Guest contributor
Shafiur Rahman
At the end of July, I exchanged some messages with Aung Kyaw Moe, the Deputy Minister for Human Rights of Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), the shadow administration formed by elected politicians and others opposing the military coup.
At the end of our WhatsApp conversation, he cryptically told me that there would be news coming soon. I asked him, “good or bad?” He replied, “both.”
The very next day, he resigned from his post. He was the only Rohingya representative at the ministerial level. In his resignation post, he declared that he can serve the Rohingya better outside the NUG.
That is quite a verdict from the person appointed to prove that Rohingya could have a meaningful place inside the country’s democratic opposition.
As of August 17, I can find no public NUG statement acknowledging Aung Kyaw Moe’s resignation, accepting it, thanking him, naming an interim successor, or anything whatsoever reaffirming its approach to Rohingya representation.
That is significant. His appointment was widely cited as evidence that the NUG had learned from the failures of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), the civilian government ousted in the 2021 coup, and was genuinely committed to building a more inclusive Myanmar.
Without doubt, the NUG benefited from Aung Kyaw Moe’s presence. It allowed the NUG to point to a Rohingya deputy minister in meetings with Western officials/donors and human-rights organisations.
It could be said that the NUG had moved beyond the chauvinism and denial that helped make the Rohingya so vulnerable under previous governments.
Now, suddenly, Aung Kyaw Moe’s departure forces an uncomfortable question for them. Was he brought in to reshape policy, or to make the NUG look better while policy remained effectively unchanged?
I asked prominent Rohingya figures, advocates, Western ambassadors, academics and others about this conundrum. Several decided not to respond or declined.
Razia Sultana, the Bangladesh-based Rohingya human-rights activist, sees the resignation as an implicit admission of failure. “When he explains his exit like this,” she says, “he is indirectly saying that the NUG failed to bring any real political progress for the Rohingya.”
Her point is that it is difficult to escape. During Aung Kyaw Moe’s time in office, there was no new development on this front. No new citizenship framework, no legal recognition of Rohingya identity, no meaningful transfer of political power to Rohingya representatives, and no clear public plan to secure any of these things.
Sultana’s criticism goes further still. She argues that the position brought Aung Kyaw Moe international standing, at a personal level, but “did not bring any real win for his people.”
He largely followed the NUG’s line while distinct Rohingya demands were “hidden or ignored.” In her view, an appointment that did not rest on clear, public commitments on citizenship, rights and inclusive governance risked serving the office-holder more than the community.
Sultana also alleges that Aung Kyaw Moe’s approach did not widen Rohingya representation. Her charge is that he retained an “old, patriarchal mindset”, and even sidelined prominent women advocates rather than helping to build inclusive leadership.
That is her assessment, not an established finding. However, for NUG watchers, it raises a question about whether one appointed male representative could ever stand in for the diversity of Rohingya political voices.
Dr. Ambia Parveen, one of the few Aung Kyaw Moe supporters willing to respond, offered a more measured reading. She is reluctant to view the resignation as an admission of failure.
Instead, she feels that it reveals both “the importance and the limitations of working within a political structure where power and priorities are still contested.”
The bottom line for Parveen is that his appointment was historically significant. And it helped move the Rohingya question beyond humanitarian concern and towards citizenship, equality and political belonging.
But she is equally clear that “representation alone is not enough.”
In June 2021, the NUG promised to repeal, amend or replace the notorious 1982 Citizenship Law. It said a future citizenship framework should rest on birth in Myanmar or descent from Myanmar citizens.
It was music to the ears of the Rohingya, but five years later, those grand words remain words.
There is still no draft citizenship law and no binding order recognising Rohingya by name.
A retired former ambassador, who spoke on condition of anonymity, argues that the NUG probably believed it had done enough with that policy statement.
But he adds that “since then neither the NUG nor Aung Kyaw Moe has made any serious attempt to reinforce this position.”
Professor John Packer, an expert on minority rights and international law, says the deeper failure was not simply a lack of follow-through on citizenship.
The NUG, he argues, should have accepted the responsibility of the Myanmar state for violations of the Genocide Convention and committed itself to preventing repetition and negotiating reparations, including development programmes.
Such a position would have required recognition of nationality, but it would also have put the NUG in a stronger position internationally, including at the International Court of Justice.
Packer says several NUG members “simply don’t ‘get’ the Rohingya issue.” In his view, they still treat it as a compartmentalised human-rights concern rather than a question that goes to the character of the state.
He believes some NUG figures share views and sentiments expressed by Aung San Suu Kyi, which he describes as “simply racist.”
This matters because the NUG kicked the hardest legal questions down the road to an undefined constitutional process. It offered sympathy and vague promises of reform.
But it stopped short of admitting that the state it claims to represent must own up to the atrocities against the Rohingya. That is the fundamental dividing line – it reduces the Rohingya to a humanitarian crisis to be managed, rather than recognising them as full citizens entitled to justice, restitution, and an equal stake in the country’s political future.
The result was a familiar kind of politics – loud talk about inclusion yet little evidence of institutional change.
Giving Aung Kyaw Moe a ministerial title was technically historic – the first Rohingya in such a post since 1962, even if it’s just a shadow government.
Historic though it was, the appointment came to look dangerously close to textbook tokenism – a single Rohingya ministerial figure used to demonstrate inclusion while power remained elsewhere.
The NUG placed him in the human-rights ministry rather than embedded across the decisions that shape citizenship, constitutional reform, federalism, security and diplomacy.
“This symbolic seat protected the NUG from serious international criticism,” says Sultana. “They used representation as a shield, while keeping everything the same.”
Maung Zarni, the Rohingya advocate and academic, puts it even more bluntly. He describes the appointment as “an act of tokenism designed to signal to their Western supporters that NUG would be less racist and more inclusive than NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi.”
In his view, the NUG’s leaders used the appointment as “communicative manipulation”: the right optics, with no corresponding change of heart or political vision.
The Rohingya did not ask merely for sympathy. They asked to be recognised as political actors with the rights and authority to help shape Myanmar’s future.
As Sultana points out, the NUG kept Rohingya political power “at the margins, not in the centre of building the new state.” Human-rights rhetoric offers sympathy; true equality requires power.
Aung Kyaw Moe cannot be excused from scrutiny either.
He often avoided direct questions about controversial developments. In my discussions with him, he would remind me that he was not there to conduct politics on social media.
He claimed he was playing the long game. Fair enough. No serious official should have to chase clout or tweet through every crisis. But that excuse falls flat when the promised long-term work cannot be seen or measured.
Dressing up silence as strategy was never going to be convincing. When people asked where he stood on various matters or the NUG’s repeated evasions, they were often offered little beyond reassurance that work was happening behind the scenes.
Sure, his hands were probably tied. Any Rohingya official going up against deep-seated Bamar chauvinism is going to hit a wall.
But playing it safe crosses the line into outright complicity when you never have the ability to speak out publicly.
The bitter truth is that he wasn’t just muzzled by the machine, but also too willing to play by its rules rather than risk his place at the table.
It would be harsh to treat Aung Kyaw Moe’s decision to enter the NUG as a personal mistake. Zarni argues that Rohingya survivors were right to give the mainstream opposition “the benefit of the doubt” and try to work from within.
The greatest failure was the NUG’s. It did not turn that opening into a durable representation. And, as the retired former ambassador notes, the modest gains were “very little, but not really his fault.”
Now the NUG must show whether it understood the point of appointing him at all. Surely, a public statement about his departure would be a basic start?
More importantly, it should publish a clear route to rights – a new citizenship law based on equality, explicit recognition of the Rohingya, meaningful representation in constitutional and federal negotiations, and a principled response to attacks on Rohingya civilians in Rakhine State, regardless of the perpetrator – the Myanmar military or the Arakan Army.
By refusing to turn its words into rights, accountability and shared power, the NUG has made itself morally hollow and politically inadequate.
It has become another Myanmar leadership asking the Rohingya to wait for equality, while denying them a real place in the country’s future.
Shafiur Rahman is a journalist and documentary filmmaker focusing on the politics of refugee management in South and Southeast Asia. He writes the Rohingya Refugee News newsletter.
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