Guest contributor
Shalini Perumal
Earlier this week, New Delhi’s Hyderabad House served as the venue for a state visit that solidified a major shift in India’s regional diplomacy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi formally received Myanmar’s former Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, granting full state honours to the leader of an illegal military government manufactured following the 2021 coup.
For Min Aung Hlaing, who led the coup that overthrew Myanmar’s democratically elected government, the five-day visit provided an important platform for international normalization. For the ruling Indian Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the summit represents an uncompromising execution of a transactional foreign policy—one that prioritises immediate, centralized arrangements over human rights and regional accountability.
By extending formal diplomatic protocols to a military leader facing extensive domestic resistance and international condemnation, the Modi administration has effectively shifted from cautious engagement to active validation of the junta.
This high-profile reception highlights a persistent contradiction in New Delhi’s external governance. While the BJP leadership frequently emphasises the importance of a rules-based order on global platforms, its policies in the immediate neighbourhood reveal a consistent willingness to engage authoritarian regimes, validate controversial electoral processes, disregard humanitarian rights violations, and overlook domestic conflicts to secure economic and border agreements.
The timing of Min Aung Hlaing’s five-day state visit to India was directly tied to recent institutional changes inside Myanmar. His arrival in New Delhi shortly after being sworn in as president in April, a position assumed following a multi-phase parliamentary election conducted from December 2025 into January.
Independent observers and regional civil society groups have widely dismissed these elections as an administrative sham mechanism designed to formalize and perpetuate the military’s grip on state power.
The electoral process was boycotted by major opposition parties, most notably the National League for Democracy (NLD), whose leadership—including Aung San Suu Kyi—remains in detention.
The polls were heavily dominated by the military’s political proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Furthermore, voting was canceled entirely across large portions of the country currently impacted by active conflict or governed by ethnic armed resistance groups.
By treating Min Aung Hlaing with the formal protocols of a legitimate head of state, the Modi administration has drawn sharp criticism for undercutting international efforts to isolate the junta.
Mercy Chriesty Barends, chairperson of the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), issued a direct challenge to New Delhi’s position:
“Min Aung Hlaing is not Myanmar’s legitimate president. He is the architect of a brutal coup that overthrew a democratically elected government, and has since presided over a campaign of mass atrocities against his own people.”
The diplomatic sensitivity surrounding the summit was visible in how the event was managed logistically. Departing from standard protocol for high-level state visits, Modi and Min Aung Hlaing did not address the media or hold a joint press conference at Hyderabad House. Instead, both sides retreated behind a pre-drafted joint statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs.
This media blackout suggests that while the BJP administration is intent on pursuing functional ties with the junta, it seeks to avoid the public scrutiny and awkward press questioning that would accompany an open media forum. By shielding the interaction from independent journalists, the government minimised immediate accountability regarding its relationship with a regime responsible for systemic domestic violence.
Faced with criticism from international observers and human rights organizations, the Modi government has consistently used its diplomatic corps to frame the engagement as a geographical necessity.
Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri defended the decision to re-engage with the newly configured administration in Naypyidaw, stating that India’s policy is “not intended to be a commentary on the internal political arrangements” of its neighbor. Misri further defended the strategy by stating:
“We have always proceeded on the principle that sustained dialogue is what is important. History has shown that disengagement doesn’t give us any results that are better than engagement.”
This rationale forms the core of the BJP’s neighborhood policy, yet critics argue it operates as a convenient shield against ethical responsibility.
Classifying a major civil war, the displacement of millions of people, and the systematic suppression of a civilian population as mere “internal political arrangements” minimizes a complex humanitarian crisis into a routine administrative matter.
The administration’s assertion that continuous engagement yields superior outcomes overlooks the destabilising impact of providing the junta with diplomatic legitimacy.
By maintaining high-level security dialogues—such as the recent meeting between Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Myanmar’s security officials—New Delhi treats the military as the sole authoritative entity in Myanmar. This approach ignores the reality that the junta is a primary driver of the instability along India’s eastern border.
This policy of pragmatic accommodation has defined the BJP’s response since the inception of the crisis. In March 2021, just one month after the military takeover and amidst a violent crackdown on urban protesters, Indian defense officials attended the annual Armed Forces Day parade in Naypyidaw.
The formal state visit confirms that the Modi government views the survival of the military apparatus as its primary point of contact, regardless of the costs borne by the people of Myanmar.
The centralised foreign policy pursued by the BJP in New Delhi stands in sharp contrast to the social and political realities observed along India’s northeastern frontier.
While the central leadership was hosting Min Aung Hlaing, a completely different interaction occurred in the border state of Mizoram, exposing a significant disconnect between the union government and local administrations.
In May, the Mizoram capital of Aizawl hosted an enthusiastic public reception for Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) Flyweight Champion Joshua Van, a prominent sports figure belonging to Myanmar’s Chin ethnic minority.
Van was formally hosted for high tea by Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhoma. Addressing a large public gathering, Chief Minister Lalduhoma bypassed the clinical language utilised by New Delhi’s foreign policy establishment, explicitly stating that the Mizos, Chins, and Kukis share deep ancestral ties and constitute “one ethnic family.”
This parallel event illustrates a clear divergence in priorities. In New Delhi, the central government accommodates and dines with Min Aung Hlaing, whose military command has consistently utilised heavy artillery and airstrikes against civilian areas in Chin State and Sagaing Region, forcing waves of refugees across the international boundary.
In Aizawl, local communities, civil society organisations, and state officials have actively sheltered and provided humanitarian assistance to tens of thousands of Chin refugees fleeing the operations of the junta.
By prioritising its relationship with the military elite in Naypyidaw, the BJP central government risks alienating local populations across the northeast.
The central policy effectively treats states like Mizoram, Nagaland, and Manipur as passive security corridors rather than recognising the cross-border ethnic networks that shape local stability.
This centralised approach risks creating internal political friction, as the union government demands strict compliance with a foreign policy that actively undermines the humanitarian positions taken by frontier leadership.
The joint statement released following the Hyderabad House summit focused extensively on technical, economic, and security cooperation.
The two leaders pledged to expand collaboration across trade, defense, technology, energy, and critical minerals, alongside accelerating connectivity projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport project.
Bilateral trade between the two nations was reported at $1.95 billion USD for the 2025–2026 fiscal year.
Emphasizing trade balances and infrastructure timelines amidst an ongoing civil war reflects the highly transactional nature of the BJP’s foreign policy framework.
Critics argue that under the current administration, regional diplomacy has been stripped of normative values, replacing long-term stability with immediate resource access.
The administration’s focus on securing rare-earth minerals and critical resources indicates that economic security has overtaken geopolitical foresight.
The joint statement also highlighted agreements regarding border management and non-traditional security threats, specifically targeting cybercrime and human trafficking operations that have proliferated in the region’s ungoverned spaces.
Indian Foreign Secretary Misri noted that bilateral coordination had facilitated the rescue of more than 2,400 Indian nationals from regional scam centers over the past 18 months.
While the repatriation of trafficking victims is an essential consular function, utilising these operations to justify high-level diplomatic engagement with an autocratic leader is highly problematic.
The proliferation of transnational scam networks is a direct consequence of the breakdown of law and order triggered by the 2021 coup.
Relying on the junta to police these zones ignores the fact that the military’s loss of territorial control created the governance vacuum where these criminal syndicates operate.
The Modi government’s exclusive focus on Min Aung Hlaing’s military junta reflects a broader institutional reluctance to engage with diverse political movements.
Prior to Min Aung Hlaing’s arrival in India, Zin Mar Aung, the Foreign Minister of the National Unity Government (NUG)—the shadow administration composed of ousted democratic lawmakers—sent a formal letter to India’s External Affairs Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.
The correspondence urged the Indian government to reconsider its approach:
“Since the military coup of 2021, which overturned the democratic will of the people, Myanmar has endured prolonged conflict, instability, and immense humanitarian suffering… We therefore urge the Government of India to weigh carefully the broader implications of formal engagement that may normalise or legitimise military rule in Myanmar.”
The central government’s choice to ignore this appeal aligns with a broader pattern within the BJP’s foreign policy: a preference for dealing with centralised, military executives rather than engaging with pluralistic, grassroots democratic coalitions.
This focus on the military ignores the shifting territorial realities inside Myanmar. The military junta no longer functions as a centralised state authority capable of enforcing countrywide stability.
The People’s Defence Forces (PDF) and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) have systematically dismantled the junta’s administrative presence across rural areas and captured critical international border crossings.
By formalising its partnership with Min Aung Hlaing, the BJP is aligning India’s long-term interests with an unstable and widely resisted military faction, potentially alienating the political forces that will govern Myanmar in the post-conflict era.
The formal reception of Min Aung Hlaing indicates a calculated choice by the Modi administration to prioritise immediate transactional interests over long-term regional stability and democratic solidarity.
By granting full state honours to the junta leader, the BJP government has signaled that political survival and resource access are the primary metrics governing its neighborhood policy.
This diplomatic approach provides short-term containment along the border but fails to address the underlying drivers of the regional crisis.
True security for India’s northeastern frontier cannot be sustained through pacts with a military administration that relies on continuous internal warfare to remain in power.
By normalising Min Aung Hlaing’s executive claims, New Delhi has associated its foreign policy with a highly repressive regime, creating deep-seated resentment among the majority of the people of Myanmar and establishing a precedent of strategic compliance with authoritarian rule, while claiming to be the world’s largest democracy.
Shalini Perumal is a creative international development professional who has worked previously in Mae Sot, Thailand at Mae Tao Clinic, consulted for Finnish Refugee Council Myanmar, and served as a Writer/Researcher at Insight Myanmar Podcast. She is currently a freelance journalist working on a novel.
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