group’s spokesperson told DVB. He added that the military carried out an artillery attack in response. The Defense Equipment Factory, also known as KaPaSa, produces various munitions allegedly used in airstrikes.

MANDALAY—The People’s Defense Force (PDF) claimed that four civilians were killed and two homes were destroyed in Nyaungkon village of Taungtha Township, by two Burma Air Force members from Meiktila Air Base using paramotors, on Saturday. Taungtha is located 82 miles (131 km) southwest of Mandalay. 

“Those things used to come at night time. It happens frequently during this month, causing civilian casualties,” the PDF spokesperson told DVB. He added that at least six rounds of attacks were conducted by the military on Taungtha from Dec. 25 to Jan. 18. Paramotors are a motorized steerable parachute, which can carry at least one pilot, that can fly at speeds from 30-90 miles per hour. 

(Exchange rate: $1 USD = 4,630 MMK)

Military regime and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army sign second China-brokered ceasefire deal

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The Brotherhood Alliance at the entrance to the Northeastern Regional Military Command (RMC) headquarters after the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) seized control of Lashio, Shan State, on Aug. 3. (Credit: MNDAA)

The regime in Naypyidaw, which seized power after the 2021 military coup, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) reached a formal ceasefire agreement on Saturday after the second round of China-brokered talks began in Kunming on Jan. 16.

“Stabilizing the situation in northern Myanmar aligns with the interests of all stakeholders in Myanmar and the region, enhancing security, stability, and development along the China-Myanmar border,” said Mao Ning, the spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She added that China will continue to support the “peace process” in northern Shan State.

This ceasefire agreement is the second time both sides have agreed to halt the fighting after last January’s China-brokered talks in Kunming. The first round of the revived peace talks began last month in Kunming but broke down when the regime refused to recognize the ethnic armed group’s control of Lashio, the largest city in northern Shan which fell to the MNDAA after it seized the Northeastern Regional Military Command (RMC) headquarters on Aug. 3. 

Details over areas under MNDAA control, including the Kokang Self-Administered Zone’s Laukkai, and the China-Myanmar border towns of Chinshwehaw, Monekoe, Hpawnghseng, Konkyan, Pan Lon, Kunlong, Hsenwi (Theinni), Tamoenye and Pang Hseng, were not made public.

All towns were seized by the MNDAA during Operation 1027, which was launched by the Brotherhood Alliance on Oct. 27, 2023. The alliance includes the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA).

The TNLA has seized 12 townships in northern Shan, including Mogok in Mandalay Region. The AA has 14 out of Arakan State’s 17 townships under its control. Both continue fighting the military despite a pledge for peace made by the TNLA on Nov. 25. A similar sentiment has been shared by the AA since it seized the Western RMC in Ann Township last month.

The first China-brokered ceasefire agreement began last year on Jan. 11 and ended on June 25 as the Brotherhood Alliance cited the military continual violations of the agreement due to airstrikes on areas under its control.

The regime launched airstrikes on Hsenwi on Jan. 1, which destroyed an unknown number of homes but no casualty figures were shared by the MNDAA.

REUTERS

Malaysia discusses Myanmar crisis since 2021 coup at ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Langkawi

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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Ministers’ Retreat was held in Langkawi, Malaysia, Jan. 18-19. Regime Permanent Secretary to ASEAN Aung Kyaw Moe (second from left) attended despite high-level regime officials being barred from its meetings and summits for Min Aung Hlaing's refusal to implement its Five-Point Consensus after he agreed to it in April 2021. (Credit: ASEAN)

Malaysia opened its first Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting of the year with the Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Langkawi on Saturday. Myanmar’s crisis, which has engulfed the nation since the 2021 military coup, was discussed Jan. 18-19. Regime Permanent Secretary to ASEAN Aung Kyaw Moe addressed the delegates about its tentative plan for elections in November.

“We emphasized that the election must be inclusive and involve all stakeholders, not conducted in isolation,” stated Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan. “We made it clear that the election is not our priority. Our main concern is to end the violence.” Malaysia Foreign Ministry Secretary General Amran Mohammed Zin told the media that the effort of ASEAN is focused on resolving Myanmar’s crisis. 

Reuters reported that Malaysia appointed diplomat Othman Hashim as the ASEAN Special Envoy for Myanmar on Sunday. Othman is the former secretary general of Malaysia’s foreign ministry and was selected to try to implement the ASEAN Five Point Consensus, a peace plan agreed to by Min Aung Hlaing but not implemented upon his return to Myanmar in April 2021.

Malaysia, who facilitated Myanmar’s entry into ASEAN as chair in 1997, is planning to adopt a more proactive approach as the 2021 coup has fuelled the rise of criminal activities, online cyber scams, and human trafficking along the country’s borders. But it has yet to reach out to the civilian-led National Unity Government (NUG) nor ethnic armed groups, which have led the uprising and mounting resistance to the 2021 coup.

Malaysia will host more than 300 meetings and summits throughout the year under the theme “Inclusivity and Sustainability.” Previously, Malaysia chaired ASEAN in 1977, 1997, 2005 and 2015.

Myanmar nationals in South Korea to receive assistance; Human Rights Watch releases its World Report 2025

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A protest against China's support for the regime in Naypyidaw, which seized power following the 2021 military coup, in Daegu, South Korea on Dec. 2. (Credit: Kyaw San)

Myanmar nationals in South Korea to receive assistance

Burma nationals and the National Unity Government (NUG) representative office in South Korea told DVB that the Ministry of Justice in Seoul announced on Thursday that it would continue to support migrant workers and students from Burma unable to extend their stay at the embassy. 

“It will allow those who have difficulty renewing their visas to stay legally until the political situation improves,” Kyaw San, a pro-democracy activist in South Korea told DVB. The NUG Administrative Officer in South Korea Win Paw Maung called on all in South Korea to support the resistance to the 2021 military coup. 

The South Korean government stated that nearly 6,000 from Burma have humanitarian visas, which allows them to remain in South Korea without being deported. The Burma Embassy in Seoul warned nationals against renewing their passports using NUG issued stampsThe NUG claimed that it has processed nearly 1,000 passport renewals since July

Human Rights Watch releases World Report 2025 

The military has intensified its “scorched earth” tactics against civilians in Burma through the use of indiscriminate airstrikes, forced recruitment, and unlawful detentions, in response to the armed uprising and territorial losses to anti-regime forces since the 2021 coup, states Human Rights Watch (HRW) in its World Report 2025 released on Friday.

“It’s very important that at this moment when some of these [resistance] groups are also looking for international legitimacy, that donors and the international community are also ensuring that there is pressure to ensure that human rights standards are being met,” Elaine Pearson, the HRW Asia director, told DVB at a press conference in Bangkok on Jan. 17.

The U.N. has called Burma “an abyss of human suffering” as it has verified the death of over 5,600 civilians, including 1,160 women and 624 children, killed by the military since 2021. It has documented over 3.5 million people who are currently displaced from their homes and are listed as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The number of those impacted by recent flooding across Burma is nearly 900,000.

Moon Nay Li, the joint general secretary at the Women’s League of Burma, joined us in the DVB Newsroom on Jan. 6. (Credit: DVB)

Moon Nay Li on a feminist approach to federalism

The Women’ s League of Burma (WLB) celebrated its 25th anniversary in Chiang Mai, Thailand on Dec. 9 under the theme of “25 Years of Feminist Federalism.” Moon Nay Li, the WLB general secretary, joined us in the DVB Newsroom to discuss what this means for women in Burma and how its shaping its feminist approach to federalism.

“This is very important for general peace and transforming the dynamic of democracy in our country because most of our activity, including directly the [political] issues, is [being led] by the men and also most of the male leaders do not really understand about the [on-the-]ground situation and what’s happening to the children, the women, and all the people,” she told DVB. 

To learn more about Moon Nay Li’s 18 years of work on human rights and women’s participation, as well as the WLB’s work over the last 25 years, watch DVB Newsroom season 2 episode 6 on DVB English News YouTube or Spotify. It’s also available to listen to on Apple Podcasts, YouTube Music, Audible, Amazon Music, or wherever you get podcasts.

News by Region 

NAYPYIDAW—Regime media reported that Sanjay Mathur, the U.N. Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Asia regional director, and Sara Austin Netzer, the UNOPS country director in Burma, met with regime officials in Naypyidaw on Thursday. 

Mathur held a separate meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Than Swe, and Investment Minister Kan Zaw to discuss “enhancing cooperation” between the regime and UNOPS. Several high-ranking U.N. officials have met with Min Aung Hlaing, and have presented their credentials to the regime, in Naypyidaw since the 2021 coup. 

SHAN—Three civilians, including a seven-year-old, were killed and 14 others were injured by artillery which struck a camp for IDPs near Phyar Taung village of Naungshwe Township on Friday. Residents told DVB that both the military and Pa-O National Organization (PNO) were involved in the attack. Nyaung Shwe is located 12 miles (20 km) south of the Shan State capital Taunggyi. 

“There is no current fighting in the area. I just wonder why the PNO would kill its own ethnic people,” a Naungshwe resident told DVB. The camp for IDPs is situated near Pinlaung Township, located 24 miles (40 km) southeast of Taunggyi, where fighting between Karenni resistance forces and pro-regime forces, including the PNO, has been ongoing.

The Danu People’s Liberation Army/Front (DPLA/F) told DVB that an airstrike carried out by the Burma Air Force killed three and injured 13 in Lawksawk (Yatsauk) Township, located 52 miles (84 km) north of Taunggyi, on Thursday. The DPLA/F was established in August 2022.

“This is just what the military does. The airstrike and artillery fire is going to continue,” a DPLA/F member told DVB. Along with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the DPLA/F has seized control of Nawnghkio and Mongmit in northern Shan State, and Mogok in Mandalay Region

SAGAING—Airstrikes killed two, including an infant, and injured seven others in Khampat town and at a monastery in Kanan village of Tamu Township, located 275 miles (442 km) north of the regional capital Sagaing, on Thursday. The People’s Defense Force (PDF) seized control of Khampat on Nov. 5, 2023.  

“A [resistance] member was among the victims,” a Khampat resident told DVB on the condition of anonymity. The two airstrikes damaged 15 buildings, including the monastery and pagodas. Pro-military social media channels said the military attacked a PDF office in Khampat.

(Exchange rate: $1 USD = 4,620 MMK)

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Chin resistance forces clear Mindat Township in southern Chinland to allow residents to return

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The Chinland Defense Force (CDF) Mindat outside of the entrance to Mindat Township in southern Chinland after the Chin Brotherhood seized it, and Kanpetlet Township, from the military on Dec. 21-22. (Credit: CDF-Mindat)

The People’s Administration Team, which now administers Mindat Township of southern Chinland, told DVB that it has been restoring the water supply and clearing Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and other detritus from the town in order to allow residents to return to their homes. Mindat is located 272 miles (437 km) south of the Chinland capital Hakha. 

“We have recovered unexploded 500-pound bombs, as well as cluster bombs, in the town,” Salai Yaw Man, the spokesperson of the Chin Brotherhood and its People’s Administration Team in Mindat, told DVB. 

The Chin Brotherhood and its allied resistance groups seized control of Mindat, and neighbouring Kanpetlet, in southern Chinland from the military on Dec. 21-22

Last June, fighting between the Chin Brotherhood and the Chin National Army (CNA), which represents the Chinland Council, occurred in Mindat over the course of one week before the CNA withdrew on June 24.

The Zomi Federal Union (ZFU), which is a member of the Chin Brotherhood, issued a statement on Jan. 14 asserting that it would not recognize any claims from the regime in Naypyidaw nor the Chinland Council to Tedim Township of northern Chinland. Tedim is located 117 miles (188 km) north of Hakha. 

Salai Yaw Man added that a “People’s Security Force,” which was established by the Chinland Defense Force (CDF) Mindat in 2022, will continue to provide security to residents upon their return.

The CDF Mindat imposed a curfew on the town to reportedly protect residents from airstrikes or other attacks by the military. 

The Chin Brotherhood reported that over 100 military personnel, including their family members, surrendered to them during the 40 days of fighting that took place against regime forces. 

Following the Chin Brotherhood’s victory over the regime in Mindat and Kanpetlet, Salai Yaw Man claimed that Chin resistance forces now have control of over 80 percent of Chinland.

Thirteen towns are now controlled by the Chin resistance, including the Myanmar-India border town of Rikhawdar.

Salai Yaw Man added that the Arakan Army (AA) is supporting the Chin Brotherhood militarily. Paletwa Township, 199 miles (321 km) south of Hakha, came under AA control last January.

But regime forces still control Hakha and Tedim, as well as Thantlang, located 22 miles (35 km) west of Hakha, and Falam, located 122 miles (196 km) north of Hakha.

How Bangladesh is failing the Rohingya

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Rohingya in Bangladesh commemorate the 7th anniversary of "Genocide Remembrance Day" when they were forcibly displaced from their homes in 2017 by a Myanmar military crackdown - labelled genocide by the US in 2022 - in Arakan (Rakhine) State, on Aug. 25, 2024. (Credit: Reuters)

Guest contributor

Shafiur Rahman

Foreign Affairs Adviser Md. Touhid Hossain’s recent remarks on the Rohingya crisis, delivered at a dialogue titled Bangladesh’s Interests and Security in Geopolitical Reality, reveal a troubling continuity in Bangladesh’s approach to one of the most pressing humanitarian crises in the region. 

On Dec. 19, Hossain attended an emergency meeting in Bangkok with regional counterparts to review the current situation in Myanmar. Organized by the Thai government, the meeting included foreign ministers and senior officials from Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, China, Laos, and Cambodia. 

While Hossain’s comments superficially emphasise peace and stability, they perpetuate a problematic narrative that has long underpinned the state’s policies towards the Rohingya—a narrative that not only absolves Bangladesh of responsibility but also entrenches its role in the marginalisation of the Rohingya people.

The “ticking time bomb” mantra

In his speech, Hossain reiterated the familiar trope of the Rohingya as a demographic “ticking time bomb,” warning his counterparts in Bangkok about the potential radicalisation of young Rohingya men. 

“If you don’t resolve the Rohingya and given their demographic patterns,” he cautioned, “if you have 200,000 young boys who do not see light at the end of the tunnel, they will become desperate, and desperate people do desperate things.” 

This rhetoric, a staple of Bangladesh’s diplomatic messaging, seeks to externalise the crisis while simultaneously justifying policies that exacerbate the very desperation it laments.

Yet, even as Hossain raised the spectre of regional instability, he revealed the government’s intent to press for repatriation within an implausible two to six-month timeframe. 

He claims that he told his counterparts: “I was hoping that in the next two to six months, I would be able to send some [Rohingya] back, and if peace is established, they have to be sent back; otherwise, you won’t have peace either.” 

Given the tumultuous state of Arakan (Rakhine State) in 2024, this timeline is not only unrealistic but irresponsible, serving more as a tool for domestic posturing than a serious policy objective.

A self-fulfilling prophecy

Bangladesh’s actions towards the Rohingya population have consistently undermined the peace and stability it claims to champion. 

Hemming hundreds of thousands of people inside barbed-wire camps, restricting their movement, and denying them access to education and employment opportunities create conditions of abject despair. 

Such policies not only criminalize an already vulnerable population but also fuel the potential for unrest and instability that Hossain warns against.

Recent events illustrate this hypocrisy. The government’s decision to allow armed groups to operate with impunity within the camps, culminating in a massive rally held by these discredited and violent factions in Kutupalong refugee camp on Dec. 25, signals a dangerous abdication of responsibility. 

Far from fostering security, these actions destabilize the camps and heighten tensions, further alienating the Rohingya from the broader society.

Complicity in secondary persecution

As Maung Zarni astutely observed: “Buddhist Myanmar misframes Rohingya Muslims as a threat to national security and adopts a policy of genocidal destruction. Muslim Bangladesh misframes the survivors as embryonic jihadis and adopts a policy of secondary persecution, if not outright genocide. Starting with denial of education, legal rights as refugees, and, in short, denial of a future. First, cage them in and ship them out to the prison island while touting the government as ‘compassionate’ and ‘generous.’ This is nothing short of preemptive criminalisation of 400,000 young survivors.”

Hossain’s assertion that repatriation is contingent upon peace in Myanmar conveniently sidesteps Bangladesh’s obligations under international law. 

While peace in Myanmar is undoubtedly essential, it cannot serve as a pretext for abandoning the Rohingya to indefinite limbo. Bangladesh remains accountable for hosting refugees, which includes granting access to employment, education, and freedom of movement.

The illusion of repatriation

The demand for the early repatriation of forcibly displaced Rohingyas, while well-intentioned, fails to address the deeper structural and systemic issues that have historically undermined the long-term stability of the region. 

Bangladesh has engaged in repatriation efforts for decades, yet these efforts have not resulted in sustainable peace or security, either for the Rohingya population or the region as a whole. Bangladesh’s push for early repatriation under current conditions raises significant questions about its feasibility and legitimacy.

Even as Bangladesh engages with the international community, including preparations for the upcoming U.N.-led conference on the Rohingya crisis tentatively scheduled for this year, its actions at home reveal a stark contradiction. 

Khalilur Rahman, the High Representative of the Chief Adviser Mohammed Yunus on the Rohingya crisis, recently met with the President of the U.N. General Assembly to emphasise Bangladesh’s commitment to the conference and its outcomes. 

The emphasis on “early repatriation,” reiterated in these discussions, only serves to show Bangladesh’s external posturing. Without putting its own house in order—by improving camp conditions, dismantling armed groups, and granting the Rohingya basic rights—such international overtures risk being seen as performative rather than meaningful steps toward a solution.

The situation in 2024, with the Myanmar military losing control of the state and the Arakan Army (AA) emerging as the de facto authority, fundamentally challenges the premise of any repatriation effort. 

The AA, a non-state actor without international recognition or legal standing to enter into binding agreements, cannot guarantee the safety and dignity of returning Rohingyas. The recent violence Rohingya witnessed in Arakan will not inspire their confidence either.

While Bangladesh reportedly maintains informal relations with the AA, such unofficial ties lack the accountability and oversight required for large-scale repatriation. Furthermore, the AA’s ambiguous stance on the Rohingya issue, focused primarily on Rakhine nationalism, does not inspire confidence in their ability—or willingness—to include Rohingyas in their vision for governance. 

Northern Arakan remains a fragmented space, with limited governance and significant security concerns. Without a stable administrative framework, any repatriation risks exacerbating insecurity for returnees.

The way forward

If Bangladesh genuinely seeks peace and stability in the region, it must adopt policies that empower rather than oppress the Rohingya. However, each of these steps faces significant hurdles, not least because of Bangladesh’s own policies and the broader geopolitical realities.

  • Recognizing the Rohingya as refugees: While granting the Rohingya legal status and associated rights such as education, employment, healthcare, and freedom of movement would dramatically improve their living conditions, Bangladesh has consistently resisted taking this step. Officially labelling them as refugees would require Bangladesh to comply with international legal frameworks, which it has thus far avoided. Moreover, there is domestic utility in maintaining the status quo—caging the Rohingya in camps and framing their plight as a security risk rather than addressing their rights as displaced individuals.
  • Dismantling armed groups: The presence of armed groups in the camps has exacerbated insecurity for the Rohingya, yet the government has tolerated their operations, seemingly as a way to maintain control over the camps without direct accountability. These groups have not only destabilised the camps but also served as a tool of foreign policy, with reports indicating that Rohingya fighters have been recruited to serve alongside the Myanmar military. This covert strategy aligns with Bangladesh’s broader goal of externalising the crisis while undermining the legitimacy of the Rohingya’s struggle. Dismantling these factions would require not just political will but also an acknowledgment of the government’s complicity in fostering this environment.
  • Engaging the international community: While regional players like China, India, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) must be involved in discussions about northern Arakan’s governance dynamics, this is far from a quick fix. These actors’ prioritisation of stability, economic opportunity, and the principle of “non-interference in member states’ internal affairs” often undermines meaningful engagement. Their influence over both the Myanmar military and the AA could theoretically foster dialogue, but their actions to date suggest little interest in championing justice or human rights for the Rohingya. Bangladesh’s reliance on these players to resolve the crisis risks perpetuating the same cycles of displacement and marginalisation.

Hossain’s remarks are emblematic of a broader failure to address the Rohingya crisis with the seriousness and humanity it demands. Bangladesh’s rhetoric and actions are not merely contradictory; they are counterproductive, sowing the seeds of the very instability the state purports to fear. Repatriation efforts, in the absence of fundamental changes in Arakan, are doomed to perpetuate cycles of displacement and insecurity.

It is time for Bangladesh to abandon its self-serving narratives and adopt a genuinely compassionate and rights-based approach to the Rohingya crisis. To repeat, Bangladesh remains accountable for hosting refugees. 

It has ongoing obligations towards improving refugee conditions. This includes granting access to employment, education, and movement for the Rohingya. Anything less is not only a moral failure but a recipe for enduring insecurity.


Shafiur Rahman is a journalist and documentary maker. He writes the Rohingya Refugee News newsletter.

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]

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