Guest contributor

Shafiur Rahman

The interim government of Bangladesh, through Foreign Affairs Adviser Md Touhid Hossain, has recently signaled a recalibration of its stance towards Myanmar’s ongoing crisis. 

This marks a departure from the policies of the previous regime, as Hossain acknowledges past mistakes, grapples with the worsening conditions in Rohingya refugee camps, and opens the door to pragmatic yet controversial engagement with the Arakan Army (AA). 

This shift, however, raises questions about Dhaka’s realpolitik, its long-term goals, and its priorities.

A history of missteps

To understand the interim government’s recalibrated stance on the Rohingya crisis, it is essential to examine how Bangladesh’s earlier policies were shaped by China’s influence as a regional mediator and power broker. 

The 2017 bilateral agreement on repatriation was a product of a broader China-led initiative, which prioritized the rapid return of the displaced population over ensuring their safety and rights. This approach reflected a strategic alignment with Beijing, driven by both geopolitical and economic considerations.

China, keen to stabilize its ally Myanmar and protect its investments in the region, positioned itself as a key mediator in the crisis. Its involvement came with a clear agenda: to reduce international scrutiny on the junta and present a facade of progress through repatriation agreements.

Bangladesh, recognizing the importance of maintaining favourable ties with China as a vital economic partner, aligned with these proposals. 

As part of this strategy, China’s ambassador to Bangladesh played an active role in crafting policies like the construction of model villages in Arakan (Rakhine) State, intended for Rohingya resettlement. 

These villages, however, were little more than superficial attempts to present a solution. They lacked genuine safety guarantees, further deepening the mistrust of the Rohingya population, many of whom had fled from atrocities perpetrated in the same region.

The previous Bangladeshi regime compounded these issues by prioritizing the optics of repatriation over the actual welfare of the Rohingya. 

Publicly, the government claimed concern for their plight, but its actions told a different story. Rohingyas were offered inducements to settle in pilot villages, including offers of payments of $2,000 USD and false promises of relocation to the U.S. 

Many were misled into believing they were on priority lists for migration, only to discover these promises were empty. This strategy, focused on a tokenistic reduction of the number of refugees in Bangladesh, ignored the concerns and fears of the displaced population.

The regime’s approach, marked by misinformation and a lack of genuine engagement with the Rohingya, demonstrated that their welfare was secondary to Bangladesh’s broader geopolitical objectives. 

While the government sought to present a proactive front to the international community, its policies failed to address the fundamental issues of security, rights, and justice for the Rohingya. 

Instead, they left the population increasingly disillusioned and vulnerable. These missteps have set the stage for the current government’s attempt to recalibrate its policies amidst worsening conditions and shifting regional dynamics.

Acknowledging past mistakes

Md Touhid Hossain has not shied away from criticizing the decisions of previous governments regarding the Rohingya crisis. Key among these was the signing of a hastily-crafted 2017 bilateral agreement with Myanmar for the repatriation of the Rohingya. 

Hossain has labeled this move shortsighted, arguing it failed to address the complexities of the situation, including the Rohingya’s distrust of Myanmar’s promises and the brutal circumstances of their expulsion.

Another significant policy failure Touhid highlighted was the suppression of legitimate Rohingya leadership within the camps. The absence of credible, supported leadership left a vacuum filled by criminal networks and extremist groups. 

This, in turn, has destabilized the camps, worsened security conditions, and diminished the Rohingya community’s ability to effectively advocate for its rights.

Dire conditions in the camps

Seven years after the mass exodus, conditions in the Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar have deteriorated dramatically. Over one million Rohingya live in overcrowded, resource-scarce conditions, while local host communities face increased economic pressures. 

Reports of growing criminality, violence, and recruitment efforts by armed groups further demonstrate the fragile state of the camps.

Adding to this complexity, over 50,000 new refugees—Rohingya and other ethnic minorities—have crossed into Bangladesh since July 2024, fleeing intensified conflict between the Myanmar military and the AA. 

This influx places additional strain on resources and exacerbates tensions in southeastern Bangladesh, making the need for a durable solution more urgent.

Engaging with the Arakan Army

Touhid has called for pragmatic engagement with the AA, recognizing its de facto control of 80 percent of Arakan State. While he acknowledges that Bangladesh cannot officially engage with the AA as a non-state actor, he advocates for informal or semi-formal relations. 

Touhid’s overtures are driven by the understanding that the AA is an inevitable player in resolving the Rohingya crisis, given its dominance in the region.

However, this strategy is complicated by the AA’s recent atrocities against Rohingyas, including killings, forced displacement, and abuse. For the Rohingya, the AA represents yet another source of violence and persecution. 

This raises questions about how Bangladesh’s alignment with the group could be reconciled with its stated commitment to ensuring the rights and safety of Rohingya upon repatriation.

Allowing recruitment for the military

Adding to this is Bangladesh’s tacit allowance of recruitment activities by military-aligned Rohingya armed groups like the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA). 

These groups, operating within the camps, recruit Rohingya youth to fight against the AA on behalf of Myanmar’s military. This strategy, seemingly at odds with Dhaka’s overtures to the AA, suggests a hedging tactic:

Bangladesh appears to be engaging both sides of the conflict, likely to maintain leverage regardless of the outcome in Arakan.

This duality reflects a realpolitik that prioritizes border security and geopolitical positioning over Rohingya welfare. It also highlights the difficult balancing act Dhaka is performing: aligning with various factions to navigate the complex dynamics of Myanmar’s revolutionary war.

One of the more contentious elements of the interim government’s strategy is the proposal for “safe zones” or “humanitarian corridors” within Myanmar. 

Suggested as a means to prevent further refugee influxes, this concept raises significant practical and ethical concerns. Safe zones would require international oversight and cooperation from the Myanmar military, a force accused of genocide and ongoing atrocities against the Rohingya. 

Moreover, the creation of such zones risks normalizing the permanent displacement of Rohingyas and undermines their right to return to their homes with full citizenship and safety. 

For the Rohingya, these zones could become another form of confinement, echoing the ghettoization they currently experience in Arakan State.

Realpolitik over Rohingya welfare

Touhid’s strategy reflects a pragmatic, geopolitically driven approach. Engaging with the AA acknowledges the shifting power dynamics in Arakan, while allowing recruitment for the junta’s allies hedges bets against a future where the military retains influence. 

This balancing act likely serves to preserve Bangladesh’s relationships with key regional players like China, which remains deeply involved in Myanmar’s internal politics, and to prepare for various future scenarios in Myanmar.

However, this realpolitik comes at the expense of Rohingya welfare. Bangladesh’s overtures to the AA and its tacit support for military-aligned groups appear disconnected from the atrocities both sides have committed against the Rohingya. 

Meanwhile, proposals like safe zones shift the focus away from addressing the structural injustices faced by the Rohingya, such as the denial of citizenship and the right to return to their ancestral homes.

Bangladesh’s interim government is walking a tightrope in its approach to the Myanmar crisis. While Touhid Hossain’s critiques of past policies and pragmatic overtures to the AA suggest a strategic recalibration, the approach is fraught with contradictions. 

The dire conditions in the camps, the tacit support for armed groups fighting on behalf of the military, and the controversial proposal for safe zones all point to a strategy rooted in realpolitik rather than a principled commitment to Rohingya welfare. 

In the end, this calculated balancing act may secure Bangladesh’s geopolitical interests but risks perpetuating the suffering and disenfranchisement of the Rohingya people.

Shafiur Rahman is a documentary filmmaker working on Rohingya issues. 

DVB publishes a diversity of opinions that does not reflect DVB editorial policy. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our stories: [email protected]