Guest contributor
Dr. Salai Vanni Bawii
The Myanmar military regime completed its sham election on January 25. Now, a particular set of so-called neutral scholars and analysts is resurfacing. These scholars often come from backgrounds closely tied to the military and authoritarian regimes they study.
They attend dialogues and panels at international conferences and repeatedly present their work on authoritarianism and its facets. They do this by arguing for the study of authoritarianism and by using a pseudonym to investigate phenomena they want to study.
There are certainly many problems with these scholars and panels, as they often present the same interpretations of the same data. These critiques, however, do much more than point out problems with the analysis and data.
They also present a novel and frightening way to legitimize the study of authoritarianism by using these critiques to justify it once more. The description provided, as well as the internal connection with the regime as a policy tool used to design and legitimize an authoritarian state.
While arguments appear practical, realistic, and internally coherent, there is no reason to stop at coherence; realism does not imply an absence of morality, or, more accurately, a moral vacuum.
What is being constructed here is not simply an interpretation, it is a normalizing framework, one that changes the understanding of violence, legitimacy, and transition for international actors, donors, and scholars.
The translation of data
The first question concerns methodology. Scale is not a synonym for credibility. Conducting hundreds or thousands of interviews or surveys is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for reliable insight into political will.
War, surveillance, displacement, and fear change the nature of political speech — especially in an authoritarian context. Political speech is often a product of coercion, self-censorship, and survival.
Agreeing with the regime may be a survival and a tactical choice rather than a true endorsement. To consider the political transparency of the data while ignoring the conditions of its production is to strip methodology of its ethics.
This is not a case of rigorous empiricism. This is what we may call authoritarian empiricism — the use of research techniques to legitimize power while pretending to be neutral.
When a farmer from Karen State tells an interviewer he “supports stability,” are we registering a political preference, or a survival strategy in the midst of airstrikes and civil war? This is a question that data users occasionally choose to engage with.
Ignoring agency
Myanmar’s future should not be framed solely around China’s strategic interests, even though China’s involvement in Myanmar’s political economy and regional geopolitics is important.
To analyze the sustainability or potential transition of a regime in terms of Chinese interests is not simply an oversimplification of the problem; it is an attempt to erase the will and impact of the Myanmar people.
Despite a widespread military regime in Myanmar, there is no narrative that places the people of Myanmar as merely observers of the protests or the militarized struggles, nor of the humanitarian activism or the day-to-day acts of disobedience.
The absence of such a narrative places the responsibility for the military regime’s inaction elsewhere. The thousands of lives lost, the communities that have been destroyed, the acts of incredible courage, and the revolution that was fought are reduced to a mere side note in the collision of the global powers.
Production of resignation
Similar claims about Min Aung Hlaing not needing international or regional legitimacy functions the same way. As this gets repeated in academia, it absolves moral urgency and lowers political expectations.
If legitimacies are no longer in the equation, how can one expect accountability, justice, and the rule of international law? When this gets repeated by those with academic power and access, it fosters resignation rather than constructive engagement.
This fosters the idea that oppression serves no purpose, and the only rational thing to do is to close off any hope and silence.
The rest of the world does not see it this way. Why are they blowing the whole budget on political theater of the elections if they really don’t need legitimacy? Why even ‘try’ when it comes to diplomacy?
The rest of the world is right to see it as a country that needs international stakeholders, even when some academic voices see this need as irrelevant.
Elections as transition?
The most concerning aspect of the elections is the perception that they can lead to political change, even when they are not recognized as the will of the people. This is to take the means of dictatorship and insert the means of peace into it, and to allow the international community to mistake a minimalist conception of democracy for a fundamental one.
The evidence is clear and relentless. Authoritarian elections never open up spaces for democracy; on the contrary, they close them, whitewashing state violence with institutionalized and bureaucratic forms of violence and elections.
For instance, martial law still applies in many constituencies in Myanmar. In Cambodia’s last elections, the opposition was barred from participating, and international observers debated the validity of the vote and the number of voters. Indeed, treating the 2026 elections in Myanmar as the beginning of a process aimed at achieving peace is unfortunate and dangerous.
Looking away from suffering
Speculation around the military’s internal dynamics, or the perceived tensions surrounding their escape plans, the factional tensions, the USDP election landslide, etc., diverts attention from the lived experience.
Massive displacements, widespread poverty, destroyed education systems, imprisoned and silenced educators, children traumatized, and communities that are bombed on a regular basis; these are the conditions that are presented as background. This is not a case of analysis from above; it is a case of analysis where suffering has been pushed aside.
None of this suggests that the discussion surrounding elections, negotiations, or transitions should be silenced. An extended period of crises necessitates the development of a strategy and the deployment of tempered optimism.
However, for that optimism not to become satisfaction, it must be grounded in ethics. When, as a result of their previous proximity to military power, academics are perceived as neutral and impartial observers, they do not carry the same weight, especially given the daily violations committed by the regime.
The more profound problem involves determining epistemic power – who gets to specify which understandings and frameworks are plausible and within the realm of hope?
When these types of definitions come predominantly from the elites who are shielded from direct exposure to the consequences of violence and oppression, they become more tools of normalization and less instruments of justice.
The concern is not whether the 2026 election is a framing device for transition. The questions that matter are what future visions for Myanmar are being constructed after 2026, and who is influencing those visions?
Are these visions being constructed in refugee camps, liberated zones, and classrooms, or are they merely drafted in distant, uncompromised conference rooms?
Examining intellectual space
The Myanmar revolution has been extraordinarily costly. There is a need to reclaim the dignity, transformative power, and moral authority to articulate futures rooted in a revolutionary act by displaced scholars, emerging intellectuals, and revolutionized actors.
The untold story also lies with international academic bodies, conference sponsors, and funding agencies. They need to engage with resistance communities, find ways to support displaced scholars, and discern the so-called “expertise” of those with relatively close access to the revolutionary groups.
Indeed, academia should not be a facilitator of authoritarianism. It should not be a means of softening the truth, but an end to injustice. It should not be a way of making the language of oppression more palatable.
Instead, it ought to speak the truth to oppression. History will not remember Myanmar’s future by the degree to which power was articulated, but by the degree to which truth was defended in the most crucial moments.
Dr. Salai Vanni Bawi is a Chin anthropologist from Myanmar specializing in ethnic, traditional, and cultural studies in Southeast Asia. His research focuses on conventional masculinity and cultural identity among Myanmar’s ethnic communities, with expertise in Chin ethnography. He holds a PhD in Social Science from Chiang Mai University and has conducted extensive fieldwork in Myanmar’s mountainous regions.
DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]
