Guest contributor
James Shwe
July has been a pivotal month for Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement. On July 22, the U.S. Congress advanced three of its strongest-ever bills to isolate the junta and support democratic change.
Just two days later, the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the removal (“delisting”) of several Myanmar-linked companies and individuals from its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list—including firms long associated with the regime’s arms, logistics, and jet fuel procurement.
These events may appear contradictory, causing understandable concern and confusion. However, a closer look shows that the Congressional actions signal strengthening U.S. commitment, while the OFAC delistings reflect a technical, legal process—not a retreat in policy. Here’s what’s really happening and why it matters.
1. OFAC delistings: Legal, not political—and no Myanmar exception
As recently explained by Erich Ferrari, a leading U.S. sanctions attorney, the July 24 delistings occurred as part of OFAC’s routine review process, not just for Myanmar but also for entities in North Korea, Syria, Russia, China, Iraq, and more.
Delisting requires substantial formal evidence: verifiable changes in company ownership, structure, or concrete disengagement from the military. It is not a policy shift, but an administrative, evidence-based review.
- Heavy legal burden: Obtaining delisting takes months (typically 6–18), demands specialized lawyers and compliance experts, and requires persuasive technical evidence.
- Costly process: The companies involved must pay hundreds of thousands—or even millions—of dollars to pursue delisting. This is not an option for most; only regime-linked entities with substantial resources even attempt it.
- Administrative, not political: Every removal relies strictly on documentation and legal compliance, not a signal from Congress or a softening in U.S. support.
- Continued scrutiny: Delisted entities remain under U.S. watch and can be re-designated if prohibited activities resume.
2. Global context and advocacy opportunities
This month’s delistings included not only Myanmar companies, but also high-profile cases from North Korea and other sanctioned states. This reflects OFAC’s global, ongoing technical review process—not selective easing or political accommodation.
Importantly, the fact that the junta and its cronies are willing to spend so much on these legal and lobbying campaigns is itself a win for the resistance. Every dollar spent on high-priced consultants, lawyers, and lobbyists is money not spent on weapons, ammunition, or repression.
Further, much of the Myanmar resistance advocacy is volunteer-driven, sustained by genuine commitment. In contrast, the junta’s campaigns are managed by expensive mercenaries—some of whom may provide “smoke and mirrors” results, exaggerating their effectiveness just to keep getting paid.
3. Congressional support and diaspora advocacy
U.S. Congressional commitment to Myanmar has not wavered. The passage of three bipartisan bills targeting military finances and supporting atrocity survivors is evidence that policymakers—thanks also to direct advocacy and concern voiced by the Myanmar diaspora in the U.S.—remain deeply engaged and vigilant.
The diaspora has stressed to Congress the risks posed by delisting major junta-linked entities, urging strict oversight and continued enforcement.
4. What the delistings really signal
- Sanctions pressure works: The very existence of these costly legal campaigns is proof that targeted sanctions are biting; otherwise, the junta and its business cronies wouldn’t bother.
- Not a policy softening: Neither U.S. Congress’ intent nor broader Burma policy has changed; legal and administrative reviews do not equal moral or diplomatic endorsement.
- Global and routine: Myanmar’s case is one among many; similar reviews and removals happen for sanctioned entities globally wherever technical compliance is proven.
5. Strategic guidance for the resistance
- Step up advocacy: The more we advocate and document, the more resources the junta must waste on fruitless or only technically successful petitions.
- Expose the mercenary network: Identifying and publicizing the foreign lawyers, lobbyists, and consultants cashing in on the junta’s desperation can limit their influence and raise public awareness.
- Sustain volunteer momentum: Our people-powered movement costs little but yields real international impact. Persistence narrows the regime’s options.
Bottom Line
OFAC’s July 2025 delistings are neither a weakening of U.S. policy nor a reward for good behavior. They are costly, technical legal outcomes happening in many sanctioned countries.
With continued advocacy, tougher legislation, and smart public communication, the resistance can keep the regime on the defensive and ensure that every penny the junta spends on lobbying is one less for repression.
James Shwe is a Myanmar democracy activist in the U.S. and is a member of the advocacy groups Free Myanmar and the Los Angeles Myanmar Movement. He has been trying to organize and motivate the Myanmar diaspora to advocate for democracy in Myanmar.
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