HomeOpinionWhat relief should cost, and what we can do (Part 2)

What relief should cost, and what we can do (Part 2)

Guest contributor

James Shwe

The international mood toward Myanmar’s regime is shifting. In October, the United States held direct talks with the generals and removed sanctions on the daughter of a military-linked businessman, saying the listing “no longer effectively supports US policy objectives.” 

Thailand’s foreign minister is visiting Naypyidaw on November 12, days before the ASEAN summit in Manila, and Bangkok is pressing to normalize ties. 

Many in Myanmar are asking whether the world is about to forgive the generals.

The answer depends on what we watch. Talking is not lifting. Min Aung Hlaing himself remains under U.S. sanctions, as do the core measures on the state banks, jet fuel and MOGE’s financial services. 

The real question is what relief, if any, is being traded for, and whether it buys anything that changes life for the people of Myanmar.

The new U.S. Embassy strategy for Myanmar, approved on August 31 and published in October, shows where Washington’s attention has moved. 

It is a planning document for American diplomats, not a law or an agreement. Its goals are fighting scam centers and drugs, expanding U.S. trade, supporting a negotiated peace and increasing U.S. influence. 

It proposes forums on fiscal federalism and territorial boundaries, and says they “will create opportunities to access Burma’s bountiful rare earth resources.” 

It does not mention sanctions or democracy, although its 2022 predecessor’s main goal was to “restore Burma’s path to inclusive democracy.”

That is a real change in emphasis, but it is not a repeal. The 2022 BURMA Act sets a high bar for lifting its sanctions as a whole: the release of political prisoners, the restoration of an elected government or free and fair elections, the dropping of charges against the 2020 election winners, and civilian oversight of the military.

The House has passed a bill to extend that law to 2032. And parts of the strategy work in the democratic movement’s favor. 

Federalism is a long-standing demand of the ethnic and democratic forces, and U.S. officials acknowledge that the rare-earth deposits lie mainly in areas held by ethnic armed groups. 

Any serious resource arrangement must therefore go through a federal settlement, not through Naypyidaw alone.

Then there is ASEAN. Since 2021, the regional bloc has barred the junta’s leaders from its summits, and it stripped Myanmar of the 2026 chairmanship. 

The ban was held even after Min Aung Hlaing took the title of president: at the May summit in Cebu, Myanmar was represented only by a senior civil servant. 

Some dismiss this as symbolic. I disagree. It costs the regime no money, but it is the region’s main barrier against the gradual acceptance of military rule as normal. 

Analysts call it “one of the few collective sources of ASEAN leverage” and warn that once the regime gains regional legitimacy without conditions, ASEAN “will have far fewer tools”. 

The regime’s own effort shows how much it values the seat: Min Aung Hlaing has visited five ASEAN countries in recent months.

What should relief cost? I propose a simple ladder. Gestures, such as moving a prisoner to house arrest, an amnesty followed by new arrests, or the release of a single foreign detainee, should earn a conversation, not relief. 

Verified steps, such as a monitored end to air strikes on civilians, unhindered humanitarian access across the country and a falling number of political prisoners, could earn narrow, time-limited relief that can be reversed. 

The measures that finance the war, on jet fuel, the state banks, MOGE and the military conglomerates, should stay until the armed forces and their businesses are under civilian control. 

Two things should never be bargaining chips: humanitarian licenses, and the correction of individual listings that no longer meet the legal test. Those should be decided on their merits. 

Cooperation on scam centers, deportations, trade or minerals can go ahead, but none of it shows that the generals have changed. 

A staged raid on a scam compound, a mineral contract or a new title for the commander-in-chief does not stop a single bomb.

None of this is decided only in foreign capitals. Sanctions are only as strong as the evidence, enforcement and political will behind them, and Myanmar people can add to all three.

The first contribution is evidence. Most effective designations began with leaked documents, shipping records and investigations. 

When jet-fuel suppliers renamed themselves to escape listings, governments had to be shown the new names before they could act. 

Civil servants who joined the civil disobedience movement, and sympathizers still working in banks, customs, ports and airports, know things foreign investigators cannot. 

Safe channels for sharing such information, with protection for those who share it, are among the most valuable things the movement can build.

The second is fairness. The regime’s strongest argument is that sanctions hurt ordinary people. 

The movement can take that argument away by documenting real side effects, such as blocked remittances, refused aid payments and the crackdown on hundi, and pressing for fixes. 

Bringing government evidence both for new listings and of harm that needs repair makes us more credible on both.

The third is a common price for relief. The National Unity Government, the ethnic organizations and civil society should publish a single set of conditions for easing sanctions and present it to every sanctioning government and to ASEAN. 

If we do not say what counts as progress, others will decide for us, and they may count a mineral contract or a deportation flight as progress. 

A common position also guards against the regime’s oldest tactic of dividing its opponents with separate deals.

The fourth is to turn control of territory into leverage. If Washington holds forums on federalism and boundaries, the democratic and ethnic forces should be in the room with positions prepared in advance, and should insist that no resource deal be routed through Naypyidaw alone, that any mineral trade come with published terms and audits, and that no forum be treated as a peace process while airstrikes continue. 

Local administrations can show that resources can be managed transparently, with community consent and fair revenue-sharing, and without feeding the war. 

Control on the land does not settle questions of ownership or future federal revenue, so any arrangement must be built with the communities who live on the land.

The fifth belongs to the diaspora. People of Myanmar origin in the U.S., Canada, Europe, Australia, Japan and across Asia are constituents of the governments that made the current sanctions. 

They can support the BRAVE Burma Act, which would extend US sanctions law to 2032 and require yearly decisions on Myanma Economic Bank and jet-fuel suppliers. 

They can ask Canada to extend its sanctions to the oil and gas sector, including MOGE, as 92 organizations did in October. And they can ask Thailand, quietly and persistently, to hold gas payments in a protected account.

Finally, the movement’s own conduct matters. Sanctions rest on a moral argument: that the military commits grave abuses and should not be financed. 

That argument is strongest when the resistance respects the laws of war, protects civilians and governs fairly. 

Every reported abuse by resistance forces weakens the case abroad. Every reopened school and every fair local court strengthens it.

The democratic movement does not need to denounce engagement. It needs to define success. 

ASEAN should hold its line in Manila and into Singapore’s chairmanship in 2027, and every capital that talks to Naypyidaw should be asked one question: what has the regime done, not said, to earn it? 

Sanctions will not free Myanmar; only its people can do that. But sanctions can make the war more expensive, keep the generals from buying their way back into respectability, and give the democratic movement leverage when the moment for negotiation comes. 

That leverage is worth protecting, and the people of Myanmar have more power to protect it than they may think.


James H. Shwe is a Myanmar American advocate for democracy in Myanmar and an independent policy analyst based in California. 

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