Guest contributor
Sai Tun Aung Lwin
Over the past decade, China’s Yunnan Province had only limited railway routes, with Kunming as the sole dead-end station. Today, the landscape has changed dramatically.
Through the construction of both international railroads and inter-prefecture connections, new stations have appeared in previously peripheral and underdeveloped areas such as Baoshan, Lincang, Ruili, Dali, and Jinghong (Xishuangbanna).
These railroads aim to serve several purposes: poverty alleviation, development, and regional integration through Trans-Asia Railway links.
In 1995, then-Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad announced the Trans-Asia Railway initiative, envisioning a Kunming to Singapore rail link, which members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China unanimously endorsed.
China proposed three possible routes:
1. East Route: Singapore – Kuala Lumpur – Bangkok – Phnom Penh – Ho Chi Minh City – Hanoi – Kunming
2. West Route: Singapore – Kuala Lumpur – Bangkok – Yangon – Lashio – Ruili – Dali – Kunming
3. Middle Route: Singapore – Kuala Lumpur – Bangkok – Vientiane – Shangyong – Xiangyun (or Yuxi) – Kunming
After three decades, projects such as the Laos–China Railway and the Hanoi (Vietnam) – Nanjing (China) line stand out as major achievements.
Yunnan has quietly positioned itself as a key junction linking ASEAN rail networks with China, while Chongqing has risen as a global rail hub connecting Europe, Central Asia, and ASEAN.
Under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), these rail projects transform Yunnan from a southwestern periphery into a bridgehead for China’s expansion into South and Southeast Asia.
Kunming now regularly hosts South Asia–China expos and development forums where railway projects feature prominently, including China-Myanmar Railway projects.
The Dali–Baoshan line was completed in 2022, and the Baoshan–Ruili section is projected to be finished by 2030.
Myanmar occupies a critical position where China meets South Asia. Initially, a China–Myanmar railway was planned to reach the Bay of Bengal at Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State.
However, Myanmar’s military and then President Thein Sein government annulled the feasibility study, suspecting Chinese strategic intentions, as the proposed line would cross the military’s National Defense Line along the western bank of the Irrawaddy River.
During the National League for Democracy (NLD) government, China revived the idea, this time focusing on a Ruili–Mandalay route while maintaining interest in Kyaukphyu’s deep-sea port.
TheCOVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 military coup disrupted progress, with the feasibility study completed only for the Mandalay–Ruili section.
Following the 2021 coup, China initially adopted a wait-and-see approach, maintaining neutrality while gradually recognizing the junta, increasing ministerial contacts, and pressuring some ASEAN countries to do the same.
However, this process met resistance from certain ASEAN states. Beijing also continued to engage with the NLD, opposing prolonged military rule but seeking to prevent the army’s collapse.
Chinese diplomats urged the NLD and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) to register as legal political parties under the military junta.
It promised post-election development aid and infrastructure projects, such as the China-Myanmar railway and economic corridor too. They see that the abovementioned political parties can get power through the election.
By late 2023, China was pushing the junta to make deals with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) along the border and to hold elections.
In November 2024, Min Aung Hlaing visited Kunming, where the China–Myanmar railway returned to the top of development think tanks’ agendas.
He promoted the idea of extending the project to Kyaukphyu, but Beijing assessed that post-coup militias along the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline (Mandalay–Rakhine) were beyond effective control.
Consequently, the Muse–Mandalay section became the priority, followed by a potential Mandalay–Yangon link, though no MoU currently exists for the latter.
Recently, Min Aung Hlaing’s train ride between Mandalay and Yangon served as political theatre — signaling to China that the corridor is “safe,” encouraging Chinese-backed investment, and projecting domestic stability.
In reality, routes between Naypyidaw and Bago remain vulnerable to disruption by People’s Defence Forces and ethnic armed groups, such as the Karen National Union (KNU), especially near Taungoo, Kyaukthakhar, and Phyu.
The junta’s confidence is bolstered by two military regional commands in Taungoo and Naypyidaw, and the Light Infantry Division 77 based in Bago.
Between Muse and Mandalay, various EAOs operate. With the exception of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), most maintain some level of Chinese influence or understanding.
Although China discourages inter-ethnic armed conflicts, skirmishes, checkpoint disputes, and tense standoffs are common among various ethnic armed groups.
The strength and dynamics of these groups shift with Beijing’s pressure and supply-line constraints.
In late 2023, during Operation 1027 launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the Shan State Army (SSA) — once seen as vulnerable — gained local support from Shan villagers, boosting their strength.
Recently, an incident of inter-besieged between the SSA and the Three Brotherhood Alliance showed a dynamic change.
A checkpoint in Kutkai Township, stationed by the SSA was surrounded and besieged by the Three Brotherhood Alliance. This is to underscore dynamic change.
As the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s main sponsor, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) faced pressure from China, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) facing enormous offensives by the Myanmar military.
Armed groups continue competing along the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) for territorial recognition and legitimacy.
For the TNLA, holding captured towns is critical to gaining legitimacy.
The United Wa State Army (UWSA), with hydropower projects in Hsipaw northern Shan State, benefits from TNLA territorial control.
The UWSA bankrolls TNLA operations. Hsipaw is a town with a Shan majority population threatened by junta airstrikes.
This underscores the complexity of the northern Shan war economy. The KIA has also asserted its presence, notably by arresting online scam operators in Kutkai and extraditing them to China.
Due to pressure from China a ceasefire between ethnic armed groups and the junta might be possible, as it was with the MNDAA, but cooperation between armed groups remains uncertain.
Yunnan authorities have been providing training in local governance to ethnic armed groups in northern Shan.
They have also discouraged ethnic armed groups from using the term federalism. From the Chinese perspective, federalism is a Western concept that does not originate from Burma.
This reveals a weakness in China’s approach to northern Shan, since the Shan had a long history of federalist traditions spanning several decades—from the colonial period up until the parliamentary era of the 1960s.
In rebel-held towns, the illicit economy thrives. Civilians are caught between junta airstrikes and armed group demands.
The closure of border trade, military pressure, and instability have caused income collapse, debt traps, and migration pressures.
Forced recruitment, extortion, and movement restrictions worsen the situation. So, people in northern Shan want to return to normalcy.
In Lashio, the administrative hub of northern Shan and a city handed back to the junta in April 2025, the streets are once again becoming crowded with people.
The Lashio handover shows China’s practical leverage over the northern Shan actors but creates reputational costs; except for future railway discussions to be packaged with ceasefire and anti-fraud tracks.
After years of civil war, people are tired and are looking for the lesser evil, regardless of their values.
Since the Operation 1027 second wave, locals’ support for ethnic armed groups is dwindling, except for some members of the Ta’ang community in the northern Shan.
For the junta, resuming the railway project is vital — not only for economic and security reasons, but also for legitimacy. The junta tries to lure Chinese investment into conflict-affected areas to weaken opposition. This can erode support for PDFs or ethnic armed groups.
China’s enduring policy toward EAOs centers on preventing alignment with Western powers, securing dominance over border trade, and safeguarding stability along its frontier.
In the post-2021 coup context, no cohesive, group-led movement has emerged to assert a unified national presence to foster stability. The opposition remains fragmented, lacking a consensus framework to guide its envisioned role in Myanmar’s political future.
So, China has turned to the junta.
The recent meeting statement of China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the junta’s foreign minister Than Swe underscores that Beijing wants to roll out its development infrastructure in Myanmar following the junta’s elections scheduled to begin on Dec. 28.
But Wang Yi’s remarks were tinged with concern over security and stability in Myanmar’s pre and post-election context. In reality, the junta is leading a process that is unlikely to yield meaningful outcomes—its main aim is simply to preserve the status quo and safeguard its own interests.
Meanwhile, some Chinese scholars appear increasingly uncertain about both the situation in Myanmar and Beijing’s policy approach.
This underlines that while some of China’s moves may be tactically sound, they have done little to lack the coherence of a broader grand strategy.
Reportedly, the junta chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, will go to Beijing in September.
While China views the railway as strategically important, Myanmar is not irreplaceable. Beijing must weigh the benefits of the project against the risk of Western containment and instability.
Protecting these routes is as much about military and national security as economic interest.
Sai Tun Aung Lwin is an analyst and researcher from Shan State in Myanmar, which borders China. He has over several years of experience in the media sector, with a focus on in-depth analysis and reporting on Myanmar’s peace process and ethnic conflicts.
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